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ABSTRACT
Sustainable Monetary Policy
Lessons and Evidence from the Bank Suspension Period 1797-1821
Elisa Maria Susanna Newby
This thesis re-examines the suspension of the gold standard rule in Britain
between 1797 and 1821 within the framework of the theory of credible and time
consistent monetary policy. By combining both historical and theoretical analysis
the thesis challenges the prevailing theory in which the gold standard is considered
as a contingent rule and the suspension as an exogenously credible regime.
Firstly, the thesis analyses what made the suspension credible in the absence of
the gold standard rule. It is proposed that the suspension was a credible regime,
because the resumption of the gold standard at the old par value in the future
was a sustainable plan. It is shown that monetary policy during the bad state 
such as war can still be time consistent in the absence of the formal commitment
rule, if the policy makers plan is to resume the original commitment rule when the
economy returns to the good state. The equilibrium is based on trigger strategies
iii
where private agents retaliate if a policy maker deviates from its policy plan to
resume the gold standard rule.
Secondly, the thesis aims to establish why the gold standard rule was suspended
for twenty-four years. Both historical analysis and a dynamic general equilibrium
model demonstrate that the gold standard was a shock amplier when the shocks
became persistent in the 1790s, and suspension was used to restore monetary
stability during the French Wars. As the suspension of cash payments was a
credible regime, it maintained the value and circulation of paper currency that in
turn stabilised production and consumption. Suspension increased the degree of
exibility in the economic policy as the monetary authority had an opportunity to
stimulate the economy by issuing at money during the war, on the understanding
that the at money so issued would be withdrawn from circulation before the gold
standard resumed.
Finally, it is explained why the gold standard was resumed after the relatively
successful Suspension Period. The gold standard was seen as a solution to the
problem that arose from the Bank of Englands ambiguous role as a public and
private institution. Rules were considered to be better than discretion, and the
gold convertibility was a transparent principle, which maximised the long-run wel-
fare of the society. The thesis demonstrates how already in the eighteenth century
commitment to the gold standard rule had increased the e¢ ciency of capital mar-
kets and enabled Britain to nance its eighteenth-century wars by using decit
nance. Maintaining these abilities through the gold standard was desirable.
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Introduction
An insignicant event in military history, a badly prepared landing of a handful
of French soldiers at Fishguard in Wales on 22 February 1797, was an event which
precipitated one of the most fundamental developments in monetary history: the
worlds rst successful paper money standard. When the news of this strife reached
London on Saturday 25 February, the King, Prime Minister Pitt and the Privy
Council of the Bank of England held an emergency meeting. Anticipating a panic
and a bank run to break out on the following Monday, they decided to keep the
Banks doors closed to the public in order to prevent the bearers of the Bank of
Englands notes from converting them to gold and, consequently, emptying the
Banks gold reserves.
Under normal circumstances the reserves of the Bank of England would have
been su¢ cient to meet a sudden demand for gold, but in 1797, occasioned by
sightings of French eets o¤ the coast, people were preparing for invasion. The
apprehension of an invasion of this country seems to have taken possession of mens
minds so strongly that even in every company it becomes a subject of conversa-
tionThe Times had reported already on 13 September 1796. By withdrawing
guineas from their local banks the public attempted to make available assets as
1
2liquid as possible. The Newcastle banks were rst to run out of reserves after local
farmers, on 18 February 1797, had sold their cattle cheaply and had gone, almost
in one body, to their local banks to cash the notes they had received. The farmers
actions alarmed other customers, and two days later the Newcastle banks decided
collectively to stop gold payments. Bank runs and subsequent suspensions of cash
payments followed in the nearby towns of Sunderland and Durham,1 while bankers
from all corners of the country ocked into the Bank of England to request more
gold. The public suddenly preferred the Bank of England notes to other types of
paper currency, because they were convertible to gold on demand, meanwhile en-
trepreneurs in the City of London, the usual possessors of the Bank notes, su¤ered
a serious shortage of the medium of payment. The decision to close the Banks
doors until the sense of the Parliament can be taken on that subject,2 was there-
fore justied both by the necessity to protect the Banks reserves and to secure
the circulation of the Bank notes.3
So began the Bank Restriction Period or the Suspension Period as it came
to be known and it lasted much longer than the Bank or the government had
anticipated. As the war dragged on the French Revolutionary Wars turned into
the Napoleonic Wars it became clear that resumption of the gold standard would
not be possible until the hostilities had ceased. On 1 May 1821, almost six years
1Fetter (1965) p. 21.
2The Times 28 February 1797.
3The strain of events has been recorded by several economic historians, for example Fetter (1965)
and Feavearyear (1963).
3after the Battle of Waterloo, which had nally brought the war to an end, the gold
standard was resumed. The resumption, however, turned out to be something of
an anticlimax as nobody seemed to pay any attention to the fact that paper notes
could again be converted to gold. The publics willingness to accept paper money
was remarkable given that the country had been on a de facto gold standard since
1717 and on a silver standard since medieval times. Until 1797 for practical men
money had been something that could be either converted into some commodity
or had intrinsic value itself and at money had remained outside the scope of their
understanding.
The institution at the heart of this new monetary system, the suspension of
cash payments, was the Bank of England a central bank without the powers of
the central bank. According to Fetter (1965) the Bank of England was not estab-
lished in 1694 to perform central banking functions any more than the goldsmiths.4
The Bank was a private monied company that issued shares, paid dividends and
made prots. Its role as a trusted organ of the London merchants and an agency
of government nance was ambiguous. The Bank provided ready cash for mer-
chants by granting them loans and discounting, buying their bills of exchange, and
supported the government by buying its short-term paper, sometimes by direct
demand of the Treasury. Its owners consisted of London merchants, but it was the
Parliament that periodically conrmed its existence by passing the Banks Char-
ter. Yet, from its establishment in 1694 until 1797, the Bank had continuously
4Fetter (1965) p. 23.
4followed the gold standard rule by maintaining the value of the currency in terms
of a xed weight of gold, and to a lesser extent silver, by buying and selling these
metals at a xed price on demand. But now, during the suspension of cash pay-
ments, even this straightforward operation of the Bank was redundant. And this
is where the potential problems existed since the Bank, according to one observer,
might become a paper-mint.5 Without having to worry whether its notes were
su¢ ciently backed by gold, the Bank could generate income for its owners through
discounting business or it could transfer seigniorage revenue to the government.
How did the Bank use that freedom? Contemporaries were certainly not im-
pressed, and argued that the increased money supply during the Suspension Period
had an adverse e¤ect on the price level. For centuries prices had moved according
to harvests, and the public found steadily climbing prices confusing. In particular,
the commercial boom of 1808-1810 resulted in fast credit expansion and led to
disparity between British and overseas prices, a high premium on gold and a sharp
depreciation of the exchange rate. These currency problems sparked a furious con-
ict of opinions over the conduct of monetary policy called the Bullion Debates.
The blaming nger of the bullionists, whose leading gure was David Ricardo,
pointed at the Bank of England. They considered the inconvertible pound to be
something unnatural, evil and a reason for all existing monetary problems.
These rather heavy accusations of contemporaries have, to a certain extent, car-
ried over into many modern day accounts of the Suspension Period. As a result, the
5Tatham (1816).
5Banks responsibility for creating the currency problems has been emphasised in
the various works available. What seems sometimes to have been forgotten is that
between 1797 and 1821 the Bank had to conduct monetary policy during di¢ cult
times when the war, high government expenditure, trade blockades and bad har-
vests made the formulation of monetary policy a di¢ cult task. By contrast, French
economic historian Peter Vilar (1976) describes the way the monetary problems
during the French Wars were overcome as undramatic.6 Given that only the First
and Second World Wars o¤er parallels in history to the French Wars, economic
conditions remained relatively stable during the war; for example, Bank of Eng-
lands notes were accepted as payment throughout the Suspension Period and the
British government was able to borrow at home and abroad. Furthermore, long
and short-term interest rates peaked only in 1797 and remained below six percent
indicating that markets trusted the current monetary system. Finally, the market
price of gold fell back to par two years before Parliaments planned resumption
date of 1 May 1823, which enabled Parliament to resume the gold payments two
years ahead of the schedule.
The suspension of cash payments was seen as credible markets expected the
government and the Bank to resume the gold standard in the future. In the exist-
ing literature, credibility has been explained by political and institutional devel-
opments: Britain had the most democratic parliament in the contemporary world,
the Financial Revolution at the end of the seventeenth century had created an
6Vilar (1976) p. 309.
6e¢ cient system of public nance, and the country had the worlds most developed
private capital markets with a centralised exchange system. Furthermore, society
was free, with relative freedom of press and speech that enabled the public to crit-
icise and monitor the authorities. These factors, the argument continues, forced
the government and the Bank not only to consider short-term prot opportunities,
but long-term benets to the whole country. The Directors of the Bank under-
stood that the formidable weapon of unrestricted money creation7 had not been
placed in their hands at the beginning of the Suspension Period. The Bank did
not use inationary monetary policy extensively and the war was primarily funded
by scal innovations, such as income tax and long-term borrowing, which meant
that monetary policy did not become too accommodating.
These institutional and political explanations are acknowledged in this study,
but its main contribution will arise from the type of research that has not hitherto
been conducted. In this thesis I will analyse the suspension of cash payments from
the perspective of modern macroeconomic theory, in the framework of credible
and time consistent policy. Kydland and Presscotts (1977) original contribution
precipitated a vast literature that has not yet been applied in a commodity stan-
dard setting. My theoretical models of the suspension highlight explicitly how the
absence of the gold convertibility rule revealed a time inconsistency problem in the
conduct of monetary policy when the basis of trust in the economy changed. The
gold standard had operated as a domestic monetary policy rule both by limiting
7Andréadès (1909) p. 191.
7the monetary authoritys ability to issue currency, and making the value of cur-
rency determined by direct convertibility to gold. During the Suspension Period
the monetary base was exible in theory the money growth rate could have be-
come innite and the value of paper currency was determined by the credibility
of the governments promise to convert notes to gold at some future unknown date.
In this work I will consider what made the Suspension Period credible even in
the presence of the obvious time inconsistency problem, but also why was the gold
standard resumed even though suspension of the gold standard rule had proved
to be a relatively successful regime, at least during the war. As the Suspension
Period lasted for twenty-four years, the government and the public had time to
interact and therefore, my theoretical models emphasise the paramount role of
the publics expectations and governments reputation in making the suspension
credible. Ultimately, I consider the suspension of cash payments as an example of
a sustainable monetary policy plan. According to Chari and Kehoe (1990) a policy
plan is sustainable if the policy maker follows it even in the presence of an obvious
time inconsistency problem. The plan during the Suspension Period was to return
to the gold standard at the old par value at some future unknown date.
Sustainability of monetary policy was not a trivial matter. During the French
Wars investors bought British national debt on the understanding that debt would
be paid o¤ by currency convertible to gold, and failure to return to the gold stan-
dard would have been considered as a default which would have ruined the whole
monetary system. In particular, paper currency would not have been accepted as
8a medium of exchange since it would not have had any value and demonetisation
would have caused the credit system to collapse. The gold standard had facilitated
public borrowing which had proved to be a useful tool in war nance earlier in the
eighteenth century. Maintaining the access to domestic and foreign credit markets
was considered important. On a practical level, the government of the day was
aware of the destiny of the French assignats, a paper money experiment which
had led to hyperination as a result of overissue in 1795 and severely damaged
the credibility of the French economic system. As France had lost its reputation
in the eyes of domestic and foreign creditors, Napoleon was dependent on heavy
wartime taxation. If anything, the successful resumption of the gold standard in
1821 strengthened Britains position as a world power. The global nancial net-
work centred on London in the nineteenth century and Britain was able to maintain
leadership of the rapidly industrialising world.
Both the analytical models and historical evidence presented in this thesis will
try to establish that the suspension of cash payments was a monetary regime which
increased the degree of exibility in economic policy, but again, this was conditional
on the credibility of future resumption. The Bank of England had an opportunity
to issue some at money during the war in order to stabilise economic activity
and to assist government in war nance on the understanding that money had to
be withdrawn from circulation before the gold standard could have been resumed.
Despite this obvious opportunity to print paper money, it was taxation and debt
9nance, not seigniorage, that were the main sources of public income. In conse-
quence, I disagree with some current scholars who argue that suspension maximised
the governments seigniorage revenue.8 I will employ a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model (DSGE model) to examine the stabilisation properties of the
suspension of cash payments during the war time emergency. My results suggest
that the suspension did not only secure the Banks gold reserves, but maintained
the Bank notes in circulation, which in turn stabilised consumption, price levels,
asset prices and production during the long, exhausting war.
It became evident that the gold standard could not be resumed immediately
after the war, as some optimistic politicians had hoped, because the paper money
stock was high compared with the Banks monetary gold stock and the gap be-
tween the market and monetary price of gold was too wide. In order to bring the
market price of gold back to parity, the government repaid some of its short-term
debt to Bank and the Bank constrained the volume of discounts it granted to
London merchants. Deation and widely spread economic distress was not solely
as a result of the adjustment back to the gold standard, but it meant that the
public, especially manufacturers from industrialised regions and some Members of
Parliament, questioned the desirability of resumption. The Bank of England was
the target of their hostile criticism and, therefore, constraining the paper money
supply during the peace required as strong will power as resisting the temptation
to issue it too liberally during the war.
8For example see Bordo and Redish (1993).
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In order to emphasise how the Suspension Period represented enduring social
commitment to monetary stability in the form of a domestic institutional frame-
work, this work will combine both theoretical and historical analysis. Modern
macroeconomic methodology makes the arguments and analysis of this complex
period explicit, but the historical analysis is employed in order to contextualise
the results. The outcome is not a patchwork of theories that is articially applied
to episodes from the past, but throughout the thesis historical evidence supports
the theoretical modelling, making the latter more intuitive than if I had simply
limited the analysis to stylised models. The historical analysis focuses on the in-
terplay of monetary and scal policy in those measures that in the eighteenth
century increased institutional credibility and enforced commitment to resume the
gold standard rule during the Suspension Period.
The historical evidence raises the question of why the gold standard and sus-
pension were so successful. My theoretical models suggest that agents must have
regarded commitment to monetary stability as highly likely, but much of this sta-
bility was created by the gold standard rule itself. Another important contribution
of my thesis is, therefore, to analyse what gave the gold standard its credibility in
the eighteenth century when the gold standard did not yet function as a truly inter-
national rule, as it did during the era of the Classical Gold Standard (1880-1914).
Instead of considering the gold standard as an extreme type of xed exchange
rate regime, I will analyse its equally important, but less acknowledged, role as a
domestic monetary policy rule.
11
According to Bordo and Kydland (1995) there were fourteen suspensions and
successful resumptions of the gold standard in twenty-one countries between 1717
and 19339 and therefore, the Suspension Period of 1797-1821 might have been the
rst, but it was not unique amongst monetary experiments. It was, nevertheless,
one of the earliest component parts of a much wider economic and political process
called the development of British monetary orthodoxyby Fetter (1965), which
reached beyond the Bullion Debates. Its key controversies, such as the desirable
degree of a central banks independence, the best possible monetary policy rule and
the impact of monetary policy on the real-economy, are still relevant today. Out of
these disputes developed most of the principles of modern monetary policy, which
spread from Britain to the entire Western World. Hence, although the example
I use to illustrate sustainable policy is from British monetary history, the set of
questions and problems this monetary experiment raises are universal, and in many
cases, intemporal. From this perspective my research on the Suspension Period
and sustainable plans sheds light on questions of how monetary policy should be
conducted during times of crisis, what are the welfare e¤ects of monetary policy and
what institutional arrangements must be made to ensure that the policy makers
commit to credible monetary policy.
9Bordo and Kydland (1995), Table 1. The number of suspensions would be even higher (50) if it
included those suspensions of which outcome was devaluation.
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The thesis is organised as follows. This introduction is followed by a review
chapter, in which I will explain how this study stands at the junction of the clas-
sical analysis of the gold standard, modern macroeconomic theory on credibility
and time inconsistency and historical analysis. The second chapter examines the
economic environment during the era of the Pre-classical Gold Standard 1717-1797
through a DSGE model of the Bank of Englands gold reserve policy. The starting
point for my analysis is thus the eighteenth century gold standard, not the more
familiar perspectives of the Classical Gold Standard. The third chapter examines,
in a selective manner, institutional and political developments that rstly, led to
the suspension of cash payments, and later on resumption of the gold standard and
explores the Bullion Debates in a new light. In the fourth chapter I will examine,
through a DSGE model, how the suspension of cash payments made the monetary
policy more exible and stabilised circulation, consumption and the price level
during the war years. In the fth chapter I will model the suspension of cash pay-
ments as a sustainable plan, which replaced the gold standard as a commitment
mechanism and explain what made the Suspension Period credible.
Finally, in order to make a study that concerns Great Britain, Ireland and am-
biguous commodity standards consistent, one will always need some geographical
and terminological denitions. Firstly, cash payments were suspended in England,
Wales and Ireland. Although the Bank of Ireland had an independent status, the
country became scally integrated to England after Ireland lost its own Parliament
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in 1800-1801. Currency problems in Ireland were similar to those in England be-
tween 1793-1821, but they are outside of the scope of this thesis. Scotland, which
had maintained its own independent banking and monetary system since the Act
of Union in 1707, remained nominally on the gold standard. A erce competition
between the Bank of Scotland and the Royal Bank of Scotland ensured that paper
money was not issued to the same extent as in England.10 I will follow Fetter
(1969) in that I discuss English monetary and banking problems, but the British
Bullion Debates, because Scots were very keen participants in this dispute. Sec-
ondly, o¢ cially all these four nations were on the bimetallic standard until 1816,
when gold was made an o¢ cial unit of account by Act of Parliament11. In 1717,
however, gold had become the de facto standard after the Master of the Royal
Mint, Sir Isaac Newton, overvalued silver relative to gold and the more valuable
silver coins disappeared, according to Greshams law, from circulation. It was gold
that was a true basis for the monetary standard: the Bank of England kept the
o¢ cial monetary price of gold at £ 3.17s.101
2
d. from 1717 to 1931 with two excep-
tions: the rst one during the French Wars 1797-1821 and second one during the
First World War 1914-1925.
10Scottish bank notes were a popular means of payment in bordering counties of England, al-
though the government tried to restrict their circulation by law. Davies (1994) p. 308.
11The Coinage Act, Geo. III c. 68.
CHAPTER 1
The Gold Standard Rule and Credible Monetary Policy in
Economic Theory and History
1.1. Introduction
Kydland and Presscott (1977) have convinced most policy makers that they
have to take the question of credibility seriously when planning monetary policy.
Since the publication of their seminal work, there have been a number of attempts
to address the issue of credible policy and to understand what is required in order to
make policy credible. The question has often been addressed by analysing periods
when monetary policy has lacked credibility, but by contrast, in this thesis I focus
on an era when monetary policy seemed to be very credible, even during di¢ cult
times. In particular, I reassess the period of suspension of the gold standard
rule during and after the French Wars (1793-1815) in the light of developments in
monetary theory since the publication in 1965 of last major study of this period,
F.W. Fetters The Development of British Monetary Orthodoxy.
Since 1973, monetary systems in developed countries ceased to have any links
with gold or other commodities. At the same time, research on the commod-
ity standard, which without doubt was a dominant eld of economic study for
centuries, reduced dramatically. As a result, new macroeconomic theories and
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methodologies, which have developed apace since the 1970s, have not been fully
applied to the commodity standard framework. This dissertation aims to begin to
ll this gap in the literature by analysing the gold standard and the decision to
suspend and subsequently resume the gold standard rule through one of the most
signicant innovations of modern macroeconomics, the development of the theory
of credible and time consistent policy.
As suggested in the introductory chapter, the main theme which characterises
this thesis is to explain how trust in the monetary system was maintained in the
absence of the convertibility rule and why the gold standard emerged as the most
desirable way to control monetary policy. Elements of the answer can be found
in two very di¤erent types of literature: economic theory and economic history.
Theoretical literature published before the 1970s is not short of formal models
of the gold standard, but the literature after the 1970s is not short of models
of credible monetary policy. Combinations of these two, however, scarcely exist,
and there are no theoretical studies, to my knowledge, on the gold standard as
a commitment rule. Historical analysis is necessary for supporting theoretical
modelling and providing insights into policy making during this extraordinary
period. The complex problems, which arose from the economic environment in
which monetary policy had to be conducted during the French Wars, could not
be properly addressed if historical background and evidence were ignored and the
analysis completed only through stylised models of modern macroeconomics.
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By summarising both the traditional analysis of the gold standard and the
credibility and time inconsistency literature, this review chapter will establish the
theoretical background for the models developed in this dissertation. Then I will
present a rather comprehensive review of sources for historical evidence. Here I
only consider the literature that is relevant to the core research objectives of this
thesis. Detailed discussion of aspects of various studies are reserved for subsequent
chapters. This chapter will also explain why certain bodies of research have been
left out, and justies the reason why I have taken a side-step from the dominant ap-
proach in which the gold standard is, according to the classical tradition, analysed
as a self equilibrating system.
Rather than simply presenting the theory and history in separate, self contained
chapters, the thesis is broken down thematically and chronologically within the
time frame of Pre-classical Gold Standard (1717-1797) and the Suspension Period
(1797-1821). This method was adopted to avoid repetition and, as far as possible,
constant references to other parts of the text. The chronological treatment, which
also allows other related issues to be discussed, is the logical choice because crucial
developments in economic thought took place during this period: the principles of
monetary policy, inter-linked with public nance and banking, developed from the
experience before 1797, but there was a stronger element of design of monetary
policy rules during the Suspension Period.
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1.2. The Classical Analysis of the Gold Standard
1.2.1. Self-equilibrating System of Markers
Broadly dened the classical analysis of the commodity standard dominated over
a hundred and sixty years of economic thought on money, from the publication of
David Humes model of the price specie-ow mechanism in 1752 to the collapse
of the Classical Gold Standard in 1914. Early mercantilists had regarded precious
metals as the sole constituents of the wealth of nations, which explains why Eu-
ropeans were mainly searching for gold and silver instead of non-monetary goods
during the Age of Exploration. Many late mercantilists, Hume amongst them,
analysed both gold and money with much greater sophistication than their pre-
decessors, and therefore Adam Smiths erce criticism of the mercantilists in The
Wealth of Nations was only partially justiable.1
Together with the vision of the determinants of economic growth and wealth,
the theory of the operation of markets was the most important invention of early
classical thought. These new theories were partly based on the fact that the role
of the precious metals in the economy evolved over time. As early as at the end
of the seventeenth century British merchants supplemented metallic money with
notes that were proofs of deposits or with various short-term credit instruments
known as bills. As a result, by the mid-eighteenth century the value of circulating
paper currency exceeded the value of existing stock of bullion and specie. Instead
1Smith (1776) book V.
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of being exclusively used in exchange, gold and silver were also used as reserve
commodities. Su¢ cient and stable supply of precious metals, however, was crucial
for bankers and goldsmiths, as they were expected to be able to redeem their notes
in gold or silver. Coins also remained as a primary medium of exchange amongst
ordinary people.
The classical theory stresses impersonality and automaticity of the commodity
standard. The largest class of models concerns international trade and focuses
on the mechanism by which balance of payments equilibrium is restored auto-
matically between countries which are on the commodity standard. The most
inuential theory has been David Humes two country model of price-specie-ow,
which emphasises the role of relative price movements in restoring the equality
between imports and exports. Hume shows how the mercantilistsaim to maintain
continuously a favourable trade balance is impossible: a current account surplus
leads to a surplus of specie within that economy, which leads to an increase in the
level of prices. The price level in another country, which has originally lost specie,
decreases. As a result exports will decrease and imports increase for the economy
with the initial current account surplus. The process will lead to a self-correction
of the trade balances in all countries.2 It seems like generations of economists from
David Ricardo to Michael Bordo have revised Humes model in trying to nd un-
derstanding of how the balance of payments is kept in equilibrium under a system
of xed exchange rates.
2Hume (1711-1776) pp. 308-326.
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Another doctrine of the classical thought is known as a commodity theory of
money. Money, according to Ricardo, was simply a commodity such as gold or
silver and therefore, the price of money was, like that of any other commodity, its
cost of production.3
Since in this thesis I will analyse the gold standard as a domestic monetary
policy rule, the international trade theory or the models of the gold standard as
international monetary institution are only of tangential relevance to this work.
I will devote some attention to the development of the exchange rate during the
suspension of cash payments in Chapter 3, but analytically in Chapters 2, 4 and 5
the gold standard will be modelled as a domestic rule that restricts policy making
instead of a system that maintains equilibrium between countries. Consequently,
studies written during the heyday of the Classical Gold Standard, or after its
collapse, for example Hawtrey (1939) and Hawtrey (1962) are not directly relevant
in light of my approach, however important or inuential their original contribution
might have been. The rules of the gameof the Classical Gold Standard, such as
free import and export of specie, did not prevail during the eighteenth and early
nineteenth century and therefore, the theory that can be applied to the Classical
Gold Standard is not relevant here.
Neither does this thesis address the question of the optimal commodity stan-
dard system, although in the nineteenth- and early twentieth centuries both schol-
ars and monied men had erce debates over the preferability of the gold, silver
3Ricardo (1821), p. 5 and p. 90.
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or bimetallic standard. From the theoretical point of view it is irrelevant which
commodity or combination of commodities is chosen as a unit of account as long as
there is a xed ratio between the metals. The gold standard became the dominant
system at the end of the nineteenth century, because it was seen to deliver price
and exchange rate stability.
The above discussion, nevertheless, does not indicate that this study is isolated
from all classical doctrines of the gold standard. For example, the way in which
money supply is determined in all three theoretical chapters of this thesis follows
Ricardo (1821). The reminder of this section is devoted to highlighting this con-
nection, but also explaining why the framework of the classical analysis without
modication is not desirable for exploring time inconsistency and credibility issues.
1.2.2. The Commodity Theory of Money
As a literary methodology dominates classical economics, I use a relatively recent
model by Barro (1979) to examine the determination of the price level and the
monetary and non-monetary gold stocks under the gold standard. Barros model
is a useful starting point for two reasons. Firstly, although the model was devel-
oped more than half a century after the collapse of the Classical Gold Standard,
the automatic adjustment properties of the model and the assumption that the un-
derlying monetary constitution is xed, follows the classical tradition. Secondly,
Barros contribution has meant that the classical analysis of the gold standard
has not entirely been forgotten. Since its publication Barro (1979) has been the
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foundation of a number of contemporary models of the commodity standard that
are referred to in this thesis, such as Goodfriend (1988) and McCallum (1996).
The framework of the model is a closed economy with its own gold production
that can represent either a single country or the world economy under xed ex-
change rates4. The stock of money M is denominated in nominal units such as
pounds and represents a liability of the central bank. Money is assumed to take
the physical form of a paper claim rather than specie. The central bank maintains
the gold standard by being ready to sell or buy any amount of gold o¤ered or
demanded in exchange for paper currency at the xed price Q. The total money
supply, following Ricardo (1821), is determined by
(1.1) M s =
1

QKg;
where the parameter  2 (0; 1] is the gold reserve ratio, which measures the gold
backing of the monetary issue. The central bank holds a reserve stock of gold Kg
and the gold reserve ratio  changes according to the central banks gold stockpile
policy. The higher ; the larger the proportion of money stock that is backed by
monetary gold and the lower the duciary issue of money. Under the perfect gold
standard, money supply equals QKg; which indicates that paper claims represent
literally warehouse certicates of gold deposits.
4If individuals were free to trade gold with residents of other nations, there would be only one
integrated monetary system.
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The demand for circulating medium Md is proportional to the general price
level of commodities P multiplied by parameters that measure the volume of trans-
actions being conducted. These parameters are real income y and function v ()
that represents the reciprocal of the velocity of circulation, where  denotes the
expected rate of ination. Formally, money demand is
(1.2) Md = Pyv()
( )
;
where expected ination is dened as
(1.3)   E
0@ P
P
1A :
A dot represents a time derivative. Expected ination and desired money hold-
ings are inversely related so that if expected ination rises, the alternative assets5
become more attractive and money demand decreases. If these assets have a xed
real rate of return, ination measures the opportunity cost for holding money. This
relationship is marked by a minus sign inside brackets underneath .
Combining money supply (1.1) and demand (1.2) gives the price level equation
(1.4) P = Q

Kg
v()y

:
5Barro assumes that these alternative assetsconsists of either capital with a xed real rate of
return or a commodity stock.
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Since the equation (1.4) holds at all times, variations of P around xed monetary
price of gold Q reect movements in the right-hand-side variables. Variables v;
 and y are assumed to be exogenous although subject to disturbances and it is
assumed that there is no sustained growth in y:
Barro applies Fishers (1922)6 denition for determination of the monetary gold
stock in a dynamic context. The countrys stock of monetary gold is determined by
gold production and the extent to which gold is held for non-monetary purposes, for
example ornamental or industrial use. Production of new gold is the only possibility
of increasing the economys existing stock. The current production function for a
representative member of the gold mining industry is expressed by the real cost
function c(k); which describes the cost in commodity units for producing gold at
rate k: The production of gold is assumed to have positive and increasing marginal
cost thus c0; c00 > 0: The nominal cost for producing gold at rate k is Pc(k), while
the nominal revenue is Qk assuming common price for gold in monetary and
non-monetary use. The gold producers consider Q and P to be exogenous and
maximise prots
(1.5) f = Qk   Pc (k)
6Fisher, I. (1922) The Purchasing Power of Money, 2nd ed. Augustus Kelley as quotated by
Barro (1979) p. 15.
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subject to gold production at rate k: The marginal cost of gold production becomes
(1.6) c0 (k) =

P
Q
 1
which implies that the quantity produced per unit time is an decreasing function
of the relative price of gold P=Q. The supply function for new gold takes the form
(1.7) ks = ks(
P
Q
( )
):
Thus if the general price level increases, the ratio between the general price level
and the xed monetary price of gold (relative price of gold P=Q) rises, the gold
supply decreases.
Let K denote the stock of gold that is held for non-monetary uses. Non-
monetary gold is modelled here as a durable good which depreciates at the constant
rate  the fraction  being lost or wasted in each period but gold held by the
central bank is not assumed to depreciate as the central bank keeps the reserve
safely in its vaults. Barro assumes that non-monetary use of gold increases with
a higher current relative price, P=Q; but decreases with expectations of a higher
future relative price: as Q is constant, expected future values of P=Q vary inversely
with ination expectations : The monetary authoritys target stock of privately
held gold is
(1.8) f(P=Q
(+)
; 
( )
)y;
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which, for simplicity, assumes a unit income elasticity. The target stock increases
in relation to P=Q.
By assuming Q to be always xed, Barro rules out the need for speculative
gold storages. The f -function therefore reects only non-speculative gold demand
such as industrial or ornamental use of gold, ruling out bank runs or other sudden
shifts in the non-monetary gold stock.
The non-monetary demand for gold is dened in the form of a ow function as
(1.9) kd = 
"
f(P=Q
(+)
; 
( )
)y  K
#
+ f(P=Q
(+)
; 
( )
)y:
Equation (1.9) consists of two parts: the rst one describes a desired gradual ad-
justment of non-monetary gold stockK towards its target stock position f(P=Q; )y in
accordance with the adjustment parameter  > 0; the second part represents the
normal replacement ow f(P=Q; )y that would be required to maintain the tar-
get value of K. A high non-monetary stock of gold decreases the non-monetary
demand for gold, thus K has a negative e¤ect on kd:
The net change in K at any point in time is given by the di¤erence between
the non-monetary gold demand and the depreciated existing stock
(1.10)

K = kd   K = (+ )
"
f(P=Q
(+)
; 
( )
)y  K
#
:
The monetary authority standing ready to buy or sell any amount of gold at
price Q; the change in the monetary gold stock is given by the di¤erence between
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gold supply and gold demand for non-monetary use
(1.11)
:
K
g
= ks   kdn = ks(P=Q
( )
)  
"
f(P=Q
(+)
; 
( )
)y  K
#
  f(P=Q
(+)
; 
( )
)y
If y;  and Q and the forms of the k- and f functions are xed, the steady
state of the system is described by equations (1.4), (1.10) and (1.11) and is dened
by
(1.12)
:
P =
:
K =
:
Kg = 0:
The expected ination is assumed to be zero in the steady state.
Equations (1.10) and (1.11) imply that in a steady state gold supply equals the
replacement demand for non-monetary gold
(1.13) ks( P=
( )
Q) = f( P=Q
(+)
; 
( )
)y;
which means that the existing stock of gold will neither grow nor shrink in size
when the relative price of gold equals P=Q:7 Equation (1.10) implies that the stock
of non-monetary gold equals its target value
(1.14) K = f( P=Q
(+)
; 
( )
)y
7McCallum (1996) p. 74 has a similar argument.
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Figure 1.1. Determination of price level and gold stocks. Barro
(1979) p. 17.
in the steady state and the steady state monetary gold stock from equation (1.4)
becomes
(1.15) Kg = k()y P=Q:
Once Kg is determined, the money stock in the steady state is
M =
1

Q Kg:
Figure 1.1 illustrates the steady state values P ; K and Kg and describes the
dynamics of P; K and Kg: The line on the left hand side of Figure 1.1 relates
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the price level P to the monetary gold stock Kg as dened in the equation (1.4).
On the right hand side, lines _Kg = 0 and

K = 0 indicate the combinations of K
and Kg that yield _Kg = 0 and _K = 0 in equations (1.10) and (1.11) taking into
account K and P from equation (1.4). Increase in Kg increases P; which decreases
ks and increases kd. Thus _Kg falls if Kg rises. Respectively, if K increases, kd
reduces and _Kg falls and _Kg = 0 line is positively sloped. Similarly, _K = 0; from
equation (1.10) is positively sloped. Appendix 1.A veries that the slope of

K = 0
is steeper than the slope of _Kg = 0:
In this model the general price level of commodities becomes a determinate
quantity that is subject to usual supply and demand analyses. According to the
commodity theory of money the relative price of gold in relation to goods is dened
by real forces, which in the classical analysis refer, for example, to gold production,
non-monetary uses of gold or changes in preferences. As these forces are assumed
to change only gradually and to a limited extent, given the physical nature of
gold, price level uctuations are expected to be fairly limited in magnitude and
duration.8
Barro continues his analysis by using the diagram in Figure 1.1 to discuss the
short- and long-run impact e¤ects of changes in conditions of various types, such
as an increase in real income or gold discoveries. Here I consider one experiment
that is interesting in light of the approach of this thesis: the e¤ect of increase in
duciary paper money issue. As in this model the economys total stock of gold
8Barro (1979), McCallum (1996) p. 77.
29
Figure 1.2. E¤ect of increased paper gold. Barro (1979) p. 21.
can be changed only if more gold is produced, Barro assumes that some passage
of time is required for the size of the gold stock to be changed. On the contrary,
circulating money stock could increase faster than the monetary gold stock if the
central bank printed and issued unbacked paper currency.
As seen in equation (1.1), any issue of duciary paper money decreases ; the
gold reserve ratio, while the monetary gold stock Kg remains unchanged. The
short-run impact e¤ect of the decrease in  is that the price level P rises in pro-
portion to a given value of Kg and the relative price of gold, P=Q; increases. The
curve that relates the price level to the monetary gold stock Kg rotates downwards
as seen in Figure 1.2. As the price level rises, _K = 0 shifts down and right with
30
given values of Kg and K and as indicated in the equation (1.10). Now from (1.11)
_Kg = 0 line declines for given values of Kg and K:
In the short-run, it can be seen from equations (1.13) and (1.15) that P and K
are invariant with : The steady state money stock M = Q Kg= remains xed as
the downward movement in Kg from (1.15) is proportional to the fall in : With
Kg held xed, the initial e¤ect of the increase inM is to increase P in proportion.
This price change induces a rise over time in K and leads also to a drop in gold
production ks. Monetary gold Kg falls because P declines from its initially higher
position in proportion to the decrease in Kg: Eventually, a point is reached where
K is su¢ ciently high and P is su¢ ciently reduced so that K begins to fall. The
only long-term e¤ect of the increased paper money issue is to drive out part of the
monetary gold stock without a¤ecting the price level: K and P return to their
original positions. Barro argues that as long as the price of the gold Q is kept
constant, the issue of paper money does not result in a change in the price level,
but increases the short-run volatility of the general price level.
The above analysis can be misleading to some extent, because it indicates that
the monetary authoritys gold reserve policy would be a matter of indi¤erence.
According to McCallum (1996) the short-run impact e¤ects can be sizeable and
may disappear slowly, depending on the gold supply conditions.9 In addition,
creating more and more paper money would lead to an increasing amount of paper
notes to be converted, which would be inconsistent with the assumption that Q
9McCallum (1996) p. 77.
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stays xed. In the steady state the monetary authoritys seigniorage can be dened
as
(1.16)
M
P
  Q
Kg
P
= ky   ky:
The maximum seigniorage revenue implies that if  ! 0; the seigniorage would
equal M= P : The cost of seigniorage nance, as Barro points out, is that it can
make the gold standard unfeasible, but it remains unclear what the implications
in this framework would be.
Barros analysis is useful in the framework of the Classical Gold Standard,
but is probably too simple to address deeper or complex issues of credibility of
the monetary system. Firstly, it is partly built on hypothetical assumptions and
parameters that do not always have any real-life counterparts, such as the central
banks target stock for privately held gold and the adjustment parameter of private
gold. Secondly, any speculative demand for gold is ruled out even though agents
know that the gold backing is not perfect. Apart from the section where Barro
examines the e¤ect of change in ; the government is assumed to keep the gold
reserve ratio xed. This is a popular assumption in the framework of the Classical
Gold Standard and it is due to the fact that between 1845 and 1914 the Bank of
England was forced by law to keep its gold reserve ratio within a narrow range.
By contrast, during the eighteenth century the gold reserve ratio was volatile and
fell during the political disturbances when the public preferred specie to notes,
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and increased in peace, when notes and bills were willingly accepted. The Bank
of Englands gold reserve policy that aimed to stabilise the gold reserve ratio is
analysed in the DSGE framework in Chapter 2. Thirdly, the impact of the relative
price level and the expected rate of ination to private gold demand is ambiguous,
because Barro argues that gold demand increases if the current relative price level
increases, but gold demand decreases, if the expected rate of ination increases. If
the price level is expected to increase in the future, the rational agents are likely
to increase their gold holdings, rather than reduce them. Finally, although Barros
analysis has an element of expectations, it is predominantly a static model. During
the Suspension Period the value of money was determined by a credibility of the
government and the Bank of Englands promise to convert currency to specie at
future. Expectations and the monetary authoritys reputation, which played a
crucial role in determining the price level in the absence of the gold standard,
would be di¢ cult to model in Barros framework, because if the gold backing was
removed from his model, it is obscure how the price level would be determined.
1.2.3. The Question of Su¢ cient Reserves
How much reserves should the central bank hold under the gold standard? The
desirable level of gold reserves would ensure price stability and make bank runs
unlikely, but minimise dead-weight loss which occurs because gold does not bear
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any interest for its owner or for the central bank when kept in the banks vaults.10
The problem of sudden runs on reserves disappears under the prefect gold standard
where the entire money stock is backed by gold, but this system might not be
e¢ cient if we imagined a case where gold would yield utility in non-monetary form
for its holder. On the other hand, if the gold backing ratio were close to zero, the
central bank would be able to act as nancial intermediator and lend all monetary
gold to private agents, but in the case of unexpected gold demand, the bank should
rst call in the loan to be able to convert its notes, which would increase transaction
costs. Goodfriend (1988) discusses in detail the trade-o¤ between zero and perfect
gold backing and shows that the optimal gold reserve ratio is between 0 and 1.
But keeping the gold reserve ratio xed prevents the central bank from pursuing
other objectives such as the stability of the price level.
Obsteld and Rogo¤s (1983) model of speculative bubbles has a simple answer
to the above question: the backing of the currency has to be perfect in order for
bank runs to be ruled out. The central bank has to be able to redeem the money
stock at xed price Q; but the backing is partial in the sense that the xed price
of the backing commodity is above its market price. Therefore, if the market
price of gold Qm is below the mint price Q, the public satises its gold demand
by obtaining gold from markets rather than from the central bank. Feasibility of
10Smith (1776) was a precursor of this discussion. He predicted that if the country were to
allow banks to issue paper bank notes that were evidences of safe private indebtedness, so called
real-bills, the price level would not be a¤ected. A commodity money system is wasteful because
there are better uses for the resources absorbed by a commodity money. See the discussion in
Sargent and Velde (2002) p. 101 and Sargent and Wallace (1982).
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this policy requires that the government has access to su¢ cient gold reserves to
purchase the entire money stock M at the support price Q:
Throughout this thesis I depart from Barro (1979) and side with Obstfeld and
Rogo¤ (1983) in assuming, in essence, that under the gold standard money is only
regarded to have value if it has either intrinsic value, is directly convertible to gold
or the private agents expect money to be convertible to gold. It is well known,
however, that the gold backing was never perfect, not even during the Classical
Gold Standard, and therefore in Chapter 2, I will present historical evidence of the
Bank of Englands gold stockpile policy and develop a DSGE model to elaborate
on the question of how the value of partially backed paper money was maintained
during the Pre-Classical Gold Standard. In subsequent chapters I will investigate
how this seemingly imperfect rule emerged as the best available method to enforce
the credibility of the monetary system.
1.3. Monetary Policy Rules under Fiat and Gold Standards
Although the structural credibility problem in the conduct of monetary policy
was recognised only thirty years ago, social responses to this dilemma have a long
history. In his recent study on the history of monetary targets Flandreau (2007)
argues that the Bullion Debates during the Suspension Period were the rst public
discussion over relative advantages and disadvantages between credibility and ex-
ibility. An outcome of this debate was that the gold standard was considered as the
most desirable monetary policy rule, even though its predecessor, the eighteenth
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century gold standard, had been a result of an evolutionary process rather than
active policy design. In this section my objective is to link the gold standard and
the suspension of cash payments to the theory of credible monetary policy. I rst
discuss the time inconsistency problem and summarise solutions that are suggested
in the vast literature published after Kydland and Presscotts original contribution
in 1977. Then I review the existing three studies that have applied, although not
through quantitative modelling, the time inconsistency theory to the commodity
standard. I will conclude this section by focusing on those particular aspects of
the credibility and time inconsistency theory and literature that are signicant for
the models developed in this study.
1.3.1. Theory of Credible Monetary Policy
Following the seminal contribution of Kydland and Presscott (1977) a contradic-
tion between a policy makerscapacity to boost the economy transitorily and their
inability to achieve this on a permanent basis was recognised and gradually ac-
cepted. Calvo (1978) and Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) have applied Kydland and
Presscotts theory of discretionary policy making into the context of monetary pol-
icy. Monetary authorities are tempted to promise low future ination now, but
surprise the public with unexpectedly high ination in the future. If there are
rigidities in the economy, for example rms and workers consider expected ina-
tion when they agree upon nominal wages beforehand, the authorities might be
tempted to create surprise ination that reduces real wages. As the rms make
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their employment decision based on real wages, which decreases when the price
level rises, ination increases employment and output. In general, since the gov-
ernment sets policy sequentially, it has an opportunity to conduct discretionary
policy subsequently revise its decisions according to private agentsplans. Even-
tually the rational agents recognise the monetary authoritys incentive to boost
the economy and adjust their ination expectations in the wage setting process
so that in equilibrium the benets of unexpected ination disappear and only the
cost of high ination remain.
In the presence of a time inconsistency problem, a society would benet from
having access to a commitment technology, a policy or a rule that would tie the
hands of the policy maker from changing announced future policy. Solutions sug-
gested in the literature can be roughly divided into three categories: delegation,
rules and reputation. Rogo¤ (1985) argues that the monetary policy should be del-
egated to an independent agent that has a greater dislike for ination than society,
such as a conservative central banker, who is independent from the governmental
policy, and who might be penalised if ination is high and rewarded if ination is
within its target. Alternatively, society could impose external constraints on the in-
struments which the monetary policy maker can use, such as a xed exchange rate
regime. Ination surprises under the xed exchange rate would put a downward
pressure on the currency which would eventually reduce a countrys international
competitiveness11. The third type of technology, rst discussed in the context of
11This argument is put forward in Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) and is discussed in Chang (1998b).
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monetary policy by Barro and Gordon (1983a), does not rely on institutions as do
the above two, but on the reputation of the monetary policy authority. On the
assumption that the monetary authority and the public interact for a su¢ ciently
long time, the monetary authority can eliminate the ination bias by developing a
reputation for honouring its announcements of low ination. The ability to make
credible promises is considered to be socially valuable and maintaining this ability
presumes that the policy maker does not renege on its current promises.
1.3.2. The Gold Standard: a Contingent Rule or Domestic Monetary
Policy Rule
Today, three decades after Kydland and Presscott (1977), the central banks in
developed countries have succeeded in bringing down ination. New measures,
namely central bank independence and ination targeting, have brought about
this change. But although tools and rules are based on recent developments in
economic theory, monetary management, as argued by Flandreau (2007), is not
a recent thing. Throughout the ages societies have had to nd ways to limit
authoritiesopportunity to abuse their power over monetary systems. During the
time of absolutist monarchs the commodity standard evolved as an important
external constraint which aimed to restrict monetary policy decisions. As the
story of the commodity money systems began in ancient times and ended in the
1970s, it is inevitable that the way in which this constraint was imposed evolved
according to changing economic conditions. This process as whole is outwith the
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scope of this study, but instead I examine what kind of commitment mechanism the
gold standard was and how it operated in the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-
century, before the gold standard had become an international rule. My main
argument is that during this period the gold standard functioned as a domestic
rule in the framework of national monetary policy. So far only a handful of studies
have examined the commodity standard and credibility issues: Bordo and Redish
(1993), Bordo and Kydland (1995) and Bordo and Schwartz (1997) in their related
studies, and most recently, Flandreau (2007).
According to Bordo and Kydland (1995) and Bordo and Schwartz (1997) the
gold standard rule to buy or sell gold in unlimited amounts was itself a commitment
mechanism that bound monetary policy by limiting the ability of current and future
policy makers to conduct discretionary monetary policy. If the trade partners of
the country were on a gold or silver standard, with xed ratio between gold and
silver, countries had, in fact, a xed exchange rate regime which put an external
constraint on policy in the manner explained above. Bordo and Kydlands and
Bordo and Schwartzs core argument, however, is that the gold standard had a
two-fold purpose: it was a commitment mechanism per se, but during a war or
other emergency the government could change the rule by temporarily suspending
the gold standard on the understanding that the convertibility would be restored
at the original parity after the emergency had passed. The authors call the gold
standard a contingent rule. This means that countries committed to the gold
standard rule with a war or other di¢ cult timeas a contingency. In all other
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periods the gold standard is maintained unconditionally. In a related paper, Bordo
and Redish (1993) argue that during the suspension of the gold standard rule the
objective of the government was to maximise seigniorage revenue. Market agents
would regard successful adherence as evidence of a credible commitment and would
allow the authorities access to seigniorage and bond nance at favorable terms.12
In all other periods the gold standard is maintained unconditionally.
The gold standard as a contingent rule argument has become widely accepted
and it has inuenced the way suspension periods have been reassessed in re-
cent years. Due to its contingent nature, Bordo and Kydland (1995), Bordo and
Schwartz (1997) and Rolnick and Weber (1998) consider the paper money stan-
dards in the middle of the gold standard, for example in England from 1797-1821
and from 1914-1925, as continuum of the gold standard.
Flandreaus (2007) counter argument to Bordo and Kydlands theory of the
gold standards contingency is based on the fact that in 1821 the gold standard
was not resumed automatically, but as an outcome of the Bullion Debates, which
was the rst systematic discussion of monetary policy targets. Gold convertibility
was seen as a preferable target or rule over the policy that had been conducted
during the Suspension Period when the Bank of Englands Governors had been
able to regulate the issue of money according to their best judgement.
The history of monetary policy targeting  the use of specic policy instru-
ments to reach particular targets touches, according to Flandreau (2007), on the
12Bordo and Kydland (1995) p. 424.
40
Bullion Debates, and not only on the Keynesian Revolution. Transparency of the
target, the gold convertibility, was seen as important, because the Bank of England
itself was not a transparent institution. In fact, it attempted to be as opaque and
as di¢ cult to monitor as possible by not releasing crucial data of its bullion levels
or discounts outstanding.13 By contrast, convertibility itself was a straightforward
principle that made the government and central banks policies observable. The
public was able to test the maintenance of the rule by comparing the o¢ cial mint
price of gold to its market price,14 which was the price the goldsmiths were selling
out gold. If the market price was above the mint price, that was an indication
of mismanagement, usually over issue, and resulted in gold owing from the cen-
tral bank and from the country. The gold standard, Flandreau continues, did
have a feasible alternative: discretionary monetary policy conducted by the pri-
vate central bank. This option was advocated by inuential parties consisting of
industrial entrepreneurs, some private bankers and some Members of Parliament.
Flandreaus conclusion is that the gold standard re-emerged in 1821 as a domestic
rule an invisible hand of monetary policy not as an historical accident, but as
a result of public debate and discussion that had, as will be examined in Chapter
3, surprisingly modern features.
13Horseld (1953).
14Flandreau (2007).
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1.3.3. The Rule under the Suspension of Cash Payments
This thesis stems from the literature on time consistency and develops Bordo and
Kydlands (1995) theory of the gold standard as a contingent rule and Flandreaus
(2007) argument about the gold standard as an invisible hand of monetary policy
in the context of the Pre-classical Gold Standard of 1717-1797 and the Suspen-
sion Period of 1797-1821. The biggest benet of my theoretical and more abstract
method of analysis over the existing studies is that arguments are explicit and less
obscure by the historical and institutional facts and vested interests of historiog-
raphy. The main contribution is to explain and establish theoretically how the
credibility of the monetary system was maintained in the absence of gold backing.
This is a crucial question which the gold standard as a contingent rule theory is
not able to answer. Bordo and Kydland (1995) and Bordo and Schwartz (1997)
argue that the gold standard was a superior regime which simply had no long-term
alternatives in the minds of the public and the policy makers. The resumption of
the gold standard was thus exogenously credible. Their argument is probably due
to misspecifying the nature of the gold standard in the early eighteenth century
and rather reects the classical thought in that the monetary policy under the gold
standard was essentially and entirely subjected to the imperatives of convertibility.
The suspension of cash payments was a long period of constant shocks when the
monetary rule enforced by the gold standard was not in place and the government
had an opportunity to conduct discretionary monetary policy. By contrast to
42
Bordo and Kydland (1995) and Bordo and Schwartz (1997), this thesis identies
the gold standard and the suspension of cash payments as di¤erent monetary
regimes, because the monetary rules these regimes enforced were not identical. As
emphasised in Chapter 4, the gold standard regime implemented the convertibility
rule, but the monetary rule under the Suspension Period was replaced by a plan
to return to the gold standard at some future point.
Because the Suspension Period lasted for a quarter of a century, not just a
temporary time as argued by Bordo and Kydland (1995), I am able to analyse this
period through a formal model of the monetary authoritys reputation that is based
on long-term interaction between the private and public agents. Chari and Kehoe
(1990) and Stokey (1989) dene how economic policy can be sustainable even in
the absence of a commitment technology. The equilibrium is based on trigger
strategies where private agents retaliate if a policy maker deviates from its policy
plan. Ireland (1997) and Chang (1998a) have applied this theory in the context of
monetary policy under the at standard: private agents assume that if a monetary
authority makes and breaks a promise of low ination, it will be unable to credibly
promise low ination in the future and the private agents behave according to
this assumption. The suspension of cash payments o¤ers a concrete setting and a
real-life example in which these rather abstract and theoretical arguments can be
tested and developed further.
My results are related to interesting comparative research between the simi-
larity of other suspension periods for example the Greenback era in the United
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States during the Civil War (1862-1878)15 and the suspension of the gold standard
in Britain during the First World War (1914-1925) and entries to and exits from
xed exchange rate regimes such as the Exchange Rate Mechanism or European
Monetary System.16 The question these studies raise is whether the resumption
of the gold standard was a time contingent event which occurred only when the
market price of gold was at par, or whether the credible commitment to resump-
tion by the policy makers inuenced expectations and caused the market price to
converge. The latter answer is probably closer to the truth as both in 1821 and
1879 the market price of gold converged fully to an expected peg ahead of x-
ing: in Britain the gold standard was originally planned to be resumed in 1823
but the return was already possible in 1821, and the United States had a similar
experience.
1.4. Historiography and Sources
Having examined the analytical background of this thesis in a critical manner,
I turn to present sources for the historical evidence and some source criticism.
Theoretical work in this research is informed by historical analysis, but the histor-
ical analysis will not only complement the theoretical and quantitative modelling
it is important in its own right. If the theoretical analysis can pinpoint the key
issues which arose during this important juncture when gold specie and convertible
15Calomiris (1994) and Smith and Smith (1997).
16Obstfeld (1998), Miller and Sutherland (1992).
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notes were successfully replaced by paper money, the historical analysis is able to
contextualise them.
The nature of my research, looking to this period from the viewpoint of time in-
consistency theory, means that some historical analysis and records in monographs
written before the credibility and time inconsistency theory was formulated in the
late 1970s, can be re-assessed. The single most valuable source for this study was
the seminal monograph by Fetter (1965) which combines the complex histories and
practices of monetary institutions, and connects them with doctrines, opinions, as
well as personal and political factors in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
Britain. Fetters key observation is that before the suspension of cash payments
there was no generally accepted theory of a monetary and banking system17.
What became the dominating view was the newly orthodox liberalphilosophy of
economic policy, advocated by Ricardo and other bullionists who sought a mon-
etary framework for the classical, self-adjusting, competitive model-economy, in
which the role of central authority was reduced to a minimum by automatic rules.
Another monograph I refer to extensively was Feavearyears (1967) narrative his-
tory of pound sterling. Especially important was his research on growth of credit
and credit control in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-centuries. Clapham (1944)
was the rst historian who had records of the Bank thrown open to him and there-
fore he was able to collect signicant amount of detailed information of the Banks
17Fetter (1965) p. 1.
45
history. As he wrote his two volumes at the invitation of the Bank, some of his
arguments are generally thought to be too generous.
The Bank did not conduct economic policy alone. According to recent studies
by Neal (2002) the British nancial system, being a rich mixture of varied nan-
cial institutions and its complex interrelated markets, managed to absorb more
shocks and rebound more strongly than its Continental rivals. This argument ap-
plies also to monetary policy making, which was of a result of interaction not
always harmonious between several institutions and therefore, limiting analysis
just to the Bank of England would not have been su¢ cient. Valuable sources in
understanding the scope of this interaction were: Dickson (1967) and Hargreaves
(1930), who study the development of governments long-term borrowing and the
Financial Revolution in general; King (1936) and Pressnell (1956) who analyse
the increasing inuence of the merchant and country banks and the growth of -
nancial intermediation provided by the money markets; and Craig (1953) whose
monograph about the Royal Mint is an interesting account of the relationship of
the two institutions responsible for coinage and printing: the Bank of England and
the Royal Mint.
The era of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars o¤ers an unique ex-
periment in monetary and nancial history. Comparative studies between British
and French experiences were especially eye-opening. Sargent and Velde (1995)
analyse public nance from the perspective of modern theories of money and the
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government budget constraint. Bordo and White (1991) argue that at the mid-
dle of the eighteenth-century Britain and France were nancially equally strong.
Both countries experienced paper money periods, but the outcomes were drasti-
cally di¤erent: the French assignats failed, which cost France its reputation as
borrower, but the paper pound succeeded, which strengthened Britains position
as a world power even further. Britains credibility gave it access to nance on
favorable terms, while Frances poor reputation forced it to rely heavily on tax-
ation. According to North and Weingast (1989) and Broz and Grossman (2003)
British superiority as a borrower was explained by the evolution of constitutional
arrangements after the Glorious Revolution in 1688, which allowed the government
to commit credibly to upholding property rights which reduced the risk of failure.
The monetary question was a very live one throughout the Suspension Period
although the strength of the debate uctuated according to economic and political
developments. Thus, there is a great deal of writing from the period both in
pamphlet form, and in the pages of newspapers and journals such as The Times
and Gentlemans Magazine. In particular, the original works of three men, David
Ricardo, Henry Thornton and Sir Francis Baring have been referred to in this
thesis. The Bullion Report, an enquiry into the Cause of the High Price of Gold
Bullion, was the single most inuential contemporary document. Other primary
printed sources this thesis makes use of are those acts of Parliament that concerned
the Suspension Period.
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As it is generally acknowledged that Britain nanced the French Wars through
a combination of taxation and public borrowing, scal policy played as impor-
tant role as monetary policy during the Suspension Period. Fiscal theory and
scal history, however, have been developed and examined extensively by eminent
economists and economic historians such as Robert Barro, Larry Neal and Patrick
OBrien in the context of the Suspension Period and therefore, it is not the pur-
pose of this thesis to research this area in depth. Their works have been referred
to extensively in subsequent chapters.
In my historical analysis I do not rely solely on verbal accounts. Quantitative
data analysis in this thesis is primarily based on the unpublished microche ap-
pendix for Gayer, Rostow and Schwartz (1953), which I transferred to machine
readable database form during the rst year of my Ph.D. Together with these
two volumes, their work gives voluminous amounts of information: from histor-
ical narrative to statistical analysis combined with economic theory. Some well
known counter-factual statements for instance, on the impact of the French wars
on economy, are explained by the broken compilation process.18 Furthermore the
authors derived or borrowed some time series from other researchers, which were
not necessarily reliable or used primary sources, such as Gentlemans Magazine,
that did not report correct information in the rst place. If much better time-
series have become available, I have used them instead. For example Schwartzs
18The main part of the work was carried out between 1936-1941, but not published until 1953
after the sudden death of Gayer in 1951.
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painstaking compilation of the monthly index of British share prices from 1811
to 1850 have recently been superseded by Shea (2007) The Handbook of 18th and
Early 19th Century British Corporate Finance. Respectively, new data about real
wages have become available. The biggest benet of Gayer et al. (1953) for this
study is, however, that data is given on a quarterly or monthly basis.
To nish this section it is important to stress that this thesis is a contribution
to economic theory and not an inclusive study of ideologies in the historiography
of economic thought, neither have I compiled new data or presented new historical
records. Whilst the thesis challenges the work of some economic historians, the
primary focus is on monetary policy and theory.
1.5. Conclusions
In this review chapter I have provided an account of the theoretical and histor-
ical background of this thesis. Combining these two strains of literature provides
a much richer piece of work than if I would have just concentrated on one element.
An additional challenge in my research was that the theoretical base was wide: so
far the research into the gold standard has been conducted through the stylised
models of the Classical Gold Standard such as Barro (1979), and theoretical liter-
ature of commitment and time inconsistency in the commodity standard context
has been non-existent. Historiographically, di¤erent aspects of the suspension of
cash payments are emphasised in the various works available, and no consensus
emerges.
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The decision of the Bank of England to cease converting paper money to gold in
1797 o¤ers a curious experiment of paper money nance. This period, as it raises
many questions, has been analysed extensively during past decades so that it has
forced some authors, Fetter19 amongst them, to conclude that there is little to add
to theoretical analysis concerning the Suspension Period. However, interesting re-
search opportunities stem from the intersection between a new analytical approach
and a real economic problem. The suspension of cash payments has remained a
puzzle, which classical analysis has not been able to solve.
19Fetter (1965) p. 26.
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1.5.1. Appendix 1.A
Phase plane analysis of the determination of the price level and gold stocks
The system that describes the motion of Kg and K; given constant ; k; y; 
and ; can be written from equations (1.11) and (1.10)
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As the gold supply is a decreasing function and the target level of private gold an
increasing function of the relative price level, the partial derivatives with respect
to the relative price level yield
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Taking the partial derivatives of (1A.1) and (1A.2) with respect toKg andK yield:
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The stability conditions became
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By rearranging the left hand sides of (1A.9) and (1A.10) it can shown that the
slope of the _K line is steeper than _Kg:
k
f 0
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ky
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1
f 0
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y
(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[(+ )yf 0   ks0]f 0 > 0
yf 0   ks0
[(+ )yf 0   ks0]f > 0
which holds as ks0 < 0 and f 0 > 0.
CHAPTER 2
Macroeconomic Implications of the Bank of Englands
Gold Reserve Policy
2.1. Introduction
The threat of Stuart restoration during the Jacobite rebellions in the rst half
of the eighteenth century did not only cause a dynastic crisis, but nancial chaos
in London. This panic manifested itself in regular runs on the Bank of England
of alarming dimensions.1 As the Bank was in danger of running out of gold, it
employed a peculiar strategy to slow down the gold ow: the Bank paid out specie
in tiny six-pence pieces, which took so long to count that time was gained for the
panic to ease and gold demand to reduce to the normal level.
This example raises the question of why the Bank of England, the most powerful
monetary institution of the most developed nation in the world, was forced to use
such an unconventional method, not just on this occasion, but several times in
the eighteenth century, to protect its gold reserves. The answer lies in two factors,
which are examined in this chapter: rstly, in the limited control the Bank had both
over the total money supply and the credit markets of the country; and secondly, in
the importance of the gold convertibility rule that had emerged as the best method
1Acres (1931) Vol I p 107.
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of providing stable purchasing power of currency. Inadequate and inconsistent
laws restricted the Banks ability to conduct monetary policy through methods
such as restricting the growth of the money supply or controlling of the interest
rate. Together with the Royal Mint, the Bank of England controlled minting of
silver and gold specie, which was thus centrally decided and tightly regulated. But
merchants bills of exchange and private bank notes formed the more elastic part
of the money supply it was exible and spontaneous and followed demand of local
business and industry.
As discussed in the review chapter, Bordo and Kydland (1995) argue that the
gold standard was intended as a contingent rule which could be suspended during
a war.2 The convertibility in the eighteenth century was not, however, suspended
until 1797, thus England fought four wars3 while staying on the gold standard. In
this chapter I argue that the eighteenth century gold standard functioned indeed
as a contingent rule, but in a di¤erent manner than argued by Bordo and Kydland
(1995). The Bank did not suspend cash payments in advance of every panic;
instead it imposed an adjustment cost to notes-to-gold conversion in order to reduce
the outow of gold. As both historical and theoretical analysis in this chapter
shows, it was not the automatic operations of the gold standard rule, but these
2Bordo and Kydland (1995).
3The War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), the War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748),
The Seven YearsWar (17561763) and the American War of Independence (17751783). The
French Revolutionary Wars started in 1793.
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rather unconventional practices that evolved over time, which had a crucial role in
implementing monetary policy.
The main contribution of this chapter is to examine the impact of the gold
convertibility rule through economic history and theory in the context of the eigh-
teenth century gold standard: the Pre-classical Gold Standard of 1717-1797. By
contrast, the Classical Gold Standard, a method for regulating monetary arrange-
ments between nations, lasted an extraordinarily short time.4 At the beginning
of this chapter I examine the institutional development which led to the gold con-
vertibility rule emerging as the most important monetary policy rule. According
to Flandreau (2007) the benets of the gold convertibility rule were formally ac-
knowledged during the Suspension Period, but in this chapter I argue that the gold
convertibility rule emerged as an predominant principle soon after the establish-
ment of the Bank of England in 1694. The credible commitment to the gold con-
vertibility rule brought benets, such as access to public borrowing on favourable
terms, but required discipline and good governance. As the Banks control over
the economy was limited, and its gold reserves were low, the Bank had to use an
unconventional adjustment cost strategy to maintain the gold convertibility rule.
In the nal section of this chapter, I analyse the e¤ects of this adjustment cost
through the lens of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model which shows
how the adjustment cost was potentially an e¢ cient way to control not just gold
demand but the economy as a whole.
4Chown (1994) p. 72.
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2.2. Emergence of the Gold Convertibility Rule as a Core Monetary
Policy Rule
2.2.1. Constitutional Arrangements that Improved the Credibility of
Economic Policy
A history of Britains constitutional development demonstrates clearly how impor-
tant it was to reform monetary and nancial practices. Although tightly inter-
linked, many economic historians, for example Fetter (1965), examine the develop-
ment of monetary policy without much reference to scal policy, such as national
debt. In this section I explain how the commitment to the gold convertibility
rule was only possible after substantial improvement in the credibility of public
institutions which had started at the end of the seventeenth century.
The establishment of the Bank of England in 1694 as a private joint stock bank
that was in charge of public nance, was the most successful out of the hundreds of
nancial experiments of the late seventeenth century5. The Bank was born, out of
the marriage of conveniencebetween the business community of the City and the
government of the day:6 the merchants were motivated by prot opportunities and
the government needed cash to pay for its war expenditure. The establishment of
a credit institution, which was under the direct control of Parliament, gradually
5The Bank of Englands notional early rival could have been the Land Bank. Its supporters saw
the Bank of England as hugely speculative, and by using the words of Daniel Defoe, thought that
Land was the best bottom for public banks. Clapham (1944) Vol I, p. 1.
6Davies (1994) p. 256.
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ended the dominance of the goldsmiths over the credit market, whose business
practices had largely been unregulated.7
But the Bank of England was not born as an historical accident, as sometimes
argued, rather, its establishment was a part of wider economic development in
public nance called the Financial Revolution. Until the end of the seventeenth
century the English government, unlike its counterparts in wealthy continental
countries such as Holland or the Italian Kingdoms, did not have access to long-
term borrowing. During the Commonwealth, indirect taxation, especially custom
duties, increased public revenue, and made the funding of short-term borrowing
securing interest payments of loans by taxation possible to a limited extent.8
Return to royal rule did not improve the state nance any further as in order to
cover large and recurrent revenue decits the crown and its government had to
mainly rely on selling and renting of the Crowns lands. The existing loans were
principally Crowns personal loans, being backed only by the Crowns promises
and debatable reputation. By cancelling contracts and forcing loans the Crown
ensured that the royal debt stayed small and costly to serve. During the short
reign of James II in the 1680s the royal debt amounted to £ 2 million pounds9 and
the long-term interest rate was approximately eight percent.10
7Vilar (1976) p. 213.
8Dickson (1967) p. 42. Hargreaves (1930) p. 1.
9OBrien (2001).
10Dickson (1967) p. 470.
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The scal and nancial revolution emerged after the Glorious Revolution of
1688, which has been seen as the starting point of the development of e¢ cient
capital markets and improved opportunities for public nance through borrowing
and taxation. Long-term public borrowing was introduced by William III and
his Dutch advisors, but it did not gain immediate acceptance.11 Contemporary
critics saw the public debt, modelled on Hollands public funding system, as a
political trick and just one more way to raise the wealth of the aristocrats. The
Bill of Rights (1689) gave Parliament control over the public spending of crown
and government as it examined and censored the budget and voted on taxes. Even
though Parliament was a corrupt institution and its control was introduced in order
to secure support for the new regime, it increased the credibility of the state as
borrower and increased the willingness of both domestic and foreign creditors to
lend money in higher amounts and on a lower rate than before the Revolution.12
The long-term rate of interest, as measured by the yield on the government stock,
reduced from the war time rate of 14 percent in the 1690s to 6-7 percent in the
period 1702-1714. The key evidence of this institutional success, which allowed the
government to commit credibly to upholding property rights, was a rapid growth
of private capital markets.13
According to Dickson (1967) after the War of Spanish Succession in 1714 the
governments tax revenue from custom, excise and land was su¢ ciently high, about
11Dickson (1967) pp 17-18.
12Hargreaves (1930) p 4.
13North and Weingast (1989).
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£ 6 millions per year, to cover the ordinary government expenditure. Improved in-
direct taxation enabled Britain to move towards tax smoothing, which meant that
recurrent wars of the eighteenth century the War of Austrian Succession (1740-
1748), the Seven Years War (17561763) and the War of American Independence
(17751783) were nanced by borrowing and, subsequently servicing and amor-
tising the debt by taxation in peace time. As compared to the unpopular and slow
process of collecting taxes, short-term borrowing had real advantages, especially in
sudden emergencies. Some short-term credit instruments could have been issued by
the Exchequer and other departments independently from the Parliament and were
considered to be a temporary emergency measure. After the crisis, more expen-
sive short-term debt was gradually converted into long-term funded debt and then
consolidated into perpetual annuities.14 The long-term national debt, a funded
debt, took its name from the policy of backing the debt by taxation; Parliament
voted for earmarked tax for each individual loan. Broz and Grossman (2003) sum-
marise advantages of funding the loans over short-term debt. Firstly, by paying
the subscribers annually over long periods helped the government to meet the im-
mediate needs of war nance; and secondly, funded debt facilitated e¢ ciently tax
smoothing. Successful serving of the debt after one war built up the governments
reputation and allowed it to build even larger debt in the following war.15
14Bordo and White (1991) p. 305. Sargent and Velde (1995) p. 478.
15Bordo and White (1991) p. 305.
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2.2.2. The Bank as an Agent of Government Finance
After the establishment of the Bank of England, Parliaments priority was to nd
ways of limiting the power of the King and government over the Bank of England
in lending. The Bank had to instantly stop payment if it had ceased to receive the
interest on the sum which it had advanced to the government16 and the Bank was
not allowed to lend to the government without the explicit consent of Parliament.
In this section, I argue that equally signicant was another novel aspect of the
Banks operations: management of its own specie and bullion reserves. Given that
gold and silver emerged as money in ancient times, it seems di¢ cult to imagine
that before the establishment of the Bank there were no public institutions that
would be credible enough to have gold reserves and issue convertible paper money.
To understand why the gold convertibility rule became so crucial, it is useful to
think of a counter factual: previous monarchs had not been able to issue notes
payable on demand because, unlike the Bank, they did not have reserves of any
kind and, for example, Charles IIs orders were payable only with eighteen months
delay.17 Although the rst balance sheet of the Bank shows that its gold reserves
were low compared to its liabilities and its assets mainly consisted of government
paper, the merchants accepted the notes at par in payments very soon after its
establishment. The condence of merchants was the most important determinant
of the Banks strength.18
16North and Weingast (1989) p. 821.
17Feavearyear (1963) pp. 126-127.
18Vilar (1976) p. 281.
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The Bank of England was not, however, the rst public institution, which had
issued duciary currency, but the rst one to be able to issue it in a sustainable
manner and to learn from its own mistakes. The rst lesson in the management of
public nance and convertibility came as early as in 1696. Charles II had started
to issue tallies, wooden sticks that had previously been used as evidence of tax
payments, to persons who made either advances or gave supplies to the king,
promising to redeem them later with interest.19 Tallies were issued to such an
extent that even though the interest rate on them was increased, no more could
be placed. At the date of the Banks foundation the value of tallies outstanding
was around £ 5,000,000 and they were accepted in the City only at a considerable
discount of 25 or 30 percent.20 The Bank, however, in addition to deposits and
interest-bearing notes, had the right to raise working capital through discounting
the bills of exchange, which tallies practically were. The acceptance of tallies at
the Bank had two immediate e¤ects: the value of these wooden sticks rose to par,
and the government was again able to issue them, using the income to pay the
suppliers of the army.
The tallies resulted in a credit expansion accompanied by a fever of gambling in
the stock market, increased gold and silver prices and depreciation of the currency.
The price of silver and commodities increased by about 25 percent, but the price
of gold and the gold guineas increased by about 40 percent. The circulating coins
19Feavearyear (1963) p. 110.
20Feavearyear (1963) p.127.
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became badly clipped: during the recoinage between 1695 and 1696, £ 4,700,000
worth of clipped coins brought to the Royal Mint contained only £ 2,700,000 worth
of silver.21
After the rst credit expansion the special position of the Bank of England, as
a banker to government and as a London note issuer, was recognised. The lesson
learned was that the purpose of the Bank was not to absorb as much government
debt as possible, but to make the government debt an attractive investment option.
Since the nominal return on government debt was xed, large purchases of the debt
by the Bank were likely to increase circulating money stock, raise the price level
and reduce the realised return of the government paper. In order to encourage
the public to buy government paper, of which return is thus inversely related
to ination, the value of money had to stay stable and the publics condence
towards the monetary system strong. In the eighteenth century the national debt
was not created by the Bank of Englands direct purchases, but through the issue
of bills and bonds which were traded on the London Stock Exchange. At the same
time that the national debt was born, paper money came into existence, as people
gradually realised that money could take forms other than just specie with intrinsic
value. Because the Bank was not able to control the nations total money supply,
for the reasons that are examined in the next section, gold convertibility became the
main method of maintaining the credibility and stability of the monetary system.
21Feavearyear (1963) p. 141.
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2.2.3. The Extent of the Bank of Englands Control over the Money
Supply
In order to be able to examine the e¤ectiveness of the Bank of Englands monetary
policy during the period of Pre-classical Gold Standard, I examine the extent to
which the Bank was able to control the total money supply of the country. During
the Industrial Revolution, demand for various di¤erent types of bills and notes was
so high around the country that the supply of Bank of England notes alone could
not satisfy the demand.
The English banking system developed as a three layered pyramid, as seen
in Figure 2.1, consisting of the Bank of England, the rest of the London private
banks and the country banks.22 By the second half of the eighteenth century the
Bank of England notes had become the main currency used in large payments in
London. London private banks gradually ceased to issue notes because they could
not compete with the interest rate paid by the Bank of England.23 The Bank of
England notes rarely circulated outside the London area, where the country bank
notes were the main medium of exchange. Especially after 1750 the growth of
the country banks had increased regional money supply. The system resembled
the gold exchange standard of the twentieth century: the private bank notes were
convertible to the Bank of England notes, which in turn were convertible to gold
on demand. Many of the London bankers kept their reserves in the Bank notes or
22Fetter (1965). Pressnell (1956) pp. 75-76.
23Pressnell (1956).
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Figure 2.1. Credit Pyramid in the Eighteenth Century
towards the end of the eighteenth century, kept accounts in the Bank. They had,
therefore, direct access to the Bank of Englands notes and bullion. The London
private banks integrated small country bank units by supplying links between
country banks in agricultural areas, which had excess capital for lending, and the
industrial areas, which had excess demand for capital.
The enactment of the Bubble Act of 172024 limited the maximum partners of
banks in England and Wales to six and gave the Bank of England a monopoly in
joint stock banking. The capital of any other bank was therefore limited to what
could be provided by up to six partners, which meant that English banks were
severely undercapitalised.25 The number of the country banks grew hand-in-hand
246 Geo. I, c. 18.
25Dowd (1989) p. 118 .
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with the Industrial Revolution. The growth was, however, uneven, as it was typical
for the country banks that their numbers would have been brought down by a crisis
and the note circulation down by a third or by half, but one or two years after
each crisis both their number and note issue was again greater than ever. In 1750
there were twelve country banks outside London but in 1793, there were nearly
400.26 The number of London private banks almost doubled in the second half
of the eighteenth century. Data on the circulation of country bank notes is not
available until 1804 and onwards when the law required stamp duties to be paid
on private notes. The value of all notes stamped in 1805 was £ 10,700,000 thus the
private bank notes consisted of almost forty percent of the total paper money in
circulation.27
The Bank of Englands control over the country banks was not obvious as they
did not keep substantial amounts of reserves in the Bank notes or gold, but in
deposits with London private banks.28 Therefore, the main inuence of the Bank
over the country banks was through the London money market. If there was a
small, urgent, need for money, coin was still the only form of money available as
small notes were illegal in England and Wales. The country banks then drew down
their gold deposits from London, and London banks drew cash from their accounts
with the Bank. According to Pressnell (1956) to some extent the Bank functioned
as a lender of last resort: when money was scarce country banks in general turned
26Pressnell (1956) pp. 5-7.
27Pressnell (1956) p. 188.
28Pressnell (1956) p.76.
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to London much as London rms turned to the Bank of England as the lender of
last resort.29
In the eighteenth century it was not yet realised that convertibility alone was
not su¢ cient to guarantee stable prices when hundreds of banks were allowed to
issue their own notes. As country bank notes were convertible to gold on demand,
currency should have, in theory, behave as if it was entirely of gold. David Humes
price-specie-ow mechanism, discussed in section 1.2, implied that any loss of gold
to other countries should have required the country banks to reduce their note
issue by the same absolute amount so that prices in Britain would fall, and foreign
prices rise, together acting to restore equilibrium on the foreign exchanges and in
the relative price levels. But given the uncoordinated manner by which notes were
issued, the response was not quick to prevent uctuations in nance and trade.30
It was widely believed at the time that the instability of English banks was
not due to their undercapitalisation, lack of reserves or money supply, but to their
freedom to set their own terms of redemption and issue small notes.31 As silver
and small coins were rare, notes with face value of six pence became acceptable.
Therefore, the circulation was not restricted through limiting the rights of money
supply as such but the face value of notes. In 1775 Parliament forbade English
banks from issuing notes of less than £ 1 in order to protect the public, especially
29Pressnell (1956) p. 76.
30Davies (1994) p. 310.
31Dowd (1989) p. 118.
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illiterate poor people, who commonly used the small notes. Two years later Parlia-
ment passed further laws reducing the negotiability of paper money and specifying
some security measures, such as signatures and dates, on notes.
Until the Suspension Period there was no organised discussion about the rela-
tion of the credit of the private banks to the total money supply or of the potential
problems resulting from the fast growth of the country banks. Fetter (1965) ar-
gues that the banking problems stayed in the background of the political agenda
as more acute questions such as parliamentary reform, the American War of In-
dependence and the French Revolution dominated the discussion.32 It is possible
that the country bankscredit issue did not bother decision makers because it did
not create major ination. Troubles lay ahead, however: between 1790 and 1793
canal mania had increased the credit demand for investments, which were partic-
ularly slow to yield return. The outbreak of the French Revolutionary war in 1793
was followed by a deep nancial crisis in England, but the war rather accelerated
the crisis.33 The Bank of England, with the help of the Treasurys issues of the
Exchequer Bills, was able to maintain gold convertibility for four further years, but
in February 1797 the Bank ceased gold payments altogether to protect its reserves
and maintain its notes in circulation.34
32Fetter (1965) p. 11.
33Pressnell (1956) p. 457.
34Fetter (1965) p. 14.
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2.3. Strategies to Secure Convertibility during the Pre-classical Gold
Standard
2.3.1. Gold Supply and Demand
In previous sections I examined the importance of the gold convertibility rule and
the Banks lack of control of the total money supply, which would have been,
without doubt, the most e¢ cient way to support convertibility. As this was not
possible, one would assume that the Bank had ways of controlling gold markets, i.e.
gold supply and demand. But again, unsystematic monetary development meant
that there was a large conict between aims and means. This was potentially prob-
lematic in the commodity standard environment, because any kind of commodity
standard has to deal with the dilemma of arbitrage prots, which arises when the
market price of the commodity backing the currency increases above the mint or
monetary price, the price the individual has to pay to purchase the commodity
from the central bank. For example, if the monetary price of gold were below the
market price, gold could be purchased from the central bank and sold at a higher
price in the private market. The arbitrage prot is the di¤erence between the
monetary and the market price of gold.
The theory of the Classical Gold Standard rules out these arbitrage prot op-
portunities by the automatic price adjustment mechanism. The circulating money
stock has to decrease when people buy gold from the central bank and as a result
the market price level of all commodities, including gold, falls until the original
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rise in the market price of gold is matched. The arbitrage automatically keeps the
market price of gold equal to the mint price of gold. Under the international gold
standard, disturbances in the price level in one country were wholly o¤set by an
automatic balance-of-payments adjustment mechanism, which involved shipping
of gold from one country to another.35 As discussed in the previous chapter this
and other automatic operations of the gold standard have been the focus of much
economic research.
The price adjustment mechanism, however, did not work to the same extent
during the Pre-classical Gold Standard as the gold standard did not yet operate as
an international rule. Regular wars and revolutions in European countries caused
political disturbances and commercial distress such as trade blockades. Disruptions
in gold supply and shipping conditions, especially during maritime warfare, made
the gold convertibility rule a challenging task to follow. Bank runs and nancial
panics were relatively common and demand for gold was at its highest during
political disruption. If there were simultaneous gold supply blockades, the Bank
of England was in danger of exhausting its gold reserves. The bullion reserves of
the Bank fell especially during the wars, when the expenditure of the government
increased. As seen in Figure 2.2, the gold backing of the Bank notes was far from
perfect.
Strict laws prohibited the export of English bullion and coins or smelting Eng-
lish specie, but export of foreign gold was permitted. From 1717 to 1797 the xed
35Goodfriend (1988).
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Figure 2.2. Bank of Englands Bullion Reserves and Notes in Circu-
lation 1720-1797. Annually.
monetary or mint price of gold had been at £ 3.17s.101
2
d. an ounce. As can be seen
in Figure 2.3 the market price of gold prior to the Suspension Period had risen
above the parity price only by a relatively small percentage. Englands principal
foreign exchange operations were with Hamburg, which was on a silver standard
and the uctuations in the London-Hamburg rate were linked to changes in the
gold-silver ratio in Hamburg. According to Fetter the price changes were so small
that the prices of gold and silver in London and Hamburg were generally used
interchangeably. The stock of foreign coin and bullion in England was large and
worked as a bu¤er in case there was a temporary fall in the exchange rate and hence
71
reduced the pressure on the Banks bullion.36 The law, which made the export of
British bullion and specie abroad illegal, was supposed to prevent the ow of gold
from Britain, but as the law was di¢ cult to implement, it did not have much ef-
fect. According to Fetter (1965) there was a general acceptance by the bankers
and merchants of London of the idea that in practice British monetary gold was
withdrawn from the Bank and smuggled to the continent when the exchanges were
unfavorable and the price of gold abroad was higher than at home.37
Figure 2.3. Percentage Deviation of the Market Price of Gold from Par.
36Fetter (1965) pp. 27-28.
37Fetter (1965) pp. 4-6.
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Vilar (1976) argues that the stable system of gold import and minting played
a crucial part in creating monetary stability in England, which lasted until the
end of the eighteenth century.38 This fact is captured by the theoretical models
presented in Chapters 4 and 5. The banker who has partial reserves, but is required
to convert notes on demand, has to have access to other sources of gold in case
gold demand exceeds reserves. As Britain did not have any gold mines of its
own, the domestic demand for new gold had to be satised by import. Early in
the eighteenth century new gold mines were found in Brazil, which between 1721
and 1780 produced 56 percent of the worlds gold39. The rst beneciary of the
sudden increase in Brazilian gold production and gold imports into Europe was its
colonial master Portugal, but it was not able to keep possession of the metal. The
Anglo-Portuguese diplomatic and military alliance during the Wars of the Spanish
Succession (1701-1714), and some small scale economic complementaries, such as
privilege in wine import, gave Britain a great advantage in the Portuguese gold
trade40. In the commercial triangle of Brazil, Britain and Portugal, the balance
was always in Britains favour and virtually free competition for British goods in
Portugal and its colonies drained gold away from them.41
As the gold supply conditions were stable, the Bank of England was able to
support the monetary system with a relatively low gold backing rate. Figure 2.3
38Vilar (1976) p. 231.
39Schmitz (1979).
40Vilar (1976) p. 225 argues that Portugal become if not totally dependent on England politi-
cally, at least strongly inuenced by her economically, almost to exclusion of other powers.
41Vilar (1976) p. 227.
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shows how, apart from an exception in 1740, the value of bullion was always below
the value of depository notes. The Bank itself was an active gold trader and bought
gold directly from the ships to meet immediate gold demand and employed its own
gold dealers.42 As the Bank had to exchange gold for its notes, buying gold did not
increase the gold backing rate signicantly, but helped to satisfy the gold demand
in the short-run. Another motivation in restricting the outow of monetary gold
was to avoid the Bank making a loss on gold trade. Between 1774 and 1797 the
average price of standard gold bullion had been £ 3.17s.73
4
d.43 As the mint price of
gold was £ 3.17s.101
2
d., the average market price was just 0.003 percent below the
mint price. If the market price of gold was high and the Bank was forced to buy
gold, it made a loss, as gold had to be sold out at a xed price.
2.3.2. Methods to Reduce Outow of Monetary Gold
When monetary gold was withdrawn faster than it was deposited, the Bank of
England had a number of strategies to reduce the outow of the gold. For ex-
ample, the Bank o¤ered to change its ordinary deposit notes to interest bearing
notes or some other form of paper currency. In May 1696 the Governor of the
Bank announced that government tallies would be given to any person under any
uneasiness for want of his mony44 and people were invited to exchange their notes
42Clapham (1944) Vol I, p.132.
43Clapham (1944) Vol I, p. 8.
44Acres (1931) Vol I, p. 70.
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to sealed bills, which bore interest.45 The same strategy was used again during
the crisis following the South Sea Bubble in 1721.46 As the lack of, and therefore
the demand for, small change was chronic at the eighteenth century, the Bank
persuaded the public to accept conversion of their large notes to the same amount
of new notes which had a smaller face value.
Various delaying strategies were also common. In 1696 the Bank committed to
pay all notes of £ 5 and under in full only alphabetically:
beginning upon Wednesday the 28th day of October instant with
Notes payable to names of A and B, and so on Wednesday of every
week two letters through the alphabet.47
Another delaying strategy was to pay demands for cash in shillings and six-
pences. The Bank adopted the strategy from the goldsmiths who had monopolised
the banking business until the establishment of the Bank of England in 1694.48
Even at the end of the eighteenth century only relatively wealthy individuals had
accounts at the Bank, and ordinary people, the most likely to rush to withdraw
their small savings, deposited their valuables with the goldsmiths. The goldsmiths,
who had to face the rst wave of the cash runs, began to delay payments during
the panic caused by the second Anglo-Dutch war in 1667, when the Dutch eet
was in the Thames and threatened to attack London. They and some other City
45Clapham (1944) Vol I, p. 42.
46Acres (1931) Vol I, p. 117.
47Acres (1931) Vol I, pp. 73-74, as quoted in London Gazette 26 November 1696.
48Acres (1931) Vol I, p. 5.
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businessmen considered the Bank of England as their competitor.49 The lead-
ing goldsmiths remained hostile towards the Bank and could demand immediate
payment in cash at a time when they knew the Bank was embarrassed.50
Bank runs usually followed domestic disturbances such as the South Sea Bubble
in 172151 and the Battle of Prestonpans in 1745 during the Jacobite Rebellion.52
Gentlemans Magazine describes how the Jacobites had a
design to hurt credit as much as was in their power, and to get gold
to send to the rebels; in which the directors wisely disappointed
them, by ordering payment in silver53.
Often it was only a general feeling of uneasiness that made people prefer cash
to notes. For example the serious illness of Queen Anne in 1713, her death in
1714 and uncertainty about her successor caused runs on the Bank54. Panics were
sometimes groundless, and it seems that it was di¢ cult to forecast which event
actually provoked a bank run. For example Clapham mentions that during the
Seven YearsWar (1759-63) there was no acute banking pressure and the war
years were a time of relative domestic prosperity.55
49Acres (1931) Vol I, p. 5.
50Acres (1931) Vol I, p. 98.
51Acres (1931) Vol I p. 116-117.
52Acres (1931) Vol I pp. 180-181. Clapham (1944) Vol I pp. 233-234.
53Gentlemans Magazine Vol. 15, Sept 1748, pp. 499-500.
54Acres (1931) Vol I p. 107.
55Clapham (1944) Vol I, p. 236.
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2.4. Implications of the Adjustment Cost Policy
Although these delaying strategies and other methods the Bank used to slow
down the ow of gold from its vaults might seem unconventional means of conduct-
ing monetary policy, they proved to be e¤ective strategies in managing the gold
standard during the chaotic years of the eighteenth century. The DSGE model
developed in this section shows how the impact of the adjustment cost policy was
not just limited to the gold reserves of the Bank, but had an e¤ect on the economy
as whole.
2.4.1. The Model
Consider an economy which has two sectors, household and the central bank, and
one perishable consumption good and one durable consumption good, gold. Only
gold can be stored across the periods and therefore, it has also the role of a capital
good. Gold yields direct utility to the representative household and enters into its
utility function. The central bank monopolises the gold trade in the country: it
buys gold from abroad according to its gold stockpile policy and the only way the
household is able to buy gold is to convert some notes to gold at the central bank.
The monetary price of gold, the price the household has to pay at the central
bank, is always xed at q. Buying gold from the bank is associated with an
adjustment cost56 which can take the form of foregone leisure or we can think that
the consumption good gets destroyed at a convex rate while the agent waits at the
56Adjustment costs on durable goods are examined by Bernanke (1982).
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bank. The total cost of buying newgold from the central bank, qt (Kt  Kt 1) ; is
the sum of the monetary price of gold and the convex adjustment cost,
(2.1) qt (Kt  Kt 1) = q (Kt  Kt 1) +  (Kt  Kt 1)
1

Kgt 1
;
where q denotes the xed money price of the gold, Kt is the households gold stock
at period t, Kgt is the monetary gold stock at period t and parameter  denes
the steepness of the cost curve, 0 <   1. The adjustment cost is an increasing
function of gold demand (Kt  Kt 1) in period t and a decreasing function of the
monetary gold stockKgt 1 in period t 1: The larger the stock of gold in the central
banks vaults, the more willing the bank is to sell out gold.
The circulating money stock, denominated in nominal units such as pounds,
represents a liability of the central bank and takes the physical form of a paper
claim rather than a commodity. As in Barros model which was presented in the
rst chapter, a binding law requires the central bank to be prepared to buy and
sell any amount of gold o¤ered or demanded in exchange for paper money at the
xed pound price q: The money stock per capita in period t is given by
(2.2) Mt =
qKgt
t
;
where t 2 (0; 1] is the gold reserve ratio.
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If (2.2) is written for Kgt ; and substituted to (2.1), the total cost of gold pur-
chases becomes
(2.3) qt (Kt  Kt 1) = q
"
(Kt  Kt 1) +  (Kt  Kt 1)
1

tMt
#
:
The higher the circulating money stock, the lower the adjustment cost of gold
purchases.
In this Lucasian economy agents are households with two specialised individ-
uals, a producer and a shopper. The discussion is restricted to a representative
household. The shopper enters period t with predetermined holdings Mt 1 of
money, which the producer had gained during the previous period. Like in the
Lucass tree model the household does not consume its own production directly,
but has to sell it in markets for money. With this money the shopper buys the con-
sumption good and gold in the following period.57 In period t the shopper has an
opportunity to purchase the consumption good at price Pt, gold at xed monetary
price q and government bonds that yield a risk free interest rate Rt. By assuming
that the adjustment cost reduces available consumption directly, the adjustment
cost enters the cash-in-advance constraint
(2.4)
q
Pt
(Kt  Kt 1) + Ct  Mt 1
Pt
+
q
Pt

(Kt  Kt 1)
1

t 1Mt 1
;
57Sargent (1987) pp. 156-15 9.
79
where Ct denotes the households consumption. The cash-in-advance constraint
states that gold and consumption purchases in period t are limited by the cash
holdings and the adjustment cost at the beginning of period t. Government bonds
are not subject to a cash-in-advance constraint, as we assume that gold deposits
can be converted to bonds directly.
The cash-in-advance constraint, not just in this chapter, but also in Chapters 4
and 5, puts an emphasis on the fact that in this thesis I model a commodity stan-
dard, where money is used in exchange, rather than a commodity money system.58
To date the gold standard and other commodity standards have been modelled
assuming that either specie or redeemable notes alongside with coins are used as
a medium of exchange. This dissertation, however, makes a departure from the
prevailing literature by considering an economy where only paper money circu-
lates and gold operates as a backing commodity if held by the central bank or as a
consumable good that yields utility if held by the household. Commodity money
systems have been analysed recently by Barro (1979), Sargent and Wallace (1983),
Goodfriend (1988) and Bordo, Dittmar and Gavin (2003).
An innitely lived households preferences are described by the utility function.
The total utility is taken to be the sum of expected discounted values of present
58Velde and Weber (2000) introduce a similar constraint which they call coins-in-advance con-
straintin their model of bimetallism.
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and future period utilities
(2.5) E0
1X
t=0
t [u (Ct) + w (Kt)] ;
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, Et is an expectation conditional on informa-
tion up to and including time period t and u0 (Ct) = w0 (Kt) = 0 when Ct; Kt !1
and u0 (Ct) = w0 (Kt) =1 when Ct; Kt ! 0:
By choosing sequences for Ct; Bt+1; Mt and Kt; the representative household
maximises (2.5) subject to the sequence of cash-in-advance constraints (2.4) and
the following budget constraint
(2.6)
Bt+1
RtPt
+
Mt
Pt
+
q
Pt
Kt  Mt 1
Pt
  Ct + q
Pt
Kt 1 +
Yt
Pt
+
Bt
Pt
for all t;
where the endowment Yt is an exogenous state variable, the government bonds are
denoted by Bt and the price of bonds is dened as the inverse of the interest rate
1=Rt 2 (0; 1]. Initial levels of M0; K0; Kg0 and B0 are given. The Lagrangian for
the household problem is
L = E0
1X
t=0
t [u (Ct) + w (Kt)](2.7)
+t

Mt 1
Pt
  Ct + q
Pt
Kt 1 +
Yt
Pt
+
Bt
Pt
  Bt+1
RtPt
  Mt
Pt
  q
Pt
Kt

+t
"
Mt 1
Pt
+
q
Pt

(Kt  Kt 1)
1

t 1Mt 1
  q
Pt
(Kt  Kt 1)  Ct
#
:
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The rst order conditions necessary for the optimality of the households choices
are
Ct : u
0 (Ct) = t + t(2.8)
Bt+1 :
t
RtPt
= Et
t+1
Pt+1
(2.9)
Mt :
t
Pt
= Et
"
t+1 + t+1
Pt+1
  t+1
q
Pt+1

(Kt+1  Kt)
1

tM
2
t
#
(2.10)
Kt : 0 = w
0 (Kt) + t
q
Pt
"
(Kt  Kt 1)
1 

t 1Mt 1
  1
#
  t q
Pt
(2.11)
+Et
(
t+1
q
Pt+1
"
1  (Kt+1  Kt)
1 

tMt
#
+ t+1
q
Pt+1
)
(2.12) t
"
Mt 1
Pt
+
q
Pt

(Kt  Kt 1)
1

t 1Mt 1
  q
Pt
(Kt  Kt 1)  Ct
#
 0; t  0
lim
i!1
Rt+S
Bt+i
Pt+i
= 0(2.13)
lim
i!1
Mt+i
Pt+i
= 0:(2.14)
Combining (2.8), (2.9) and (2.10) and rearranging we get that
(2.15) t = u
0 (Ct) [Rt 1   1]
"
Rt 1   q (Kt  Kt 1)
1

t 1M
2
t 1
# 1
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The multiplier t; the shadow value of liquidity services of money, has to be non-
negative in order for the cash-in-advance constraint to be binding. As Rt 1  1; the
second term of equation (2.15) is positive. The third term, the adjustment cost
term, is positive since
(2.16) 0  q (Kt  Kt 1)
1

t 1M
2
t 1
 1:
If the adjustment cost term equals unity, t equals the marginal utility of con-
sumption.
Combining (2.8) and (2.9) gives the Euler equation
(2.17)
u0 (Ct)  t
RtPt
= Et
u0 (Ct+1)  t+1
Pt+1
:
Substituting (2.15) into (2.18) gives
u0 (Ct)
Pt
8<:1  [Rt 1   1]
"
Rt 1   q (Kt  Kt 1)
1

t 1M
2
t 1
# 19=;(2.18)
= RtEt
u0 (Ct+1)
Pt+1
8<:1  [Rt   1]
"
Rt   q (Kt+1  Kt)
1

tM
2
t
# 19=; :
The Euler equation can be written as
(2.19)
u0 (Ct)
Pt
g (Rt 1; Kt) = RtEt

u0 (Ct+1)
Pt+1
g (Rt; Kt+1)

;
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where
(2.20) g (Rt 1; Kt) = 1  [Rt 1   1]
"
Rt 1   q (Kt  Kt 1)
1

t 1M
2
t 1
# 1
and
(2.21) g (Rt; Kt+1) = 1  [Rt   1]
"
Rt   q (Kt+1  Kt)
1

tM
2
t
# 1
are the adjustment cost terms. As Rt  1 and 0  q (Kt Kt 1)
1

t 1M2t 1
 1; the func-
tion g ()t decreases, when the gold demand in period t increases. If q (Kt+1 Kt)
1

tM
2
t
approaches one, g (Rt; Kt+1) approaches zero.
2.4.2. Stabilisation of Consumption
With these preliminary solutions in hand we are now able to study the e¤ect of
the adjustment cost on consumption.59 Inevitably the adjustment cost on gold
conversion smooths gold consumption, but this section shows how the adjustment
cost also stabilises consumption. The functional form of (2.5) and preferences
follow Goodfriend (1988). In (2.5) the functional form of the utility of consumption
is
(2.22) u (Ct) = vt logCt;
59This part of the model is inspired by Hansen and Singelton (1983).
84
where vt is a consumption preference parameter dened as vt = v (1 + t) > 0;
hence the consumption preference shock is denoted by t and is generated by an
i.i.d. white-noise processes. Respectively, the utility of gold is
(2.23) w (Kt) = wt logKt;
where wt = w (1 + !t) > 0 is the gold preference parameter and the gold preference
shock !t is generated by an i.i.d. white-noise processes. Using the functional form
of the utility function, the Euler equation (2.18) can be written as
(2.24) RtEt

Ct+1
Ct
 1
vt+1
vt

Pt+1
Pt
 1
g (Rt; Kt+1)
g (Rt 1; Kt)

= 1:
Let
(2.25) ct+1 = Ct+1=Ct;
denote the gross growth rate of consumption,
(2.26) xt+1 = (vt+1=vt) (Pt+1=Pt)
 1 g (Rt; Kt+1) =g (Rt 1; Kt)
and
(2.27) zt+1  c 1t+1xt+1:
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In what follows I assume that the joint distribution of ct+1 and xt+1 is lognormal
which might, in the presence of adjustment costs, seem simplistic. This simpli-
cation seems acceptable as my aim is to examine the e¤ect of the adjustment cost
mechanism on the economy at the macroeconomic level and not to test this theory
empirically. Hansen and Singelton (1983) list some restrictions that are caused
by the joint distribution assumption (for example for production technology), but
they are not relevant in our model.
Since the nominal rate of interest Rt is known in period t the equation (2.18)
can be written as
(2.28) Et (zt+1) =
1
Rt
:
Next let c^t+1 = log ct+1; x^t+1 = log xt+1 and z^t+1 = log zt+1: The distribution of z^
is log normal, with constant variance var (z) and mean z;t: Hence, the expected
value of zt+1 is
(2.29) Et (zt+1) = exp

z;t + (var (z) =2)

Equating (2.28) and (2.29) and, rearranging yields
(2.30) z;t =   log Rt   (var (z) =2) :
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Dene the di¤erence between z^t+1 and its mean z;t as
(2.31) Vt+1  z^t+1   z;t:
The expected value of V equals zero,
(2.32) E (Vt+1) = Et
 
z^t+1   z;t

= Et [x^t+1   c^t+1 + log Rt + var (z) =2] = 0;
where z^t+1 = x^t+1   c^t+1 + log Rt. This implies that
(2.33) E (c^t+1) = Et [x^t+1 + log Rt + var (z) =2] :
In order to analyse the variance of c^t+1 we can ignore the constant term log Rt
and (var (z) =2) : The predictable terms variances of x^t+1 and c^t+1 are related
by the expression
var [E (c^t+1)] = var [E (x^t+1)](2.34)
= var
"
E
 
log

vt+1
vt

Pt+1
Pt
 1
g (Rt; Kt+1)
g (Rt 1; Kt)
!#
:
As noted above the function g (Rt; Kt+1) is a decreasing function of the demand
for new gold (Kt+1  Kt) : Therefore, if the gold demand increases the adjustment
cost puts downward pressure on consumption by reducing the variance of the ex-
pected consumption growth rate var [E (c^t+1)] : The higher the adjustment cost for
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gold, the lower the expected variance of the consumption growth rate and more
stable the consumption.
The adjustment cost implies that mean consumption is lower, but the variance
of expected consumption (2.34) is smaller. There is, therefore, a trade-o¤ in which
agents might be willing to reduce mean consumption for more predictable con-
sumption and in the future, it might be interesting to analyse whether some level
of adjustment costs, in some sense, might be optimal.
2.4.3. Price Level Smoothing
How does the adjustment cost together with the central banks gold stock pile
policy a¤ect the price level? In order to solve for the price path, combine the
rst order conditions (2.8) and (2.11), substitute t with (2.15) and use (2.20) and
(2.21) to simplify the expression to yield
(2.35)
0 = w0 (Kt) +
u0 (Ct)
Pt
[1  g (Rt 1; Kt)] q (Kt  Kt 1)
1 

t 1Mt 1
  q
Pt
u0 (ct)
+Et
(
q
Pt+1
u0 (Ct+1)  u
0 (Ct+1)
Pt+1
[1  g (Rt; Kt+1)]
"
q (Kt+1  Kt)
1 

tMt
#)
:
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Using recursive substitution and the law of iterated expectations (2.35) can be
expressed as
q
Pt
u0 (Ct)
(
1  [1  g (Rt 1; Kt)] (Kt  Kt 1)
1 

t 1Mt 1
)
(2.36)
=
1X
i=0
Et
iw0 (Kt+i)
+TEt
q
Pt+T
u0 (Ct+T )
(
1  [1  g (Rt 1+T ; Kt+T )] (Kt+T  Kt 1+T )
1 

t 1+TMt 1+T
)
:
As T approaches innity, the transversality condition becomes
(2.37)
lim
T!1
TEt
q
Pt+T
u0 (Ct+T )
(
1  [1  g (Rt 1+T ; Kt+T )] (Kt+T  Kt 1+T )
1 

t 1+TMt 1+T
)
= 0
and (2.36) becomes
(2.38)
q
Pt
u0 (Ct)
"
1  [1  g (Rt 1; Kt)] (Kt  Kt 1)
1 

t 1Mt 1
#
=
1X
i=0
Et
iw0 (Kt+i) :
The price path can be written as
(2.39)
1
Pt
=
"
qu0 (Ct)
(
1  [1  g (Rt 1; Kt)] (Kt  Kt 1)
1 

t 1Mt 1
)# 1 TX
i=0
Et
iw0 (Kt+i) :
As in Goodfriend we turn to consider the central banks gold stockpiling pol-
icy and its e¤ect on the price level. The stock piling policy varies stochastically
according to the gold supply conditions abroad and is written in terms of its e¤ect
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on the households gold stock,
(2.40) Kt =
K
1  t
:
where   N (0; 2) and t 2 [ 1; 1] : Parameter t reects the central banks
gold stockpile policy: For example, a positive gold stockpile shock, such as gold
discovery, increases the gold stock of the central bank and the stock piling para-
meter t > 0. The gold backing  from (2.2) rises which through (2.4) indicates
that the adjustment cost reduces. As in Goodfriend, gold is assumed to be cost-
lessly transformable between utility-yielding and stock-pile forms.60 As the central
bank monopolises the gold trade, the e¤ect of the gold discovery impacts on the
representative household through the central banks policy.
Next we substitute (2.40), (2.22) and (2.23) to (2.39) and take expectations.61
By using the covariance rule E(XY ) = EXEY + cov(X; Y ) we can write the price
path as
1
Pt
=
1
q
"
1  [1  g (Rt 1; Kt)] (Kt  Kt 1)
1 

t 1Mt 1
# 1
Ct
vt

(2.41)

1
K

wt (1  t) +

1   [w   cov (w; )]

;
60Goodfriend (1988) denes gold policy as purchases of gold nanced entirely by bond sales and
interest on the resulting government bonds is nanced with lump-sum taxes. Funds acquired
from pure gold policy actions that reduce the governments gold stockpile, are used to retire
existing government debt or to make new government loans. The reduced interest expense is
used to reduce lump-sum taxes and the increased revenue is paid out in lump-sum transfers.
61See Appendix 2.A for detailed derivation of this equation.
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where 1=Pt is the consumption price of currency in period t, i.e. inverse of the
price level.
With the adjustment cost policy the central bank is able to pursue price level
smoothing. If the gold demand increases, the second term in (2.41)
1  [1  g (Rt 1; Kt)] (Kt  Kt 1)
1 

t 1Mt 1
decreases, which puts a downward pressure to the price level Pt. A positive gold
preference shock has a similar e¤ect on the price level. On the other hand, positive
covariance between the gold preference w and gold stockpile policy  drives up
the price level. If the households gold demand is correlated with the gold supply
conditions, i.e. there is a simultaneous gold inow to the country and an increase
in gold preference, the price level becomes less stable.
During the Classical Gold Standard the automatic adjustment mechanism re-
duced the outow of monetary gold and reduced the arbitrage prot opportunities.
This mechanism did not function in the eighteenth century, because the Bank of
England was not fully in charge of the money supply and regular wars disturbed
gold supply conditions. The adjustment cost on gold purchases had, however, sim-
ilar e¤ects on the economy. If there were an exogenous gold preference shock, the
adjustment cost reduced the price level that made gold relatively more expensive.
Without the adjustment cost the potential variability in consumption would have
been larger: a positive gold preference shock would have increased households
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gold purchases and through the cash-in-advance constraint less money would have
been available for consumption purchases.
If both gold and consumption yield utility to the household, why would the
central bank want to discourage gold consumption? The answer lies in the fact
that the central banks objective here may be to stabilise the economy. Gold con-
sumption reduces the circulating money stock, which through the cash-in-advance
constraint reduces consumption and the market activity. Gold preference shocks
make the economy less stable: as only a small percentage of the countrys money
supply was backed by monetary gold, it was important that the public preferred
to hold paper money and the gold preference shocks could have been controlled
e¢ ciently.
2.5. Conclusions
This chapter has addressed monetary policy during the Pre-classical Gold Stan-
dard, which provides a starting point for the analysis of the Suspension Period.
After the establishment of the Bank of England in 1694 the gold convertibility rule
evolved as a core monetary rule which increased the credibility of the monetary
system. This monetary development was not, however, separate from other polit-
ical development, but a part of larger institutional innovation called the Financial
Revolution.
Two key factors challenged the feasibility of this rule: rstly, the Bank did not
have a monopoly to issue paper money as country banks had a right to print and
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circulate their own notes. Secondly, external shocks such as political disturbances
and arbitrage prot opportunities created bank runs putting pressure on reserves.
The Bank of England was able to manage the gold convertibility rule despite
these challenges with a simple adjustment cost policy, which increased the total
cost of gold purchases. Furthermore, with the adjustment cost the central bank
could manipulate the price level, stabilise consumption and encourage consumption
instead of gold consumption.
One could ask why the adjustment cost policy failed in 1797 when the Bank
had to suspend the gold convertibility rule for twenty-four years. Firstly, until
the end of the century the stable system of gold import and minting played a
crucial role in monetary stability in England, but in the early 1790s there were
large gold supply shocks: the Brazilian mines, which were the main source of new
gold, started to dry up and the market price of Brazilian gold increased. The war
that broke out in 1793 caused disturbances on the sea and increased the insurance
costs of shipping.62 After assignats had failed, France tried to get back to the
gold standard and in 1795 the demand for bullion in Paris was so high that the
guineas bought at the mint price of £ 3.17s.101
2
d. per ounce from the Bank of
England could be sold £ 4.3s.0d per ounce in Paris. The Bank tried to improve
the exchange rate in February 1796 by shipping silver to Hamburg and buying
Brazilian gold from Lisbon, but as the market price of gold bars were now much
higher than the mint price, coinage was unprotable and in the end, gold was sold
62Vilar (1976) p. 227.
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as bars before the Bank had a chance to mint them.63 Finally, the war against
revolutionary France and the direct nancial support for British allies increased
the governments demand for credit and specie. The adjustment mechanism failed
as it could not stop the drain of specie that was not caused by the general public,
but by the government.
In the light of this model the Suspension Period could be seen as an extreme
adjustment cost, a long slow down in gold convertibility. The suspension was
never perfect in the sense that the Bank kept converting those notes it wanted to
withdraw from circulation, such as old bank notes, that were easy to counterfeit.
The Bank also paid its dividends in gold and even increased them from 7:5 percent
to 10:5 percent in 1807. The Suspension Period, however, raises complex modelling
issues, which cannot be addressed in this simple framework.
63Fetter (1965) p.19.
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Appendix 2.A
Taking the expectations of the price path function (2.39) gives:
(2A.1)
1
Pt
=
"
qu0 (Ct)
(
1  [1  g (Rt 1; Kt)] (Kt  Kt 1)
1 

t 1Mt 1
)# 1 TX
i=0
Et
iu0 (Kt+i)
1
Pt
= qu0 (Ct)
"
1  [1  g (Rt 1; Kt)] (Kt  Kt 1)
1 

t 1Mt 1
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(2A.2)
"
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+
1X
i=1
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iwt+i
Kt+i
#
By using the covariance rule E(XY ) = EXEY + cov(X; Y ) we can write the
equation as
1
Pt
= qu0 (Ct)
"
1  [1  g (Rt 1; Kt)] (Kt  Kt 1)
1 

t 1Mt 1
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1
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1 

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CHAPTER 3
From Discretion to Rules: How Gold Convertibility
Emerged as the Best Available Monetary Policy Rule
during the Suspension Period
3.1. Introduction
During the rst ten years of the Suspension Period economic conditions had
remained relatively stable, but in 1808 optimism revived, turned into feverish spec-
ulation with the acquiescence of the Bank, only to be followed by a severe economic
crisis in the summer of 1810. The gloom over the future of the country was cap-
tured by a contemporary French observer, who wrote that neither by payment
nor non-payment can the British be saved.1 Immediate resumption of the gold
standard would have brought capital gains to those who had accepted inconvert-
ible paper currency and an opportunity to gain arbitrage prots at a great cost to
the Bank. On the other hand, continuation of the paper pound regime would have
increased the domestic price level and the market price of gold even further, made
the trade decit worse and eroded the credibility of the Bank of England.
1The Times 21 September 1810.
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The Frenchmans prediction did not come true after all, but it took the Bank
of England a further eleven years before it could start paying out gold. These
years saw the rst public debate over the conduct of monetary policy in British
economic history, known as the Bullion Debates. What was better for society,
it was asked: should the experienced directors of the Bank, who, according to Sir
Francis Baring, seemed to have been able to issue the right amount of money at
the beginning of the Suspension Period,2 be allowed to continue to issue according
to their best knowledge; or, should gold payments be resumed as soon as possible
as Ricardo and his supporters insisted, since inconvertible paper currency was
something unnatural and allowed the directors to issue Bank Notes indenitely.3
Traditionally protagonists have been divided into bullionistsand anti-bullionists
according to whether they blamed the Bank or war-time conditions for creating
ination. Political and economic relationships within the di¤erent interest groups
that participated in the debate were, however, more subtle and complex than
has previously been argued. Neither the bullionists, nor the anti-bullionists were
monolithic, which became obvious towards the end of the 1810s, when adjust-
ment to the gold standard began. Members from both sides considered that there
was a direct link between widespread economic depression that followed the peace
in 1815, and the Banks adjustment policy. The Bank, which had been accused
of conducting inationary policy, was now criticised for its decision to constrain
2Baring (1797) p. 11.
3The Times 17 August 1810.
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circulation. Some Members of Parliament and representatives of private banks
and industry supported the idea of continuation of the suspension or some other
monetary arrangement.
According to Flandreau (2007) there was thus nothing obvious in explaining
why the gold standard was chosen as the best monetary policy rule in the 1810s.
The Bullion Debates challenged all known monetary arrangements and raised cru-
cial questions of what was the most desirable monetary policy rule, what was the
impact of monetary policy on the real-economy and what was the best possible
way to monitor policy makers. This chapter argues that the decision to resume
the gold standard rule in 1821 as an outcome of the Bullion Debates, and modern
best-practice monetary policy design, namely central bank independence following
the analysis of Kydland and Presscott (1977), therefore, have an underlying unity:
they are both social responses to the fundamental problem of time inconsistency
of monetary policy.
But why was the suspension of cash payments a credible monetary system
although it had created an economic environment where the time inconsistency
problem was present? The dominant explanation in the existing literature to this
condence has been that of Bordo and Kydland (1995) and Bordo and Schwartz
(1997). These writers argue that the suspension was credible, because the gold
standard was a contingent and superior rule, which, by contrast to Flandreaus
argument, did not have any alternatives in the minds of people. In this chapter I
argue that Bordo and Kydlands theory would be more plausible if the suspension
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of the gold standard rule had only lasted for three months, as initially planned in
1797, but by 1821 a generation of merchants and bankers had sold and bought,
borrowed and lent without ever having had rst-hand experience of convertible
currency. These monied men would not have based their trust purely on a monetary
doctrine, which seemed distant to many of them by the 1810s. Their trust was
based on the government and the Bank of Englands ability to conduct monetary
policy even in the absence of the gold standard rule. The long-term interest rate
peaked at the beginning of the Suspension Period,4 but remained stable thereafter
and domestic and foreign investors bought government consols in spite of the risk
that the debt might be redeemed in paper money.
The reason that the current study reaches di¤erent conclusions to Bordo and
Kydland (1995) and Bordo and Schwartz (1997) lies in our approaches to the
suspension. Bordo and Kydland (1995) and Bordo and Schwartz (1997) consider
the gold standard and the suspension of cash payments to be essentially similar
monetary regimes one being the continuation of the other while I argue that
the suspension of cash payments was a monetary policy regime in its own right.
This chapter establishes that contemporaries considered the gold standard and
the suspension to be separate systems. Under the gold standard the credibility
of monetary policy had been based on rules but, under suspension, it was based
on the Bank of Englands reputation. The money supply, which was not xed to
monetary gold, and a oating exchange rate increased the degree of exibility in
4As seen in Figure 3.1.
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the economy. Flexibility, in turn, was valuable during the war-time emergency as it
permitted discretionary policies, namely stabilisation, and the need for stabilisation
was urgent during this long war, when one shock followed another. This non-
trivial approach forms the basis of my theoretical models of the Suspension Period
presented in Chapters 4 and 5.
The train of events during the Napoleonic Wars initiated this complex debate
over economic doctrine, which in turn changed political practice, yet these new
theories did not precipitate the Suspension Period. In February 1797 there had
not been time for careful considerations, as the country was on the edge of nancial
ruin. Narrative historiography suggests that the gold standard was abandoned in
order to protect the Banks reserves. This theory does not explain, however, why
the Bank waited for twenty-four years before resuming the gold standard, as its
reserves improved considerably during the rst three months of suspension. Those
researchers, who have acknowledged that there were other motives which justify
the continuation of suspension, have argued that inationary policy during the
Suspension Period maximised either the Banks proprietorsprivate prots5 or the
governments seigniorage revenue6. A fault common to both these theories is that
they ignore of the problem which this episode created in relation to credibility and
time inconsistency. My thesis, in contrast to existing studies, proposes that the
aim of the authorities was to stabilise the economy during this long and exhausting
5See Ricardo (1811) and Andréadès (1909).
6See Bordo and Kydland (1995) and Bordo and Redish (1993).
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war, but the success of this policy was conditional on the credibility of the plan to
resume the gold payments. On a practical level the Bank conducted stabilisation
policy by issuing notes, especially those of small denomination, that were used all
over the country as a medium of exchange,7 by discounting bills of exchange of
London merchants and granting them loans, and by buying the unfunded short-
term debt of the government. Increased money supply had also indirect e¤ects,
for example real wages were likely to decrease when nominal wages reacted slowly
to the changes in money supply. The impact of stabilisation policy is examined
in its historical context in this chapter and in a formal theoretical framework in
Chapter 4.
This chapter does not seek to present a comprehensive overview of the Suspen-
sion Period as those have been already written, for example, by Clapham (1944),
Feavearyear (1963) and Fetter (1965). Rather, relevant historical episodes will be
used selectively in order to motivate theoretical models presented in Chapters 4 and
5. In the rst section of this chapter I analyse how the Banks decision to suspend
gold payments maintained paper money in circulation which in turn supported the
credit markets and stabilised economic activity during the war. The second part
of this chapter examines the Banks monetary strategy and the governments scal
strategy during the war. The third section investigates those structures of society
7Coins disappeared from circulation at the beginning of the Suspension Period. In some extent
coins with insintric value were at this point seen as a good money, and notes subsequently as a
bad money (the Greshams law).
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and economy which enforced the credibility and ensured resumption of the gold
standard.
3.2. Deviation that Stabilised the Economy: the Suspension of Cash
Payments
3.2.1. Credit, Currency and Circulation
On Monday 27 February 1797, after an emergency meeting between the King,
Prime Minister Pitt and the Privy Council of the Bank, the following announce-
ment, entitled as a message from the King, came to mark the start of the Suspen-
sion Period:
The Bank of England should forbear issuing any cash in payment
until the sense of Parliament can be taken on that subject and the
proper measures adopted thereupon for maintaining the means of
circulation and supporting the public and commercial credit of the
kingdom at this important conjuncture.8
Close reading of the declaration reveals how members seemed to have been
equally concerned about the state of circulation and credit, as of the bullion re-
serves of the Bank. The argument that the gold convertibility rule was suspended
in order to secure the Banks gold reserves seems, therefore, anomalous in the light
of the above announcement. The low bullion levels and the shortage of notes re-
sulted in di¤erent sets of problems. Bullion reserves enabled the continuation of
8The Times 28 February 1797.
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gold conversion, which in turn supported the value of money. As established in
Chapter 2, the outow of gold was nothing new as domestic political disturbances
had created gold demand shocks in the eighteenth century, but what had changed
in 1797 was that war time conditions, especially warfare at sea, meant that the
Bank was not able to import gold to replace what left its vaults. On the other
hand, the credit and payment structure of the country was dependent on the circu-
lation of the Bank of England notes. Merchants and entrepreneurs of London were
connected by complex nancial networks and not by bilateral agreements. Failure
of one house would have been detrimental for other businesses and the crises in
London would have spread elsewhere in the country, since London was a nancial
intermediary between industrial and agricultural counties. By suspending the gold
convertibility rule the Bank was able to ensure that circulation did not fall too low
and create deationary pressure.
But how did a central bank became so closely involved with private credit?
The answer lies in the fact that the Bank of England was established as a private
institution, which yielded prots for its share holders and these prots came from
discounting9, purchasing bills of exchange o¤ those London merchants who were
considered credit worthy and able to pay the interest charge. Discounting large
9The Banks discount policy is as old as the Bank itself: In May 1695 the Bank decided that
any safe man might discount up to £ 3000, but at 4 12 percent even if he did not keep his cash
in the Bank. The Bank discounted promissory notes, inland and foreign bills of exchange and
papers of various public and private institutions. It granted the individual loans to the public
that were of all sizes, to all sorts of people and on a considerable variety of securitiessome
of these early loans were hardly anything else than pawns, as the records mention that one man
was able to receive £ 200 on plate. Clapham (1944) pp. 123-129.
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volumes of the bills of the London merchants and private banks, not purchase of
bullion, became a principal method by which the Bank put its notes into circulation
by the end of the eighteenth century.10 These commercial discounts were controlled
by the Bank itself with full discretion. The Banks Committee in Waiting had
the responsibility of supervising the discounting business, but also the Court of
Directors itself imposed rather detailed rules on suitable clients and their maximum
limits.11
The discount business gave the Bank income to pay its dividends, and for
businessmen it gave ready cash, but it also meant that the Bank held assets in
stock which had not reached their redemption date. During a panic this was a
pitfall, especially since the Banks ability to regulate demand for credit was limited.
All private discounts other than East India Bonds (and government consols) were
subject to the legal prohibition of interests above ve percent, even though the real
market rate would have been higher. The well meaning purpose of the usury laws
was to safeguard the public from speculators, but from the Banks viewpoint, the
usury laws stood in the way of e¤ective credit control. The usury laws, condemned
already by Adam Smith,12 made the demand for the Bank of Englands discounts
tightly linked to the variations in market interest rates. If the market rate increased
above ve percent, as often happened during times of distress, the discount business
10King (1936) p. 12.
11Clapham (1944) Vol I p. 124. Clapham (1944) Vol I p. 128-129. Fetter (1967) warns that
economists should be cautious when using Banks credit data, especially series named Bills and
Notes Discounted.
12Smith (1776), Book II p. 319.
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Figure 3.1. Annual Interest Rates 1780-1825.
became unprotable for private lenders.13 The brokers of private lenders evaded the
usury law widely for example, by charging higher commission or refusing to lend
money to those who did not keep high balances on their current accounts. Hence
the Banks discounts became relatively cheap when the market rate of interest rose
above ve percent.14 The usury laws made the Bank expand credit, when it would
have liked to limit it.
13Smith (1776), Book II, p. 458.
14Du¤y (1982).
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As can be seen from Figure 3.1, two decades before the Suspension Period the
long and short-term interest rate15 increased above the usury rate three times. In
1783 a combination of overheating after the peace following the War of American
Independence and commercial di¢ culties in Holland which made Dutch investors
sell their British assets, led to the external drain of bullion. Without being able
to increase the interest rate to reduce demand for discounts, the Bank controlled
the absolute volume of discounts it gave to the London merchants. This policy,
however, worsened the crisis as many merchants were on the edge of insolvency
and later in the same year the Bank felt obliged to increase its discounts as a
precautionary measure.16 Another crisis followed the outbreak of war with France
in February 1793 when country banks were brought down by the runs on banks
reserves. This time, facing an internal drain, the Bank reacted by increasing, not
decreasing, credit. The government set up a Committee on the State of Commercial
Credit that recommended an issue of Exchequer Bills. The critical situation was
eased just by the announcement of the issue plan and the Exchequer Bills provided
the markets the needed emergency circulation medium.17
Large foreign expenditures caused the nal crisis before the Suspension Period.
At the end of 1794 Prime Minister Pitt made heavy calls upon the Bank to support
his allies in Continental Europe by considerable sums of specie all drawn from
15According to Heim and Mirowski (1987), the East India Bond rate is a good approximation to
the short-term interest rate.
16Feavearyear (1963) p.177.
17Clapham (1944), Vol I, p.263.
107
the vaults of the Bank. The directors of the Bank became increasingly worried
that lending huge sums of money to the government would clash with the Banks
original charter that forbade it to lend to the government without the permission
of Parliament. The Directors, however, were powerless before the governments
wartime demands as these were considered essential for the survival of the coun-
try.18 The most e¢ cient way the Bank could thus control its total advances was to
regulate private discounts. Following the increase of the governments loans and
the subsidy to the Continent, the Court of Directors voted on a discount restriction
policy on 31 December 1795. The Court was supposed to decide to what amount
the discounts should be allowed to go during the ensuing week.19 If the demand of
discounts was higher than the weekly quota, discounting was to be done without
regard to the respectability of the party or the solidity of the Bills.20 Two months
later, a group of proprietors of Bank stock were protesting against this discount
rationing, especially when it also concerned respectable parties.21
The French Revolutionary Wars resulted in more serious external gold drains
than other wars in the eighteenth century. According to Neal (1990) previously
the government was able to use foreign exchange bills to nance its armies on the
Continent: as the British colonial and manufactured goods were much in demand in
Europe, the European merchants willingly accepted the bills drawn in London and
18Du¤y (1982).
19Committee of Treasury Books, 1795-1797, 31 December 1795, as quoted in Clapham (1944),
Vol I, p. 269.
20Clapham (1944), Vol I, p. 269.
21Fetter (1965), p. 21.
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used these bills to pay for the import of the goods from Britain. But when Britains
continental allies su¤ered repeated military reverses, the British merchants lost
markets for their exports, and the bills of exchange drawn in London had to be
extinguished increasingly by means of specie rather than goods.22
In late 1796 a class of persons subject to weak and extravagant alarms23 was
hoarding guineas. The Committee on Treasury reported on 22 February 1797 that
the gold reserves of the Bank had fallen by £ 622,000 since 1 January 1797 and
as can be seen in Figure 3.2, were £ 1,086,170 on 26 February 1797, just before
the decision to suspend cash payments. The run on the Banks reserves, however,
was not so much as a result of speculative panic reecting the lack of credibility
of the Bank itself, but rather as a pre-emptive measure by the country banks
and individuals.24 The Banks position was weakened by the constant internal
drain of bullion from the Bank to the country which had already started in 1795.
The country bankers were rationally anticipating bank runs and built their gold
reserves in order to be well prepared to meet their customers demand for specie.
In addition there had been external drains of gold to Ireland, France and Britains
Continental allies. Exchange rates were unfavourable and nally, the market rate
of interest increased sharply in late 1796, which distorted credit markets. Demand
for the Bank of England notes was large, because they were convertible to gold on
demand.
22Neal (1990) pp. 201-203.
23Thornton (1802), p. 97.
24Fetter (1965) and Flandreau (2007).
109
Figure 3.2. Gold Minted at the Royal Mint and the Banks Bullion
Reserves 1794-1825. Annual Averages.
The distress arising in London, according to Henry Thornton, was a distress for
notes of the Bank of England,25 which were by far the most important medium of
exchange in this commercial and nancial centre of the country. The whole credit
system, payments which are most of them promised beforehand,26 had been built
on the Bank of England notes. For a few days before the suspension demand for
the Bank of England notes was so high that interest paid on them increased to 16
or 17 percent.27 Thornton estimated that:
25Thornton (1802) p. 113.
26Thornton (1802) p. 113.
27Thornton (1802) p. 113.
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A diminution, for instance, of one-third or two-fths, might, perhaps,
be su¢ cient to produce a very general insolvency in London, of which
the e¤ect would be the suspension of condence, the derangement
of commerce and the stagnation of manufactures throughout the
country.28
According to Gayer et al. (1953) (Figure 3.3) the circulation of the Bank Notes
fell seventeen percent between the last quarter of 1795 and last quarter of 1796,
meanwhile the gold stock of the Bank reduced almost forty-ve percent, shown in
Figure 3.2. Despite the variations in the Banks monetary gold stock, stabilisation
of circulation was crucial for the credit markets at the most critical of times. If
they reduce materially their notes in time of di¢ culty and distress, there are no
other Notes which are ready to supply the deciency in the circulation.29 Real
alternatives to the Bank of England notes did not exist, as country bank or private
bank notes did not circulate in London. Converted monetary gold did not return to
circulation, as it was smuggled from the country or put away in hoards. Sir Francis
Baring, London merchant banker, had recognised that the Bank notes were not
just a substitute for money, but the basis of the monetary system.30 Merchants
in London were not interested in specie: The guineas applied for by persons in
28Thornton (1802) p. 114.
29Thornton (1802) p. 288.
30Fetter (1965) p. 29.
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London, was, generally speaking, account of people in the country, Thornton
explains.31
Figure 3.3. The Bank of England Notes in Circulation 1790-1925.
Quaterly Averages.
3.2.2. Restoration of Condence after the Suspension of the Cash Pay-
ments
While the order to suspend cash payments by the Privy Council was being pub-
lished on Monday, 28 February 1797, the merchants and bankers of London had
31Thornton (1802) pp. 112-113.
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their own meeting to consider of a general Resolution to promote the universal
Circulation of Bank of England Notes instead of Specie.32 They declared that:
...we will not refuse to receive Bank Notes in Payment of any Sum
of Money to be paid to us, and we will use our utmost Endeavours
to make all our Payments in the same Manner.33
The declaration was then published in The Times bearing the signatures of
many hundreds of leading business houses. According The Times the resolution
did credit to the patriotism and loyalty of the Gentlemen presentas it was sup-
posed to prevent Embarrassments to Public Credit34 The directors of the Bank
also published a notice at the same time assuring both the public and its propri-
etors that the Bank was in most sound condition.35 The merchants and bankers
had undeniably common interests with the directors of the Bank. If the Bank
notes had fallen on discount not accepted at their face value there would have
been delays in payments and other obligations that would have brought down
many large London houses and with them the country banks, which in turn had
close links with the local industries. But on the other hand, these practical men
would not have supported policy in which they did not have faith and therefore
merchantswillingness to accept the Bank notes can be seen as a testimony of the
Banks credibility and initial success of the experiment.
32The Times 28 February 1797.
33Ibid.
34Ibid.
35Clapham (1944) Vol I p. 272. Feavearyear (1963) p. 183.
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A few days after the suspension the Parliament authorised the Bank to issue
previously prohibited notes of a face value less than £ 5 to help with the shortage
of circulating medium. After the gold and silver coins had disappeared to hoards,
there was no legal tender currency in circulation. Those people who had used
only coin in the past, were now introduced to the inconvertible paper money.36
In many regions the Bank of England notes started to circulate alongside the
country bank notes for the rst time. The authorities conrmed the status of the
Bank of England notes as de facto legal tender currency by legislation. The Bank
Restriction Act passed on May 3 assured the public that:
all Sums of Money, which now are or shall become payable for any
Part of the Public revenue shall be accepted by the Collectors, Re-
ceivers and other O¢ cers at the Revenue, authorised to receive the
same, in Notes of the said Governor and Company, expressed to be
payable on Demand, if o¤ered to be to paid.37
According to Fetter the Bank was careful not to call the Bank of England
notes legal tender currency, because they could have become associated in the
public mind with the failed assignats in France38 and given an impression that
the monetary base had shifted permanently. Only after Lord King in 1811 had
announced that he would no longer receive his tenantspayments of their rents in
Bank notes at face value, but in revised value according to the amount of paper
36Clapham (1944) Vol. II p. 3.
37Act 37 Geo III c.45.
38Fetter (1965) p. 59.
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money which would be required to purchase it (gold) at the present market price39
Bank notes were made legal tender by Act of Parliament.40
The transition between the monetary regimes caused relatively little distur-
bance and the condence in the payment system in London and the provinces was
restored. Figure 3.2 illustrates the improvement in the gold reserves of the Bank
from the lowest point of £ 982,000 in March 1797 to over £ 4,000,000 in August
1797, and continued to grow for the next year and half. Figure 3.4 shows how the
exchanges with Hamburg improved immediately and uctuations in the exchange
rate and price of gold were hardly di¤erent from those under convertibility. The
long-term interest rate peaked in May 1798, as can be seen in Figure 3.1, but fell
to the pre-suspension level by 1799. The resumption of the gold standard in 1799
was debated in Parliament, and the Bank had expressed its readiness on more than
one occasion to resume the payments immediately if necessary,41 but the govern-
ment, for political reasons42, wanted Parliament to extend the Restriction Act
both in June and November 1797, and three times between 1802 and 1803,43 until
in April 1803 a new war put an end to the discussions about the early resumption.
These political reasonsmeant simply that the government wanted to retain the
39Feavearyear (1963) p. 204.
40Act 51 Geo III, c. 127. It is disputable how clear-cut the Act was, but in practice it made the
Bank notes legal tender.
41Feavearyear (1963) p. 190. Clapham (1944), Vol I, p. 272.
42Cannan (1925) p. xviii.
43The suspension of cash payments was continued repeatedly by the Acts of Parliaments: Act 37,
Geo. III, c.45, 3rd May 1797; Act 37, Geo. III, c.91, 22nd June 1797; Act 38, Geo. III, c.3, 30th
November 1797; Act 42, Geo. III, c.40, 30th April 1802; Act 43, Geo. III, c.18, 28th February
1803; Act 44, Geo. III, c.1, 15th December 1803;
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opportunity to respond rapidly to war time disturbances which would otherwise
have real e¤ects on the economy.
Figure 3.4. Price of Hamburg Bills on London 1790-1825. Monthly.
3.3. The Fiscal and Monetary Strategy during the French Wars
3.3.1. Fiscal Innovations: National Debt and Income Tax
It is generally acknowledged that the way in which Britain nanced its wars in
the eighteenth century is a classical example of decit nance: the high levels of
wartime spending were paid mainly by borrowing rather than by current taxation,
but after the war, accumulated debt was served by increasing taxes.44 Initially also
44Barro (1999). See also Bordo and White (1991).
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the French Revolutionary War was nanced according to this principle: 90 percent
of expenditure between 1793 and 1798 was covered by credit.45 Figure 3.5 shows
how the scale of the government expenditure led the national debt to double from
about £ 232 million to £ 509 million between 1793 and 1802 and at the climax of the
war in 1815 the total national debt had exceeded £ 800 million, over 250 percent
of the national income.
Figure 3.5. Unfunded, Funded and Total National Debt 1789-1825. Annually.
But as the war dragged on, the public expenditure increased (Figure 3.6), the
budget decit became large for a longer period of time than during previous wars,
and it became clear that taxes had to be raised to meet the rising debt charge. In
45Bordo and White (1991).
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1799 Prime Minister Pitt introduced an income tax in Parliament as it was not
possible to increase the revenue from indirect taxation, such as custom duties, any
further. As the debt increased steadily throughout the war, taxes also had to be
raised continuously from 1799 until the end of the war in 1815. Income tax was
a heavy burden which reduced the purchasing power of domestic consumers the
yield of tax revenue was 12.7 millions in 1806 and 15.6 millions in 181546 but
the impact of taxation was not solely negative. Firstly, income tax enabled the
government to collect tax revenue from foreign merchants, who were attracted to
Britain by existing liquid markets, opportunities from war supplies and relatively
lower taxation compared with France.47 Secondly, the tax revenue guaranteed
interest payments of three percent consols, perpetual annuities that formed the
core of national debt and were cheaper to service than unfunded, oating debt.
The governments aim during the war was to reduce the proportion of unfunded
debt and use it in emergencies. Most of the national debt was created in the
private credit markets, at the London Exchange, and, unlike in France, there were
no debt forcements. In December 1796 when the war was very unfavourable to
Britain, some form of compulsory loan had been considered for those individuals
with annual income above a certain level, but the idea of forcing the loan was
abandoned as unnecessary and instead it was decided to appeal to the patriotic
feelings of the nation.
46Gayer et al. (1953), pp. 137-139.
47Neal (1990), p. 138.
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Figure 3.6. Public Expenditure of Great Britain 1800-1816. Annually.
By stabilising the payment system and credit markets the suspension of cash
payments supported the governments scal strategy. If the production had fallen
at the beginning of the war as a result of a credit constraint, entrepreneursability
to pay taxes would have been reduced and the nation would have lost its main
method of war nance at the very beginning of war.
The British government had a good reputation as a borrower as it had not
defaulted on its debt payments in the eighteenth century, and its ability to borrow
during the Napoleonic Wars was ultimately based on the credibility of the govern-
ments monetary strategy to resume the gold standard in the future. The debtors
must have believed rstly, that once the war had nished the country must be able
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to ensure a ow of revenue large enough to service the debt and secondly, the debt
would be serviced by a currency that would be convertible to gold.48 The failure
to resume the gold standard or resumption at a lower par value devaluation 
would have been considered as a default.
Although Napoleons continental system temporarily blocked British trade to
the Continent, it failed to halt the British nance system. Neal (1990) estimates
that eight to ten percent of British national debt was held by foreigners living
abroad in 1816, but the gure would be even higher if it included immigrants
living in Britain.49 Continental merchant bankers anticipated the victory of Britain
and resumption of the gold standard, and kept building their credit in London
during the war. These holdings were locked in London: if the foreign capital was
withdrawn suddenly in large quantities, the pound would fall and the remaining
assets would be locked even more securely. According to Neal, the strength of
the government stocks on the London Stock Exchange throughout the war and
stable interest rates are a testimony to the credibility of the governments scal
and monetary policy.
Nevertheless, for David Ricardo and many other contemporaries, the national
debt was an evil which almost any sacrice would not be too great to get rid of,
a mill stone around the neck of the nation. In general, the state of public nance
raised as much criticism as monetary policy during the Bullion Debates. Ricardos
48Bordo and White (1991).
49Neal (1990), p. 221.
120
suggestion to pay away the debt in one go did not seem very realistic considering
the war the country was engaged in.
Williamson (1984) has suggested that Britains slow growth and industrialisa-
tion between the 1760s and the 1820s can be explained by the war debt, which
crowded out civilian accumulation, inhibited growth, and contributed to the dis-
mal performance in the workersstandard of living. In light of evidence compiled
by Heim and Mirowski (1987) the government borrowing, however, did not have
a crowding-out e¤ect on private investments as entrepreneurs of the Industrial
Revolution used regional short-term bills of exchange, not long-term nancial in-
struments bought and sold in the London Exchange, to nance their investments.50
3.3.2. The Bank of Englands Role in War Finance
The Bank of England exercised its discretionary monetary policy both by buying
government paper and discounting London merchantsbills of exchange. Figure 3.7
includes all the assets of the Bank arising from its business with private borrowers
private advances, and its public advances, that mainly consisted of Exchequer
bills. The gure shows how the private discounts in total grew faster after the
suspension compared with the public advances. If the markets did not absorb
as many Exchequer bills as the Treasury wished to dispose of, the Bank bought
50The question of whether the national debt crowded out private investments during the
Napoleonic Wars has become a topic of much debate, and no consensus exists. In recent years, for
example, Termin and Voth (2005) have argued against and Clark (2001) for Heim and Mirowski
(1987).
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Exchequer bills at the direct request of Treasury brokers.51 The heavy responsi-
bility of the Governors was not eased by the fact that the Banks public advances
were still subject to parliamentary control and it was technically prohibited from
buying Exchequer bills or making advances to the Treasury without Parliaments
permission. During time of war Parliament was not keen to enforce the law or
limit Treasurys needs.52 According to my own calculations, based on Gayer et al.
(1953), the Banks private advances made up on average 53 percent of the total
unfunded national debt between 1800-1821.53
During the rst ten years the growth of the discounts was moderate. Figure 3.3
shows how before the suspension the Banks note issue had been about 10 to 11
millions, but increased issue straight after suspension can probably be explained
by the issue of the notes of small face value. Economic activity was low and in
order to maintain condence immediately after the suspension, the Bank relaxed
its private discounts.54 Between 1800 and 1801, as seen in Figure 3.4, the pound
depreciated on the Hamburg exchange, but this was due to bad harvests and
deation in Hamburg, not the Banks credit expansion.55 Sir Francis Baring praised
the directors of the Bank writing that
51Clapham (1944) p. 62. Gayer et al. (1953) Microlm appendix p. 1388.
52Gayer et al. (1953) Microlm appendix p. 1386.
53Both Gayer et al. (1953) and Acworth (1925) warn how the contemporary national accounts
were extraordinarily complicated, thus these gures are just rough estimates.
54Du¤y (1982).
55Feavearyear (1963) pp. 191-192.
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Figure 3.7. Public Advances and Bills and Notes Discounted by the
Bank of England, 1794-1825. Monthly.
From long experience, the Directors of the Bank must understand
correctly the amount to which their Notes can circulate without de-
preciation or discount. ...they have proved that they have conducted
themselves with equal judgement, by not extending their issues be-
yond what the currency of the country requires and can support.56
If during the rst ten years of suspension the Banks credit policy had been
relatively restrictive, the following years were quite the opposite. By 1808 Napoleon
had mastered his Continental Blockade in trying to stop the British Continental
56Baring (1797) p. 11.
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trade, which forced British merchants to search for alternative trade channels.
New markets were opened for British goods both in Northern Europe and South
America, which created a wave of optimism. According to Du¤y (1982), the
Banks acquiescence in the growing demand of discounts transformed a simple bout
of speculative fever in the powerful movement of ination. The notes outstanding,
seen in Figure 3.3, of which volume had remained relatively stable from 1806 to
1808, began to rise sharply in 1809 until the peak was reached in 1810. The
commercial boom was, however, short lived. The exchange rate depreciated, the
price level rose and from late 1809 onwards bankruptcies increased. The summer
of 1810 saw the outbreak of several economic crises.
3.4. The Gold Convertibility Rule as an Invisible Hand of Monetary
Policy
3.4.1. An Inquiry on the High Price of Bullion
Changes in the price level during the early nineteenth century, Figure 3.8, seem
rather modest if compared to war time hyperinations in the twentieth century, but
for contemporaries, stalwart believers in the virtues of a stable value of money,57
the general rising level of prices and the currency disorder, both comparable de-
preciation of the Bank of Englands notes in the Continental exchanges and the
12 percent premium on gold, seemed puzzling and started a major public debate
57Davies (1994), p. 299.
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called the Bullion Controversy or the Bullion Debates. The dispute has been la-
belled as a debate over a single issue, a real-bill doctrine, which aimed to establish
whether or not discounting real bills was inationary. According to Smith (1776)
a real bill was drawn by real creditor upon a real debtor58 and they could not
be defaulted because there are actual goods in existence59. Anti-bullionists, the
government, the directors of the Bank and some London merchants and bankers
insisted that as long as the Bank only discounted real bills, it was only serving
the legitimate needs of trade and could not over-issue.60 Bullionists disagreed and
argued that the source of the bill was irrelevant: the Banks credit policy had led to
over-issue. Discounting real-bills was a safe and protable business for the Bank,
but as the market rate of interest remained above the usury level during the war,
more and more merchants turned to the Bank to discount their bills. Pressure
for more accommodation imposed a di¢ cult task for the monetary control of the
Bank as discounting all sound paper was likely to produce over issue, but being
too restrictive might produce widespread distress.61
In early 1810, Parliament appointed the Select Committee on the High Price
of Bullionto inquire into the high price of gold, so as to nd out whether the Bank
had issued the right amount of money or over-issued. Between February and May
1810 the Committee held thirty-one meetings and examined twenty-nine witnesses,
58Smith (1776), p. 411.
59Thornton (1802) p. 85.
60Flandreau (2007) and Sargent and Wallace (1982).
61Du¤y (1982), p. 68.
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Figure 3.8. Index of Wholesale Prices of Domestic and Imported
Commodities1790-1830. Monthly Averages. Base: Jan-1825=100.
including the directors of the Bank, and on 8 June 1810 the committee published
its Report from the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the High
Price of Bullion, in which it took into consideration the State of the Circulating
Medium, and of the Exchanges between Great Britain and Foreign Parts.62 The
Committee did not compile price indexes, but aimed to be objective by presenting
time series of the market price of gold, exchange rate and the Bank of Englands
62Bullion Report, reprinted in Cannan (1925) p. 3.
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note circulation: the market price of gold was at £ 4.12s. per oz, 15 percent above
the Mint price of £ 3.17s.101
2
d (shown in Figure 3.9) and that the exchanges, with
Hamburg, Amsterdam, Paris and Portugal have correspondently depressed as low
as 16 to 20 percent below the par.63 The Committees conclusion was that the
rise in the price of bullion and the adverse exchanges had been caused solely by
an over-issue by the Bank of England and accused the Bank of pursuing real bill
policy by accepting all sound paper without considering its desirability in terms of
national monetary policy.64 The inuence of the country bank issue was noted by
saying that the quantity of country bank paper was dependent upon the quantity
of Bank of England paper, increasing and decreasing with it and by increasing its
notes, the Bank made more plentiful the reserves into which every country banker
was required to redeem his own notes.65
The Bullion Committees Report is inarguably one of the most important doc-
uments in British monetary history and it has been treated as an authentic piece
of evidence of the Banks monetary policy. Contemporaries and a large group of
historians have interpreted testimonies given by three Directors of the Bank in
front of the Bullion Committee as a sign of lack of knowledge in any monetary the-
ory. Even Clapham (1944) admits that as economists the Directors came less well
out of the debatewhen they insisted, in a clumsy manner, that the state of the
exchanges had nothing to do with issue, but was a result of war time disturbance
63Bullion Report, reprinted in Cannan (1925), pp. 3-5.
64Fetter (1965) p. 41.
65Bullion Report, reprinted in Cannan (1925) p. 61-66.
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in the balance of trade.66 Sometimes the members of the Committee appear not to
have known what questions to ask of the Banks representatives, and sometimes,
when they did, the representatives were unable or unwilling to answer.67
Figure 3.9. Percentage Deviation of the Market Price of Gold from
the Par Price 1790-1825.
Conversely, Du¤y (1982) argues that The Bullion Report overestimates the
Banks sentiment towards anti-bullionism and does not tell the whole truth of the
Banks credit policy. The committees interrogation was intense and these three
rather personal statements, as often stressed by the Directors themselves during
the interviews,68 presented the views of the corresponding directors at that precise
66Clapham (1944), Vol II, p. 26.
67Horseld (1953).
68Bullion Report, reprinted in Cannan (1925) p. 33.
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moment. The opinions of two of these interviewed directors changed in the follow-
ing year. Du¤y concludes that the Banks regulatory policy was rather imprecise
in nature. The Banks internal Discount Committee in its own report of 1810
suggested that the fault did not lie in the regulations, but in their neglect by the
Directors, who were under constant pressure from merchants and the government.
The Bank had sought to dampen commercial optimism by limiting the expansion
of credit, but the mechanism of setting a maximum credit limit had broken down.69
3.4.2. Impacts of Increased Money Supply
Whether due to mismanagement, deliberate monetary expansion, country banks
issue, war time demand or bad harvests, the pound had depreciated, the general
price level increased and the Banks prots soared. The Bullion Debates, however,
did not only aim to establish a reason for the currency problems, but the dispute
also revolved around the question of how the increased money supply, including
that of private banks, and the increased price level, a¤ected the real economy.
The dominant quantitytheory, especially that of Ricardo, was based on the as-
sumption that the economy was frictionless, with no short-run stickiness and with
high capital and labour mobility. Any reduction of parliamentary intervention to
a minimum would best serve the interest of the economy.70 By contrast, Thornton
(1802) and The Bullion Report, which was probably written by Thornton himself,
69Du¤y (1982).
70Gordon (1976) p. 25.
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anticipated that the ability of the economy to respond to shocks varied from sector
to sector.
Contemporaries considered the ability of labour markets to adjust to changing
economic conditions to be particularly slow. Adam Smith had already written
that the conict between the workers and the masters arise from the wage prot
di¤erence, because Masters are always and every where in a sort of tactic, but
constant and uniform combination, not to raise the wages of labour above their
actual rate.71 Thornton recognised that an excessive issue of paper does increase
prices of goods, though not the price of labour.72 As a result the workers may
be forced to consume fewer articles.73 Consequently, authors of The Bullion
Report recognised that wages were sticky, especially downwards. Another evil of
the general excess of currency was that:
By far the most important portion of this e¤ect appears to Your
Committee to be that which is communicated to the wages of com-
mon country labour, the rate of which, it is well known, adapts itself
more slowly to the changes which happen in the value of money than
the price of any other species of labour or commodity.74
Alexander Baring, one of the authors of The Bullion Report, became a erce
critic of Ricardos quantity theory, accusing Ricardo of treating the relationship of
71Smith (1776) p. 59.
72Thornton (1802) p. 239.
73Thornton (1802) p. 239.
74The Bullion Report, reprinted Cannan (1925) p. 67.
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money and prices as if it were a mechanical operation.75 He warned that if the
price level fell, an attempt to maintain money wage levels would lead initially to
unemployment and to social unrest in the long-run,76 whilst Robert Peel thought
that stickiness might bring some benets for the workers since the natural result
of a return to a metallic currency must be a diminution in the prots of the master,
and an increase in those of the men.77
Although contemporaries were familiar with the concept of nominal rigidities,
it was not yet fully understood that the e¤ectiveness of the Banks discretionary
stabilisation policy depended on the degree of exibility in the economy. If the
economy was perfectly exible, changes in the money supply would not have any
e¤ect on the real economy as both prices and wages would adjust immediately. But
even a relatively short lag in wage or price setting would give an opportunity to a
discretionary policy maker to respond to disturbances that was, indeed, desirable
during the war. For example, in the case of sticky wages, if the policy maker in-
creased money supply, the price level would rise and real wages respectively reduce.
This would increase producersprot margin, raise production, employment and
ultimately private consumption. Before the eighteenth century systematic ination
had not existed thus rigidities had been visible only when the harvests had been
poor and prices and wages had failed to adjust to the rising level of agricultural
products.
75Gordon (1976) p. 106. Alexander Baring was the second son of Sir Francis Baring.
76Gordon (1976) p. 107.
77Gordon (1976) p. 149.
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Figure 3.10 shows the development of nominal wages of six occupations between
1797 and 1827. Nominal wages, although they increased during the Suspension
Period, did not rise at same rate as the real value of the paper pound depreci-
ated (Figures 3.8 and 3.9). Studies by Botham and Hunt (1987) and Lindert and
Williamson (1984) suggest that real wages decreased in Britain as a whole between
1755 and 1819 but regional variations in wage levels were huge and in places where
technology was particularly advanced, such as Manchester, both nominal and real
wages might have risen during the Suspension Period.78 Lindert and Williamson
(1984) call the years between 1750 and 1820 as a period of prolonged wage stagna-
tion. Rogers (1908) argues that as the premium on gold increased by 30 percent,
the nominal wages paid in paper money would have been in reality little more
than two-thirds of their reputed value.79 The situation was probably not as grim
for all wage earners, as in the rst half of the nineteenth century agriculture was by
far the main employment (19 percent of adult men) followed by domestic service
(16 percent of adult men).80 They were both sectors in which a part of wage was
paid in kind food, drink and accommodation so that the changes in the price
level had a smaller impact on the standards of living. Lindert and Williamson
(1984) estimate that about half the adult males in England and Wales were in the
pool from which full-time wage labour could be drawn. In many sectors nominal
money wages were also xed for a year so that changes in the price level had an
78Hamilton (1942).
79Rogers (1908) p. 425.
80Gayer et al. (1953) Microlm appendix p. 1706.
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Figure 3.10. Estimates of Nominal Annual Earnings for Six Occu-
pations, 1797-1827: Adult Males, England and Wales.
immediate e¤ect on real wages, not nominal wages. Modern economic historians
have, however, devoted a considerable amount of e¤ort to analysing the develop-
ment of real wages during the Industrial Revolution, but their focus has been on
the impact of decreasing real wages on living standards rather than production.
How did the climbing level of prices and decreasing real wages a¤ect produc-
tion? A seminal, although controversial, study was conducted by Hamilton (1942),
who calls the lag of wages behind prices prot inationand argues that it was a
powerful promoter of industrial growth. Also Gayer et al. (1953) argue that ina-
tionary scal policy stimulated the economy during the Napoleonic War, although
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investments were turned away from the channels that would have been followed in
a period of peace and the increase in total output would have been di¤erently dis-
tributed amongst industries.81 Whether due to prot ination, Figure 3.11 shows,
how the industrial production grew during the French Wars. The Suspension Pe-
riod was an era of almost continuous industrial growth, when domestic production
in England increased by 68 percent.
Figure 3.11. Index of Industrial Production 1770-1825.
While labour markets were gradually made more exible in the nineteenth
century, price rigidities increased when the Corn Laws were imposed in 1815. The
81Gayer et al. (1953) p. 648.
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Corn Laws were designed to stabilise the exchange rate uctuations caused by a
large import of wheat which depreciated the exchange rate, increased the outow of
gold and could have challenged the resumption. The Laws stated that no foreign
corn could be imported into Britain until domestic corn cost 80d. per quarter.
Another function of the Corn Laws were probably to preserve the abnormally high
prots of the Napoleonic war years for the landowners. The high price caused
the cost of food to increase and consequently depressed the domestic market for
manufactured goods because people spent a large part of their earnings on food
rather than commodities.
3.4.3. Adjustment to the Gold Standard
The Bullion Report advocated resumption of the gold standard at the old par
value within two years, but the Report itself was not discussed in Parliament until
a year after its publication in July 1811.82 This delay was partly a tactic as the
government did not welcome the report wholeheartedly and it was certainly in no
rush to apply the recommendations. Figure 3.3 illustrates how the Banks issue
increased rather than decreased between 1810 and 1814. A collapse in an export
boom in 1811 marked a start of depression and, in order to relieve the situation,
the government issued £ 6,000,000 worth of exchequer bills for merchants, who then
discounted them at the Bank. This issue can be seen as another peak in unfunded
82Viner (1937) p. 171.
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debt in Figure 3.5. The early resumption was opposed in Parliament, and the rec-
ommendations of The Bullion Report were defeated by a large majority.83 As long
as Napoleon was in power, the Bank had little choice but to make advances that
the government demanded84 and the policy of the resumption of cash payments
got complicated by the indenite character of the rst peace and the Hundred
Days reign of Napoleon. Once again an Act of Parliament,85 stating that although
resumption was highly desirable, it should be postponed until 5 July 1816was hur-
ried through Parliament as the Bank and the government together were opposing
any denite resumption date86.
So profound were the years between 1815 and 1822 in dening the future of the
nation that Acworth (1925) named them as the era of Financial Reconstruction.
The economy was in a transition from war to peace and the government had
to nd the means to repair the damaged nances of the country: to cut down
taxation, reduce expenditure without creating undue hardship, discover some mode
of dealing with the debt and restoring the currency to a stable basis.87 Abolishment
of income tax in 1816 was intended to bring relief, but as indirect taxation had to
be increased, overall results are unclear. The dip in the production index in Figure
3.11 reects the adjustment of heavy industry to the peace-time demand.
83Viner (1937) p. 171.
84Fetter (1965) p. 76.
85Act 54, Geo. III c.99, 18th July 1814.
86Fetter (1965) p. 62.
87Acworth (1925) p. 11.
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Agricultural and industrial distress that coincided with adjustment to the gold
standard created controversy over the desirability of resumption. Some men who
had been most enthusiastic for a return to the gold standard began to have doubts
and it was often the very same people who had initially accused the Bank of
exploitation of people and ination, but then vigorously criticised the Bank for
deation.88 According to Fetter (1965) men who were far apart on most points
were in agreement that somebody was making too much money from the paper
money system. The Bank, which had previously been blamed for excessive dis-
counting, was accused of constraining credit and deepening distress; or, when the
Bank refused to reduce its discount rate when the market rate fell below 5 percent
in 1817 in order to dampen the demand of discounts in a legitimate way, it was
blamed for trying to prot by charging a too high margin.
There were three alternative monetary arrangements that were brought forward
by various bodies. Firstly, even though gold was made an o¢ cial unit of account in
1816, bimetallism was seen to provide more stable conditions than monometallism,
as the economy would not be dependent on the supply of a single metal. Secondly,
it was suggested that the gold standard should be resumed with a smaller gold
content of the pound, i.e. a higher gold price. Thirdly, the most radical was the
suggestion to continue with the inconvertible paper money standard, although a
pure at money system was not discussed.89 The most sound arguments in favour
88Feavearyear (1963) pp. 224-225.
89These disputes are summarised by Fetter (1965) and Chown (1994) pp. 70-71.
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of continuation of the Suspension Period were presented by Matthias Attwood and
his brother Thomas, who represented Birmingham, which, as a centre for heavy
industry, had been severely hit by the transition from war to peace.90 According
to Matthias Attwood, the nation would lose the great advantage conferred by
restriction in the context of an independent monetary policy, as the actions of
foreign countries could inuence the value of the pound. The suspension, he argued,
enabled the country to maintain an internal scale of prices, which had a reference
to its taxes and burdthens [sic], and did not depend on the scale of prices in other
countries.91 He opposed what he saw as a misguided attempt to [restore] the
ancient standard. His brother Thomas Attwood protested against the manner in
which the question of metallic standard was discussed.92 The issue of money will
create markets, and that it is upon the abundance or scarcity of money that the
extent of all markets principally depends...93 He argued that painful adjustment
of prices should not be ignored even during the time of peace: if men could
live without food and clothing for two or three years, until the reduction of the
circulating medium had acted alike in reducing the prices of all kinds of industry
and commodities then the social system might go on again.94
90Fetter (1965) p. 75.
91As quoted in Gordon (1976) p. 107.
92As quoted in Gordon (1976) p. 108.
93Thomas Attwood, A letter to the Right Honourable Nicholas Vansittart (Birmingham, 1817)
as quoted in Fetter (1965) p. 75.
94Thomas Attwood (1818): Observations on Currency, Population and Pauperism, as quoted by
Fetter (1965) p. 76.
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Between 1817 and 1820 The Times reported on a regular basis of announce-
ments of bankruptcies, crowded workhouses and starving labourers unable to buy
bread. Unemployment and starvation led to riot, lawlessness and political agita-
tion for parliamentary reform. According to Acworth (1925), corn laws, tari¤s and
restrictive trade deepened the crises and made the recovery slow.95 On 18 May
1819, Merchants, Bankers and Traders and othersof the City of London organised
a meeting against the resumption of cash paymentsin order to consider a peti-
tion to both Houses of Parliament. In this meeting Mr Atwood gave a statement
which reveals that the possibility of a permanent paper money standard had been
considered, although it was not seen as a realistic option:
Legislature never intended the restriction to be perpetual: but an-
other conclusion might with equal truth be drawn from the repeated
renewals of the restriction, namely, that it was the intention of the
legislature not to remove the restriction until threat measures could
be adopted without injury or inconvenience to the public.96
In the same meeting he expressed his concern over the hardship which the
country had to face when the debt issued in paper currency was to be redeemed in
convertible currency: Who could think of withdrawing from trade and industry
the present circulating medium, and leaving all the superstructure of debt and
taxation which had been raised on that foundation in its present state?he asked,
95Acworth (1925) pp. 120-123.
96Ibid.
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and went on to suggest that Those who wished for the resumption of cash pay-
ments ought rst to endeavour to reduce the public debt and taxation.According
to the reported amount of applauses and hisses Atwoods speech received, the
monied men of London were far from being unanimous,97 but a petition of several
hundred London merchants who were deeply impressed with a sense of the present
distressed state of the commercial and manufacturing interests, of the general want
of condence, and of the extensive and increasing evils which are the natural con-
sequence of this state of thingswas given to Parliament in December of the same
year.98 This was all, however, in vain because, for the Bank, constraining credit
during peace was a logical follow-up of the same stabilisation policy that had will-
ingly supported the merchants during the most critical of times. During the war
the Banks policy horizon had been short as the question was the immediate sur-
vival of the country, but during peace the long-run stability was seen to be ensured
by resumption of the cash payments.
Why was the gold standard resumed at the old par value, even though adjust-
ment policy deepened the depression and it was known that the gold standard
would reduce the countrys ability to conduct independent monetary policy? Au-
thors of The Bullion Report, as mentioned by Flandreau (2007), were sceptical
about the human ability to conduct discretionary monetary policy: rules were
considered to be better than discretion, and the best available rule was the gold
97The Times 19 May 1919.
98The Times 28 December 1819.
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standard. Since the Bank was both a public and a private institution, the gold
standard was seen as a solution to the problem that arose from this ambiguous
role. According to Ricardo (1811), the currency problem during the Suspension
Period was owing to the too intimate connexion between the Bank and the Gov-
ernment99 and by increasing discounts the Bank had been able to collect private
prots, which, according to The Bullion Report, were made at a very small expense
to the partiesand did not allow the state to participate much more largely in the
prots accruing from the present system100. The critics of the Bank observed that
its share price, plotted in Figure 3.12, rose almost by 50 percent between 1810 and
1817 and its dividends were constantly above the pre-suspension level.
As long as currency was convertible to gold, constraints set by the gold convert-
ibility rule ensured that even a private central bank was able to commit to credible
monetary policy.101 If the Bank overissued, the general price level and the market
price of gold would rise, which would in turn lead to the drain of bullion and to
trade decit. To avoid insolvency, the Bank would be forced to constrain its issue.
In equilibrium the Bank would issue the amount of money that would keep gold
at par. The Bullion Report thus saw the gold standard as the natural and true
control102 in the issue of paper. The nominal anchor of a modern central bank
might be an ination target of two percent, but in the nineteenth century when
99Ricardo (1811) p. 42.
100Cannan (1925), re-print of The Bullion Report p.65.
101Especially as the Banks Charter depended on renewals in Parliament.
102Cannan (1925) p. 66.
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reliable price indices could not have been compiled the price of gold was seen as
the most suitable nominal anchor, the invisible hand of monetary policy103.
Figure 3.12. The Bank of Englands Share Price and Dividends
1770-1825.
According to Flandreau (2007) the gold standard solved the monitoring prob-
lem by increasing the transparency of the Bank. The Bank had been a di¢ cult
institution to monitor: between 1696 and 1832 not a single Committee was al-
lowed to access the data of the Banks gold or treasuryholdings, and it was only
after 1833 when the Bank started to supply a continuous record of its assets and
liabilities.104 Its reserve ratio had uctuated during the eighteenth century and
103Flandreau (2007).
104Horseld (1953), p. 50.
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bank panics might have been common if the public had known how little gold the
Bank had in its vaults. Even if the public could not have access to the Banks
treasury data, they would have known that the Bank had overissued if there had
been a di¤erence between the monetary and market price of gold the latter could
have been observed easily from various price lists published.105 The discussion of
su¢ cient reserves continued beyond the resumption of the gold standard and in
1832 the Bank announced that the ratio of cash to notes and deposits was to be
1:3. This ratio became to be known as Palmers Rule after the Governor of the
Bank, and it was considered to guarantee a full currency, that kept exchanges
and the market price of gold at par.106
Although the public discussion over the monetary standard continued after the
war, the price of gold had fallen close to par by 1816. The directors decided to
experiment with the partial resumption of cash payments, but there was no internal
demand for gold. According to Fetter (1965), the public was now so used to the
notes and found them far more convenient than gold. Pressnell (1956) argues that
country banks preferred notes since handling gold and silver involved transmission
expenses.107 For modern macroeconomists this explanation is not acceptable, as
the paper pound and gold could have been considered as equal if their value in the
future was also expected to be the same. The demand for specie was, however,
dependent on the market price of gold: in summer 1817, as can be seen in Figure
105Flandreau (2007)
106Horseld (1953) p. 51-53.
107Pressnell (1956) p. 156.
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3.4, the exchange rate became unfavourable, and the market price of gold rose. The
newly coined gold went to France which caused the failure of the partial return to
convertibility. The failed experiment and the Banks simultaneous e¤ort to buy
bullion even at a loss, conveyed a strong sense of the Banks commitment to return
to the gold standard in the near future.
Figure 3.7 shows how the government paid a substantial amount of its short-
term debt back to the Bank between 1819 and 1821. In July 1819 an Act was passed
in Parliament that made it illegal for the Bank to lend money to the government for
more than three months without the permission of the Parliament. Parliamentary
committees were established in both Houses to inquire into the expediency of
resuming cash payments, and their reports in 1819 were practically identical: the
plan that got accepted proposed adjustment of the mint price of gold so that on
1 February 1820 gold was to be sold at £ 4.1.0 per ounce and then gradually at
a lower price until 1 May 1823 when all restrictions upon cash payments were
to expire.108 Ricardos idea was to resume payments through an ingot exchange
systemthat would have prevented small notes from being converted to gold, but
it was unnecessary since following the resumption plan of Parliament did not cause
problems.109 Gold was almost at parity and on 1 February 1820 when notes became
redeemable for gold at £ 4. 1s., there was no demand and only a couple of ingots
were purchased mainly for curiosity. Even though currency was not yet fully
108Fetter (1965) p. 93-95.
109Fetter (1965) pp. 91-92 and 97-99.
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convertible, gold owed into the Bank and the Banks reserves increased from
£ 4,500,000 to £ 10,100,000, between January 1820 and January 1821. On 1 May
1821 currency dealings were restored and the monetary system of the country re-
established. The fact that the Bank note was legally redeemable at a xed price of
gold seems to have meant little to the public, since it did not even get mentioned
in the major papers.110
3.5. Conclusions
This chapter searched for an answer to the questions of why the suspension
of cash payments was a credible monetary system although it gave the Bank of
England an opportunity to conduct discretionary monetary policy and why was
the gold standard resumed. In theory the Bank would have been capable of limit-
less nominal expansion without having to consider whether its gold reserves were
su¢ cient. It was, however, understood that uncontrollable issue was going to be
inationary, worsen the trade balance and make the government debt harder to
sell. Hyperination that followed French assignats was a living warning of the
danger of excessive note issue and the policy of the Bank did not become too
accommodating. By trial and error were the set of challenges and opportunities
realised.
On the positive side, the suspension of cash payments enabled the Bank to
conduct discretionary monetary policy in order to stabilise the economy during
110Fetter (1965) p. 96.
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the war. Stabilisation policy evolved over time. Initially the suspension of cash
payments was an emergency measure to calm down a panic that followed rumours
of French invasion, and to prevent the general public from hoarding notes for gold
conversion. If gold convertibility had been continued in February 1797, the Bank
and many London merchant houses would have become insolvent; the former since
its gold reserves had vanished and the latter as the payment system collapsed.
Merchants and entrepreneurs were engaged in complex nancial arrangements and
failure of one house would have created a chain of bankruptcies. As the Bank of
England did not yet operate as a lender of last resource, the role the City of Lon-
don played as a nancial intermediator between counties was crucial. Distress in
London would have spread elsewhere in the country and damaged both agriculture
and industry that would have been disastrous during the war.
The government soon realised that the need to be able to stabilise the economy
during the war was continuous, and the gold standard was not resumed although
the Banks reserves improved during the three months of suspension. The Bank
conducted its stabilisation policy by discounting bills of exchange of London mer-
chants and supporting government in its war e¤ort by buying its short-term debt.
As the market rate of interest was above the usury rate of ve percent, the discount
policy was the most e¤ective tool to regulate market activity in London. By con-
trast, seigniorage nance give the government critical exibility, but it was never a
main pillar of the war nance. The scal strategy promoted monetary policy since
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the government nanced Napoleonic Wars by selling consols and covering interest
charges by income tax.
My intention, however, is not to argue that the Bank or governments policy was
awless during the Suspension Period. Mistakes were made especially between 1808
and 1810, when the Bank conducted the real bills policy, the outcome of which was
that the domestic price level increased and the reduced real purchasing power of the
pound created a serious trade decit. The Banks ability to conduct discretionary
policy was questioned by the Bullion Controversy, which recognised a problem of
governance in the Banks position: it was a private, prot maximising monopoly
with the right to issue, but with public responsibilities. The gold convertibility
was seen as a transparent principle to monitor the performance of the directors.
After the war had nished the continuation of the stabilisation policy involved
constraining issue. Financial distress, which was caused by the economys transi-
tion from war to peace, caused many powerful members of the public to question
the desirability of resumption. The Suspension Period, during which monetary
policy was dependent on human ability was seen to be prejudical to public welfare
in the long-run.111 It was acknowledged that while the gold standard was not a
perfect rule  it reduced the countrys ability to conduct independent monetary
policy, as the economy would be a¤ected by volatility of the gold price abroad it
was still preferable to the suspension. The price of gold was seen as an important,
111The Bullion Report, reprinted in Cannan (1925) p. 65.
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transparent nominal anchor that enforced credibility, and solved the problem of
how adequate discretionshould be measured.
CHAPTER 4
The Suspension of Cash Payments as a Credible
Stabilisation Policy
4.1. Introduction
The question of how changes in the monetary regime can be used to stabilise the
economy has not received a great deal of attention in the literature. Furthermore,
the same issue has not, in my knowledge, hitherto been analysed in the context of
a commodity standard. The DSGE model developed in this chapter demonstrates
explicitly how the gold standard satises the long-term objective of price stability
during peace, but during war, when there is a stoppage in the gold trade, following
the gold standard rule intensies the volatility of the markets. Therefore, the
suspension of the gold convertibility rule that increases exibility in the conduct of
monetary policy throughout the war, might be a preferable regime as it stabilises
monetary conditions. The success of stabilisation policy is, however, dependent on
the credible commitment to resume the gold standard once the country is again in
the good state.
Treating the gold standard and the suspension of cash payments, not as a con-
tinuum, but as separate monetary policy regimes, changes the interpretation of
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both the Bank of Englands operating procedures and monetary policy rules dur-
ing the Suspension Period of 1797-1821. The gold standard enhanced credibility:
the monetary base was xed as gold reserves restricted the issue of paper currency
and the exchange rate was anchored to gold. Under the gold standard the Banks
objective had been to follow the convertibility rule, which, according to the analy-
sis presented in Chapter 2, stabilised the price level, laid the basis for positive
development of capital markets and trade, and made the government debt an at-
tractive investment option. As the Bank did not have full control over the total
money supply, gold trade or interest rates, during temporary crises the Bank main-
tained convertibility by unconventional methods, such as imposing an adjustment
cost on gold conversion. In the 1790s, however, the economy experienced a series
of shocks such as the war, large government expenditure, volatile interest rates
and bad harvests, which in peace occurred only occasionally. These long-lasting
disruptions, combined with fears of invasion, distorted the economy and increased
the publics demand for gold. The gold standard, which had enabled the Bank to
absorb temporary shocks during the eighteenth century, became a shock amplier
when the shocks became persistent. Had the Bank not intervened, but allowed
gold conversion to continue, the circulating money stock would have reduced at
the same rate as monetary gold disappeared from the Banks vaults. As converted
gold was put into hoards, contraction in circulating medium drove many London
Merchant houses to the edge of insolvency.
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Initially, therefore, the suspension of gold payments was an emergency mea-
sure that restored monetary stability, but as the war continued demand for exible
policies remained. The monetary rule under the Suspension Period to convert
circulating paper currency to gold at some future point gave the Bank an op-
portunity to conduct discretionary policy. As the amount of money in circulation
had no link to gold reserves, the Bank was able to increase the money supply
more liberally than under the gold standard raise revenue for the government by
inationary nance.1
In 1810 bullionists had observed that the money supply was slipping out of
the Banks control and demanded an immediate resumption of the gold standard.
As the country was in the middle of the war, any suggestions of resumption were
ignored by policy makers. After the Battle of Waterloo in 1815 stabilisation was,
however, no longer justied and both the Bank and the government started to take
faltering steps towards resumption.2 The government paid some of its short-term
debt back to the Bank, and the Bank constrained discounts and started to store
gold. The adjustment back to gold standard was not an easy process as it coincided
with the industrys structural change from the war-time demand to peace. The
Bank disregarded the criticism and continued its adjustment policy. The policy
was credible and the market price of gold returned to par so that in 1821 the
country was able to resume the gold standard two years ahead of schedule.
1As was discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 the Bank notes circulated in the London area and country
bank notes in provinces.
2Fetter (1965) p.145.
151
The stabilisation policy can thus be divided into two phases: during the rst
phase war years  the Bank was able to issue money and during the second
phase, which started after the war had nished, the Bank withdrew paper money
from circulation. During the French Wars the rst phase lasted for nineteen years
and the second phase for six years. An important benet of the adjustment policy
such as this is that the adjustment, which might be di¢ cult both economically and
politically, occurred during peace, but not during war.
In Chapter 3, I explored various channels through which stabilisation took ef-
fect during the Suspension Period: the Bank issued notes of small denomination,
increased the discounts it gave for the London merchants and supported the gov-
ernments urgent war e¤orts by buying its short-term paper, as the survival of the
country was at stake. Nevertheless, there is not enough evidence to support Bordo
and Redishs (1993) and Bordo and Kydlands (1995) argument that during the
Suspension Period of 1797-1821 the objective of the government would have been
to maximise seigniorage revenue. The war itself was nanced by a combination of
taxes and public borrowing and the purpose of the suspension of the gold standard
rule was to keep monetary conditions stable. Furthermore, the government would
not have had to rely on such a drastic measure if it only wanted to raise seigniorage
revenue since the gold standard rule itself was not immune from seigniorage nance
or duciary note issue: monetary authorities were able to reduce gold content of
specie or issue duciary paper money without any monetary regime modications.
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In addition to these three direct channels, the Banks stabilisation policy during
the Suspension Period had indirect e¤ects: in this chapter I focus on stabilisation
policy, the e¤ectiveness of which was dependent on rigidities in the economy. Ac-
cording to the evidence presented in Chapter 3, nominal wages in particular reacted
slowly to the changes in price level, which gave the Bank an opportunity to stimu-
late the economy by issuing paper currency, that in turn increased price levels and
decreased real wages. The DSGE model presented in this chapter demonstrates
how the Banks policy stabilised the price level, consumption, domestic production
and asset prices during a long, exhausting war.
According to Bordo and Redish (1993) the very reason for the successful sur-
vival of the gold standard during the turmoil of the nineteenth century was that
it permitted the suspension of convertibility. The theory of the gold standard as
a contingent rule proposed by Bordo and Kydland (1995) suggests that the sus-
pension was a carefully planned policy action during wartime. The source of the
contingency in 1797 was not a war, but the availability of gold in monetary use: the
historical analysis presented in Chapter 2 showed that in the eighteenth century
England did not abandon the gold convertibility rule during every war, but only
in 1797 when it became impossible to follow.
My starting point is a general DSGE model of the printing, minting, monetary
and non-monetary gold demand in an economy with nominal wage rigidities. Initial
results of this baseline model will function as a basis for the arguments developed
both in this chapter and Chapter 5. The state of the world evolves exogenously
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between a good state, peace, and a bad state, war. The aim of the central bank is
to stabilise the economy.3 The baseline model demonstrates, however, that in this
particular framework, where wages are xed for one period, an opportunity for the
central bank to boost the economy in the short-run by issuing duciary, unbacked
paper money in the good state will lead to a Barro-Gordon type equilibrium where
the ination rate is ine¢ ciently high but does not have any benets. However, in
the second section I show that if the central bank followed the perfect gold standard
rule where paper money is fully backed by gold, the time-inconsistency problem
disappears. The money stock can increase or decrease only if the commodity stock
in monetary use increases or decreases respectively. This argument is parallel to
the commodity theory of money, which I discussed in Chapter 1 and which was
advocated by classical thought. I conclude this section by demonstrating that in
the good state the nite gold endowment sets bounds on the money growth rate
and, therefore, also on the price level, consumption and asset prices. The perfect
gold standard rule makes the stabilisation of the economy unnecessary.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the feasibility of any commodity standard relies on
the availability of the backing commodity for monetary use. If the commodity
ow stops for some exogenous reason, as happens in the bad state, but the country
still follows the convertibility rule, the private agents satisfy their gold demand by
converting paper money to gold. The money stock decreases and the price level
3In order to keep the model simple, and to emphasise the fact that during the Suspension Period
stabilisation was not solely achieved through seigniorage, the central banks opportunity of raising
revenue for the government through inationary nance during the suspension is ignored.
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falls. Deationary pressure could, however, be avoided without the central bank
having to take any precautionary measures in the good state if the central bank
ceased to convert paper money to gold and issued only at money once the bad
state is observed by all agents. Private agents are assumed to accept inconvertible
paper money only if they believe that in the future, when the economy is again in
the good state, the gold standard will be restored.
This chapter concentrates on the stabilisation properties of suspension, whilst
the resumption of the gold standard rule is assumed to be exogenously credible.
The questions such as what was the impact of the suspension of cash payments
on social welfare, and what made the resumption of the gold standard credible are
analysed in Chapter 5.
4.2. The Baseline Model
Consider an economy which contains a large number of identical households,
rms and a central bank. Since households and rms behave as atomistic com-
petitors, the discussion is restricted to a representative agent of each type. The
innitely lived household consumes the consumption good Ct and gold Kt.
There are two possible states of the world: the good state called peaceand
the bad state war. The economy switches exogenously and unexpectedly between
the states. The initial state is peace and the probability of observing peace is
considerably higher than the probability of war; thus peace reects normality.
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During peace the households demand for gold, Kt; is dened through the
households optimisation problem, but during war, the demand for gold increases
above the peace time demand by some exogenous amount . As was seen in
Chapter 2, the publics demand for gold was highest during political disturbances.
More generally, according to Bordo and Kydland (1995) wars can raise a question
of the central banks solvency in the form of a potential invasion of the country
and result in bank runs. The household, who has given its asset to the central
bank, is concerned about the potential downside outcome: the gold stock of the
central bank ending up in the hands of enemies. Therefore, the household has an
incentive to salvage at least some of the gold stock it has deposited at the central
bank by converting paper money to gold. In this simple framework, increased
demand for gold is assumed to be exogenous and does not depend on factors such
as the likelihood of winning the war.
Gold trade The gold endowment4 gives information for all agents about the
state of the world. During the time of peace the household is endowed with random
amount Kst of new gold which is normally distributed with a positive mean and
variance and measured in ounces, but during the time of war the endowment is
zero. After receivingKst , the household chooses what proportion of the endowment
is minted to specie, deposited at the central bank in exchange for paper currency
and consumed as gold. Since during the war Kst = 0; the household converts some
4Given the great advantage of Britain in the Portuguese gold trade (evidence presented in Chapter
2), gold endowment might be a good approximation of the gold ow into Britain.
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of its paper money to gold. The household can purchase the consumption good Ct
both with specie and paper money, but not by consumable gold that is assumed
to depreciate fully between periods.
The central bank follows the gold standard rule by being prepared to buy or sell
gold in exchange for paper currency with a xed conversion rate Q: As in Chapters
1 and 2, money supply is backed by the monetary gold Kgt
(4.1) M st =
QKgt
t
:
The gold reserve ratio is denoted by t 2 (0; 1] ; and denes the proportion of the
circulating paper money stock that is backed by monetary gold.
The net increase in the specie supply and monetary gold between periods t+1
and t equals the di¤erence between the gold endowment and gold consumption.
The gold endowment satises
(4.2) Kst  Kt    =
 
Sst+1   Sst

+
 
Kgt+1  Kgt

;
where  = 0 during the peace and is positive during the war. The equation (4.2)
can be expressed in terms of growth rates by rewriting it as
(4.3) Kst  Kt    =

Sst+1
Sst
  1

Sst +

Kgt+1
Kgt
  1

Kgt ;
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and dening the growth rate of specie supply as
(4.4) zt =
Sst+1
Sst
and the rate of monetary expansion proportional to monetary gold as
(4.5) xt =
Kgt+1
Kgt
:
Finally, if (4.1) is written in terms of Kgt and substituted to (4.3), the constraint
(ignoring ) can be expressed as
(4.6) Q (Ks  Kt) = Q (zt   1)Sst + (xt   1) tM st :
I assume that zt 2 [1; z) and xt 2 (0; x) : The lowest bound of xt indicates that the
monetary gold stock is zero. A law restricts smelting of coins back to consumable
form, and therefore the lowest bound of the specie growth rate equals one5. The
upper bound of both zt and xt equals 1 + QKst ; which implies that private gold
consumption Kt approaches zero and the household converts almost all its gold
endowment to paper currency. Note that as gold in consumable form is assumed
to depreciate fully between periods and gold coins cannot be smelted to consumable
form, the household is not able to prepare for war by hoarding gold.
5As seen in Chapter 2, these laws were common during the Pre-classical Gold Standard. (In fact,
smelting coins is still illegal in the UK.)
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Production and Financial Intermediation The representative rm uses
labour Lt it hires from the household to produce current output via its production
technology f (Lt). Since the rm does not have access to the gold endowment, the
rm faces a cash constraint in that it starts period t without any cash or credit
holdings and it has to borrow in order to be able to pay for its workers. The second
potential source for paper money growth is the loan or discount the central bank
gives to the rm to nance the current wage bill. The rm produces, pays for its
workers, sells the output to the household on demand for consumption on a cash
basis, and after receiving its revenue, the rm pays the principal and the interest
on its discount to the central bank. A usury law is assumed to restrict the xed
discount rate R  1: In this simple model the central bank destroys its interest
yield and does not transfer dividends to the household at the end of period t. The
discount is dened by the value of existing monetary gold stock and a lump-sum
monetary transfer from the central bank to the rm
(4.7) WtLt  dt
t
QKgt+1;
where dt is the discretionary paper money growth rate. The total money supply
of the economy at period t+ 1 can be dened as
(4.8) MTt+1 = gtM
T
t ;
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where gt is the net growth rate of money, and MTt+1 can be divided into two
components, specie and paper currency,
(4.9) MTt+1 = S
s
t+1 +M
s
t+1;
where the growth rate of specie supply is dened as
(4.10) Sst+1 = ztS
s
t
and the gross growth rate of the economys paper money supply as
(4.11) M st+1 = dtxtM
s
t :
The discretionary money growth rate is denoted by dt and, as dened above,
xt is the money growth rate proportional to the growth in monetary gold. The
discretionary money growth rate is the inverse of the growth rate of the gold reserve
ratio6
(4.12) dt =
t
t+1
:
The higher dt; the lower the proportion of the circulating paper money stock that
is backed by gold. I assume dt to be bounded above by printing and storage
constraint d, which is assumed to be higher than the upper bound of xt or zt. As
6To see that (4.11) is just an alternative way to dene (4.1), write (4.11) using (4.12) and (4.5)
to yield Mst+1 = dtxtM
s
t =
t
t+1
Kgt+1
Kgt
QKgt
t
=
QKgt+1
t+1
:
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stressed by Barro (1979), the real economy restricts gold supply, and therefore, x
and z; but the upper bound of paper money supply d can be taken to be arbitrarily
large, i.e. dt 2
 
0; d

for all t = 0; 1; :::; and x < d <1:
The rm hires labour supplied by the household and the production takes place
during the goods exchange. The rm takes its price from the market, its wage from
the contract and maximises prots. The household supplies whatever labour the
rm demands. The prot function of the rm becomes
(4.13) ft = PtYt   RWtLt:
At the end of the period the rm returns all prots to the household. The rms
production function is
(4.14) Yt = f (Lt) = AL

t
where A is the xed stock of capital, Lt is labour demand at period t, 0 <  < 1;
and therefore f (Lt) is a strictly concave function. In equilibrium the real wage
bill of the rm must be equal to the marginal demand for labour
(4.15)
RWt
Pt
= f 0 (Lt) :
Now the nominal wage rigidities7 are introduced into the model by assuming
that the rm and the household agree on wages that are set in advance for a
7This part of the model is inspired by Canzoneri and Dellas (1998).
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period, before the periods gold endowment is realised.8 Although the nominal
wage is chosen before the state of the world is known, it is set at a level that is
expected to produce the real wage which equates labour supply and labour demand
and clears the goods market. The wage setting follows an exogenous process: if
the current state is peace, the wage setters anticipate the following state to be
peace and vice versa. To dene the wage, the notional labour supply is set at one,
although the actual labour supply and demand may di¤er from this. The contract
wage for period t is
(4.16) Wt =

t
R
f 0 (1) =

tA
R
where 
t is the expected value of Pt before the gold endowment is known or the
production started. If (4.16) is substituted back into (4.15) and the functional
form (4.14) is used, the labour demand of the representative rm can be written
as
(4.17) Lt =

Pt

t
 1
1 
:
If (4.17) is substituted to (4.14) one obtains
(4.18) Yt = AL

t = A

Pt

t
 
1 
:
8According to the historical evidence presented in Chapter 3, nominal wages were rigid in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
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Respectively, the real wage bill of the rm becomes
(4.19)
Wt
Pt
Lt =
A
R

Pt

t
 
1 
and the prots become
(4.20) ft = (1  )A


 1
t P
1
1 
t :
At the beginning of period t when the nominal wage is set, the wage will
reect expectations of the price level. Any unanticipated changes in the price
level, whether due to a war or something else, will cause a di¤erence between the
expected and actual price level. The rm determines labour demand based on the
real wage that is realised after the gold endowment. If the price level increases
unexpectedly, the real wage bill of the rm decreases and the employment (4.17)
increases to clear the labour market.
The Representative Household From the households point of view each
period is subdivided into two parts: the exchange with the central bank and the
exchange with the rm. The household trades bonds and gold with the central
bank and labour and goods with the rm. The minting process is exogenous, but
subject to a minting fee, brassage.
The household enters period t with predetermined nominal money Mt and
depreciated specie worth QSt; where  2 (0; 1) is the xed depreciation rate of
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specie between period t and t+1: The household agrees on the nominal wage with
the rm and then the state of the world is realised. If it is peace, the household
receives its gold endowment QKst and if war, K
s
t = 0: Now the household is in
the position to do its gold trading with the central bank, and minting: it chooses
how much gold to consume, how much to mint and how much to convert to paper
money. If Kst = 0; the household can convert some of its paper money to gold at
the central bank. After minting gold to specie, the households currency holdings
are Mt+QSt+Q (1  ) (zt   1)Sst + (xt   1) tM st ; where  2 (0; 1) is brassage,
the exogenous cost of minting. Next the households nominal bonds Bt mature,
bringing its currency holdings toMt+QSt+Q (1  ) (zt   1)Sst+(xt   1) tM st +
Bt: Finally, the household receives its labour income WtLt and uses some of its
cash to purchase new bonds costing the household Bt+1=It in period t; where It  1
is the gross nominal interest rate between t and t + 1. The rest of the currency
holdings are transferred to the goods market. The cash-in-advance constraint that
restricts households consumption purchases becomes
(4.21) PtCt Mt+QSt+Q (1  ) (zt   1)Sst+(xt   1) tM st +WtLt+Bt 
Bt+1
It
:
Since the central bank functions as a nancial intermediary, labour income is avail-
able for consumption during the same period and enters into the cash-in-advance
constraint.
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At the end of period t the household receives the cash dividend payment ft
from the rm and carries the rest of the unspent currency into period t+1. Hence
the households budget constraint states
(4.22) QSt+1+Mt+1 Mt+QSt+Bt+QKs+WtLt+ft  
Bt+1
It
 PtCt QKt:
The nominal variables in the cash-in-advance constraint (4.21), budget con-
straint (4.22), gold endowment constraint (4.6) and in the rms problem are
scaled with the economys total money supply (4.8) so that mt = Mt=MTt ; m
s
t =
M st =M
T
t ; wt = Wt=M
T
t ; q = Q=M
T
t ; bt = Bt=M
T
t and pt = Pt=M
T
t : In the rms
problem, equations (4.16)-(4.20), the scaled expected price level 
t is denoted by
!t: The cash-in-advance constraint becomes
(4.23) ptCt  mt+qSt+q (1  ) (zt   1)Sst +(xt   1) tms+wtLt+bt 
gtbt+1
It
;
the budget constraint becomes
(4.24) gt (mt+1 + qSt+1)  mt+ qSt+ bt+ qKs+wtLt+ft  
gtbt+1
It
 ptCt  qKt
and the gold endowment constraint becomes
(4.25) q (Ks  Kt) = q (zt   1)Sst + (xt   1) tmst :
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The household chooses, given the gold endowment Kst ; the amount of gold it
mints and consumes before the rm sets its labour demand for that period. The
central bank and rm have to accept whatever zt and xt the household chooses.
The households preferences are given by the value of discounted utility per
period,
(4.26)
1X
t=0
tEtU (Ct; Kt) ,
where 0 <  < 1; Et () is the expectations operator and the utility function
satises: limC!1 UC = limK!1 UK = 0, limC!0 UC = limK!0 UK = 1 and
UC;K = UK;C = 0.
As in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995) there are four markets present in this econ-
omy: the goods market, labour market, credit market and money market which in
the gold standard setup is synonymous with the gold market. The private agents
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problem must satisfy the market clearing conditions
Ct = f (Lt)(4.27)
S0 = 1(4.28)
Sst = St(4.29)
M0 = 1(4.30)
M st = Mt(4.31)
q (Ks  Kt) = q (zt   1)Sst + (xt   1) tmst(4.32)
bt = bt+1 = 0(4.33)
for all t = 0; 1; 2:::. By rewriting normalised (4.1) for Kgt and substituting it
together with (4.12) into (4.7) the wage constraint can be written in equilibrium
as
(4.34) wtLt  dtxtmst :
Like in Chari and Kehoe (1990), the private agentsbehaviour can be sum-
marised by allocations (;  ) and allocation rules (;	). For each period t let
 t =
 
 1;t;  2;t

be the households allocations for the rst and second stages
of period t; where  1;t = (Kt; St+1; S
s
t ) and  2;t = (Ct;mt+1;m
s
t ; bt+1) : Let  =
( 0;  1; :::) denote an innite sequence of such allocations. The rms allocation
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for period t is t = (Lt) and  = (0; 1; :::) denotes the innite sequence of the
rms allocations.
Formally a policy of the central bank is a sequence d = fd0; d1:::g of the discre-
tionary money growth rates where dt 2
 
0; d

. Allocation rules are the sequences
of functions 	 = (	0;	1; :::) and  = (0;1; :::) that map policies into se-
quences of allocations: the households allocation rule 	(d) species the setting
of  t = (Kt; St+1; Ct;mt+1; bt+1) ; and the rms allocation rule (d) species the
setting of t = Lt for each possible d0; d1; :::. Much of the rest of the chapter, how-
ever, will be about trying to characterise these sequences and mappings in good
and bad states, taking credibility as given and policies and allocations are analysed
in Chapter 5.
The households problem is to choose Ct; Kt; St+1; Sst ; mt+1; m
s
t and bt+1
to maximise (4.26) subject to (4.23) and (4.24) and taking also the endowment
constraint (4.25) into account. The Lagrangian for the household problem is
(4.35)
L = Et
1X
t=0
t fU (Ct; Kt)
+t

mt + qSt + bt + qK
s + wtLt + 
f
t  
gtbt+1
It
  ptCt   qKt   gt (mt+1 + qSt+1)

+t

mt + qSt + q (1  ) (zt   1)Sst + (xt   1) tmst + wtLt + bt  
gtbt+1
It
  ptCt

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where t and t are Lagrangian multipliers on the budget and cash-in-advance
constraints. The rst order conditions are
Ct : UC (t) = pt (t + t)(4.36)
Kt : UK (t) = qt(4.37)
mt+1 : gtt = Et
 
t+1 + t+1

(4.38)
St+1 : gtt = Et
 
t+1 + t+1

(4.39)
bt+1 :
gt
It
(t + t) = Et
 
t+1 + t+1

(4.40)
lim
t!1
t (t + t)mt = 0(4.41)
lim
t!1
t f (t + t) stg = 0(4.42)
Using market clearing conditions (4.27)-(4.33) and (4.34), the cash-in-advance con-
straint (4.23) can be expressed as
(4.43) ptCt = mt + qSt + q (1  ) (zt   1)St   t + (t + dt)xtmt:
In equilibrium Yt = Ct and by substituting (4.18) into (4.43), the condition for the
price level becomes
(4.44) pt = A 1!

t fmt + [ + (1  ) (zt   1)] qSt   t + (t + dt)xtmtg1 
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and solving this for the consumption gives
(4.45) Ct = A1 !
 
t fmt + [ + (1  ) (zt   1)] qSt   t + (t + dt)xtmtg :
If wages are set at the start of each period and are unresponsive to developments
within the period, money whether specie or paper currency has an immediate
e¤ect on the level of output. If dt; xt or zt increase, from (4.44), the price level rises.
The actual price level is now above the expected price level. From (4.19) the rms
real wage bill reduces, which, through (4.17), increases labour demand, production,
prots and consumption. The central bank has an obvious time inconsistency
problem in this economy as by increasing the paper money supply it can stimulate
the economy. However, as in Barro and Gordon (1983a) in equilibrium this is not
possible because the household and rm adjust their expectations and the ination
becomes ine¢ ciently high without having any short or long-run benets.
In this model the gold standard rule is an exogenous monetary policy rule, not
an outcome of an optimisation problem. Although the gold standard is a credible
monetary policy rule, policy under the gold standard does not directly compare
with an optimal policy under commitment, called the Ramsey policy analysed by
Chari and Kehoe (1990), Stokey (1989), Ireland (1997) and Chang (1998a). Within
the above denitions and initial solutions of the rm and households problems in
hand, we turn to consider the economy under two possible states of the world: the
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time of peace, when the commitment technology the perfect gold standard is
available, and the time of war, when the gold standard becomes dysfunctional.
4.3. The Well Established Gold Standard
Consider an environment where the central bank commits to the exogenous
gold standard rule at the beginning of time. In particular, the starting point is the
null history at date 0 when the state of the world is peace and the central bank
sets the discretionary money growth rate dt equal to one, which implies that  = 1
and the whole paper money stock is backed by monetary gold.
In order to simplify the analysis even further I assume that under this perfect
gold standard rule the utility maximising household does not mint any new specie
and only the gradually depreciating initial stock of specie remains in circulation.
Why would the household prefer paper currency over specie? The household is
better o¤ in terms of welfare by using paper currency as a medium of exchange,
because of the minting cost and depreciation. Furthermore, since law restricts
smelting of specie, minted coins cannot be transferred to consumable gold. In
the real world there are physical restrictions on how small coins can be minted
and used, but similar restrictions do not apply to paper currency, which can be
printed in any denominations. Therefore, I assume that the stock of specie becomes
arbitrarily small and insignicant in an economic sense when time goes by, and
the analysis is carried out under the assumption that St = Sst = 0:
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These two assumptions on paper money and specie imply that under the gold
standard the total money growth rate (4.8) becomes MTt+1  M st+1 = xtM st : In
this perfect gold standard economy the paper currency has an important role:
rstly, through the cash-in-advance constraint it facilitates transactions; secondly,
through the wage constraint (4.7) it facilitates nancial intermediation; and thirdly,
by reducing the cost of acquiring money, it increases the representative households
welfare compared to the economy, where specie would be used as a medium of
exchange.
The household chooses, given the gold endowment Kst ; gold consumption and
the money growth rate before the rm sets its labour demand for that period. The
central bank and rm have to accept whatever money growth rate xt the household
chooses.
Under the gold standard the market clearing conditions become
Ct = f (Lt)(4.46)
Mt = M
s
t(4.47)
M0 = 1(4.48)
Kst  Kt =
(xt   1)
q
(4.49)
bt = bt+1 = 0(4.50)
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for all t = 0; 1; 2:::. In terms of scaled nominal variables, the households cash-in-
advance and budget constraints under the gold standard become
(4.51) ptCt  mt + (xt   1) + wtLt + bt   xtbt+1
It
;
and
(4.52) xtmt+1 +
xtbt+1
It
 mt + bt + qKs + wtLt + ft   ptCt   qKt:
The outcome under the commodity standard describes the sequences of equilib-
rium prices and quantities that are obtained when the central bank manages gold
convertibility and the private agents respond to the stochastic, exogenous gold ow
by maximising utility and prots. The Lagrangian for the household problem is
(4.53)
L = Et
1X
t=0
t [U (Ct; Kt)]
+t

mt + bt + qK
s + wtLt + 
f
t   xtmt+1  
xtbt+1
It
  ptCt   qKt

+t

mt + (xt   1) + wtLt + bt   xtbt+1
It
  ptCt

:
173
The rst order conditions are
Ct : UC (t) = pt (t + t)(4.54)
Kt : UK (t) = qt(4.55)
mt+1 : xtt = Et
 
t+1 + t+1

(4.56)
bt+1 :
xt
It
(t + t) = Et
 
t+1 + t+1

(4.57)
(4.58) lim
t!1
tEt 1 (t + t)mt = 0
where t and t are the Lagrangian multipliers for the period t budget and cash-in-
advance constraints respectively. I assume that the central bank does not purchase
any goods. In equilibrium Yt = Ct; bt = bt+1 = 0 and (4.47) implies mt = 1. The
wage constraint (4.34) reduces to
(4.59) wtLt = xt:
If the equilibrium conditions (4.47), (4.48), (4.50) and (4.59) are substituted into
the cash-in-advance constraint (4.23), one obtains
(4.60) ptCt = 2xt:
Production and labour demand are dened as in (4.13)-(4.20).
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In this economy consumption good Ct is a cash good, but gold is an endowment
good. The household can either consume gold or convert it into currency in order
to buy its consumption good, but gold does not directly buy the consumption
good. The marginal rate of substitution of consumption for gold equals
(4.61)
UC (t)
UK (t)
=
pt
q

1 +
t
t

:
If the shadow marginal utility of money t = 0; lumps of gold could be used to buy
the consumption good and the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and gold would equal their relative price pt=q:
Using (4.54), (4.56) and (4.57), the value of the liquidity services becomes
(4.62) t =
UC (t)
pt

1  1
It

:
As in cash-in-advance models proposed by Svensson (1985) and Walsh (2003), 
is positive as long as the nominal interest rate It > 1: In steady state this implies
that x > :
Proposition 4.1 The households decision over Kt determines the lower
and upper bounds on money growth and ensures existence of the nite monetary
equilibrium. Under the gold standard rule xt 2 (; 1 + qKs) for all t = 0; 1; 2; :::.
Proof: The lower bound on the money growth ensures that  > 0 and I > 1
in steady state. The upper bound is derived from the gold endowment constraint
(4.25) where Ss = 0; and rst order conditions: If Kt approaches zero, from (4.25)
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xt approaches (1+qKs). By substituting (4.54) and (4.56) into (4.55) the marginal
utility of the private gold becomes
(4.63) UK (t) = qx 1t Et

UC (t+ 1)
pt+1

:
Let the utility function take a constant relative risk aversion form
(4.64) Et
1X
t=0
t

Ct + K

t


;
where  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and 0 <  < 1: By substituting
(4.64) into the marginal gold demand (4.63) we get
(4.65) K 1t = x
 1
t qEt

C 1t+1
pt+1

;
which implies that as  < 1; Kt > 0 for all t. If Kt approaches zero, from (4.49) it
can be seen that xt approaches qKst + 1: 
Proposition 4.2 Under the gold standard the price level and consumption
are bounded.
Proof: In equilibrium (4.46) implies
(4.66) Ct = A

pt
!t
 
1 
:
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Substituting (4.66) and normalised (4.18) into (4.60) gives a relation between the
price level and the money growth rate
(4.67) ptA

pt
!t
 
1 
= 2xt:
Solving this for pt gives
(4.68) pt = A 1!

t (2xt)
1 
and substituting (4.68) into (4.69) gives
(4.69) Ct = A1 !
 
t (2xt)
 :
As xt 2 (; 1 + qKs) ; pt and Ct are bounded. If xt approaches ; the household
consumes its whole gold endowment and converts some paper money into gold at
the central bank. Thus the price level approaches its lowest bound
(4.70) p = A 1!t (2)
1  :
If xt approaches to (qKs + 1) ; the household only consumes an arbitrarily small
amount of gold and the price level approaches its upper bound
(4.71) p = A1 ! t [2 (qK
s + 1)]1  :
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Thus under the well functioning gold standard the price level satises pt 2
 
p; p

: The
bounds on consumption can be found respectively. The lowest bound of consump-
tion becomes
(4.72) C = A1 ! t (2)

and upper bound becomes
(4.73) C = A1 ! t [2 (qK
s + 1)] :
Thus under the well established gold standard consumption satises Ct 2
 
C;C

:
How are the nominal and real interest rates dened under this well established
gold standard set up? From the rst order condition (4.57) the nominal yield on
government bonds is
(4.74) I 1t = x
 1
t Et

t+1 + t+1
t + t

which, by using (4.54), can be written as
(4.75) I 1t = x
 1
t Et

UC (t+ 1)
UC (t)
pt
pt+1

:
The ex-ante real rate of interest is dened as
(4.76) Rt = ItEt

pt
pt+1

:
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Using (4.75) the real rate of interest can be written as
R 1t = x
 1
t Et

UC (t+ 1)
UC (t)
pt
pt+1

=Et

pt
pt+1

(4.77)
= R 1ft +
covt
h
UC(t+1)
UC(t)
; pt
pt+1
i
Et

pt
pt+1
 :
Following Canzoneri and Dellas (1998) the ex-ante real interest rate can be decom-
posed into the risk-free rate and the risk premium where R 1ft = x
 1
t Et
h
UC(t+1)
UC(t)
i
is
the risk-free rate and the right hand side covariance term denes the risk premium,
the expected return on bonds above the risk-free rate. Under the gold standard
prices move pro-cyclically in the sense that the realised return on bonds is high
when the gold endowment is small and low when the gold endowment is large.
Positive shock to gold supply leads to a negative risk premium. Then the risk-free
rate becomes
(4.78) R 1ft = x
 1
t Et
"
Ct+1
Ct
 1#
thus an increase in the expected gross growth rate of consumption, Ct+1=Ct; in-
creases the risk free interest rate.
Proposition 4.3 The nominal and real interest rates are bounded under the
well established gold standard.
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Proof: If (4.68), (4.69) and the functional form of the utility function is sub-
stituted to (4.75), the nominal interest rate becomes
(4.79) I 1t = x
 
t Et
 
x 1t+1

:
As 0 <  < 1 the nominal interest rate increases when the money growth rate
in period t or the expected money growth rate increases. However, as the current
and the expected money growth rates are bounded under the well established
gold standard, the uctuations in the nominal interest rate are also bounded.
The nominal interest rate reaches its lowest bound 1 if both the current and the
expected money growth rate are expected to be . The nominal interest rate
approaches its highest bound if the money growth rate is expected to be high in
the future but low now. Thus
(4.80) It 2
 
1;

1 + qKs

1 !
:
If we now substitute (4.69) into (4.78), we get that
(4.81) Rft =
1

x
1+( 1)
t
1
Et

x
( 1)
t+1
 ;
thus expected future increase in money growth increases the risk free interest rate.
The real interest rate under the gold standard becomes
(4.82) Rt =
1

x
1+( 1)
t
Et
 
x 1t+1

Et
 
x 1t+1
 :
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The real rate of interest increases if the money growth rate in period t increases
or if the expected increase in future money growth rate increases, but again as the
money growth rate is bounded, so the real interest rate is bounded:
Rt 2
 
1;

1 + qKs

(1 )!
:
The interest rate risk under the gold standard is solely dependent on the risk
related to the stochastic nature of the gold endowment. It is not related to govern-
ment policies or labour market conditions. Interest rate targeting or money stock
targeting are not feasible policies under the gold standard.
If the nominal wages are xed for a period, money has an immediate e¤ect
on the level of output. From equation (4.69) the positive gold endowment shock
increases the gold available for conversion. The money growth rate xt increases.
Now the household is able to increase its consumption purchases, which increases
prices and decreases the real wage below the expected level. The rms wage bill
reduces that in turn increases labour demand and production.
The important outcome of the gold standard rule is the way in which it solves
the discretionary problem which arises from the xed wage structure. Although
the gold standard does not eliminate the link between money and output, it does
prevent the central bank from exploiting it by printing paper money unexpectedly.
The gold standard rule makes most monetary policy procedures, such as money
targeting, dysfunctional. The role of the central bank is passive in conducting
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the monetary policy, it simply facilitates the convertibility and provides printing
services.
Another outcome of the gold standard is that as the money growth rate x is
bounded through the gold endowment, the price level and consumption become
bounded. Under the well established gold standard, market activity never disap-
pearsas the private consumption is always positive even when the growth rate in
money stock might equal one. Nevertheless, the gold standard does not eliminate
the variance of private consumption, or the periods of disination, but as x > 
(given that  is close to one) the economy does not experience serious deationary
pressure.
One could ask, however, what would happen if the endowmentKst became arbi-
trarily large. The answer is that in such an event the monetary constitution would
have to adjust as gold would not full the requirements for a suitable backing com-
modity any more. Any commodity standard must be established on a commodity
that is rare, durable and easy to identify.
4.4. The Suspension of the Convertibility Rule
4.4.1. The Regime Switch in the Bad State of the World
The exogenous switch between the states always occurs after rms and households
have set wages. All agents observe that the gold endowment is zero. A bad state,
a war or some natural disaster, can last for several periods, but is not known
to last forever, and therefore, neither is the stoppage on the gold endowment
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permanent. During the bad state the households demand for gold increases above
its peace-time level Kt by . The absolute amount of additional gold demanded is
not important for this model, but its e¤ects are: in particular, xt is no longer well
dened by  and the gold endowment as under the perfect gold standard: By (4.68)
the price level falls and the expected price level ! is now above the actual price
level. The real wage bill of the rm, dened by (4.19), increases which forces the
rm to cut employment and production. By constraint (4.59) any gold conversion
reduces the reserves on which the rm can borrow. Finally, from the cash-in-
advance constraint (4.60), a fall in money holdings reduces private consumption
and the nominal interest rate is unity, It = 1:
Following the gold standard rule in the bad state clashes with the central banks
policy objective to stabilise the economy. Gold conversion imposes deationary
pressure on the economy, which would be especially undesirable in the bad state,
such as in the war time emergency, since private consumption is already low.
The central bank is left with two options: either to follow the gold standard rule
or change the monetary constitution of the country. What are the alternative
monetary regimes to the gold standard? Firstly, given that in this model the
private agents only value claims that can be converted to gold as money, the at
regime would not be feasible. But even if at money was acceptable, the outcome
might not be desirable, because in this sticky wage framework the government
would have a temptation to increase employment and production by increasing
the money growth rate. The behaviour of the money stock and price level would
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be incorporated into expectations and the nominal wage set at the beginning of
the periods would adjust fully. Under the at standard the total money growth
rate is dened by M st+1 = dtM
s
t where the upper bound of discretionary money
growth rate d is arbitrary large. Ireland (1997) has shown that even though the
central bank would be able to commit to a sustainable money growth rate, any
deviation from the rate would cause the economy to revert immediately to the
worst possible hyper-ination equilibrium. The at money system, therefore, does
not necessarily o¤er a solution in this particular framework.
Instead of abandoning the gold standard rule completely, the central bank, with
a simple action such as closing its doors and refraining from converting any gold
during the crisis, could prevent the deationary pressure. The suspension of the
convertibility rule implies that paper notes are not convertible to gold immediately,
but at some future point after the crisis has passed. The gold standard will be
resumed at the old par value Q: During the suspension the value of the households
paper currency is not dened by the immediate conversion to gold, but by the
credibility of the central banks promise to convert the currency in the future. If
the household did not consider this promise to be credible, the circulating paper
currency would lose its value immediately. In this chapter, in contrast to chapter
5, suspension is assumed to be exogenously credible.
If the gold standard rule were suspended, could the economy switch to the
commodity money regime where only gold coins would be used as a medium of
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exchange? The expectations in the commodity money regime would not be in-
uenced by the credibility problem, because coins have intrinsic value. In this
particular framework, however, gold coins could not start circulating at the begin-
ning of the bad state, since the household is assumed not to have a precautionary
incentive to hold gold specie. The household is not able to mint any gold when it
realises that Ks = 0 as it does not have access to gold.
4.4.2. The Stoppage Periods
As illustrated by the historical evidence, suspension consists of two stages, stoppage
and adjustment periods. The former covers the bad state, war, and the latter starts
when the good state, peace, re-emerges, and lasts until the resumption of the gold
standard is feasible. During both stages the gold standard rule does not fully
apply. In what follows I assume that period t+N is the last gold standard period
and period t+N + 1 =  is the rst period of suspension. Periods between  and
 + j   1 are the stoppage periods when the gold endowment is zero, and periods
between  + j and  + S are the adjustment periods when the gold ow is again
positive. Period  + S + 1 is the rst period of gold standard after resumption.
The sequence of events during the stoppage periods is as follows. The household
enters period  + i; where i = 0; :::; j   1; with predetermined money M+i, whilst
the value of existing monetary gold QKg+i is proportional to the money stock only
if it is the rst stoppage period (i = 0); and smaller than M+i in subsequent
periods. Next, the representative household and the rm set the nominal wage,
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dened by (4.16). Then both the central bank and the private agents observe that
Ks+i = 0. If it is the rst time, the central bank closes its doors and announces
its policy plan to convert paper currency to gold at the old par value at some
future unknown point, otherwise the central bank simply does not convert any
currency to gold. Then the households bonds mature, it receives its labour income
w+iL+i and uses some of its cash to purchase new bonds. The rest is carried to
the goods market. The cash-in-advance constraint for the rst and subsequent
stoppage periods is parallel to (4.60) where x+i is set to one.
(4.83) p+iC+i  m+i + w+iL+i + b+i   b+i+1
I+i
where i = 0; :::; j   1. The households budget constraint in the absence of gold
ow reduces to
p+iC+i  w+iL+i + f+i(4.84)
 m+i+1 +m+i + b+i   b+i+1
I+i
;
where i = 0; :::; j   1.
An important element of the suspension is the way in which it does not just
remove the restriction from money market, but also the restriction from the credit
market. The suspension abolishes the tie between discounts and monetary gold,
namely (4.59). The central bank is now able to increase the value of the discount
above the value of the monetary gold stock. As x = 1; the wage constraint (4.59)
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during the stoppage periods becomes
(4.85) w+iL+i  d+i;
where i = 0; :::; j   1 and d+i is the rate of money expansion the central banks
money injection. During the stoppage periods money supply is dened as
(4.86) M s+i+1 = d+iM+i for i = 0; :::; j   1:
If net bonds are assumed to be zero during the stoppage periods, the cash-in-
advance constraint (4.83) can be written as
(4.87) p+iC+i = 1 + d+i:
The wage and production levels are dened as in (4.16)-(4.19). By using the
equilibrium condition C+i = Y+i and substituting (4.18) into (4.87) the price
level in the stoppage periods becomes
(4.88) p+i = A 1!

t (1 + d+i)
1 
and consumption
(4.89) C+i = A1 !
 
t (1 + d+i)
 :
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During the stoppage periods, by (4.88) and (4.89), the price level and consump-
tion are solely determined by the central banks discretionary policy monetary
injection d+i. The price level and consumption are bounded upwards only by the
arbitrarily large printing limit d: According to (4.89), during the stoppage period
the central bank has an opportunity to increase money growth rate in order to
stimulate consumption virtually at will.
4.4.3. The Adjustment Periods
If the stoppage in gold ow lasts between periods  and  + j   1, where j  1;
period  + j is the period when the gold ow resumes and the adjustment back to
the gold standard begins. I assume that the gold ow returns to the pre-suspension
level.
The sequence of events during the adjustment period is as follows. The house-
hold enters period  + i where i = j; :::; S with predetermined money M+i, whilst
the value of existing monetary gold QKg+i is smaller than M+i. Next, the rep-
resentative household and the rm set the nominal wage, dened again by (4.16),
and then all agents observe that Ks+i is positive. The household makes a decision
over the private gold consumption K+i: The rest can be deposited at the central
bank in a similar manner as during the gold standard, but the household is not
able to withdraw any gold. Given that the doors of the bank stay closed for the
notes-to-gold conversion, the willingness of the household to deposit gold might
not seem realistic, but according to the historical evidence presented in Chapter 3,
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the public was indi¤erent between gold and paper currency during the Suspension
Period, because the resumption was credible. Then the households bonds mature,
it receives its labour income and uses some of its cash to purchase new bonds. The
rest is carried to the goods market. The cash-in-advance constraint for the rst
and subsequent adjustment periods is
(4.90) p+iC+i  m+i + (x+i   1) +i + w+iL+i + b+i  
b+i+1
I+i
:
where i = j; :::; S and the wage bill under the adjustment is
w+iL+i = d+ix+i:
If (4.16) and the equilibrium condition bt+i = bt+i+1 = 0 are substituted into
normalised (4.90), we get that
(4.91) p+iC+i = 1 + (x+i   1) +i + d+ix+i
for i = j; :::; S: Substituting (4.14) into this expression, the price level and con-
sumption during the adjustment periods are given by
(4.92) p+i = A 1!

t

1  +i +
 
+i + d+i

x+i
1 
and
(4.93) C+i = A1 !
 
t

1  +i +
 
+i + d+i

x+i

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where i = j; :::; S. The price level and consumption in the adjustment period
depend both on the money growth rate x+i proportional to monetary gold, the
discretionary money reductionrate d+i and the gold reserve ration +i:
The resumption of the gold standard is not immediately achievable after the
gold endowment has resumed, because the circulating money stock exceeds the
value of monetary gold and the gold backing is not perfect. Therefore, in the
adjustment periods the central bank can still conduct discretionary policy, but
now, instead of stimulating the economy with money transfers, the central bank
must withdraw paper currency from circulation. The non-scaled net paper money
supply in adjustment periods is dened as
(4.94) M s+i+1 = d+ix+iM
s
+i
where i = j; :::; S, d+i  1 and x+i  1:
4.4.4. Terminal Condition
The central banks optimisation problem, derived in Chapter 5, denes the actual
rate by which the at money is issued and subsequently withdrawn from circu-
lation, but here the topic is discussed generally. Under the suspension of cash
payments it is not a formal conversion rule, but a terminal condition, which re-
stricts the central banks issue of at money. If the gold standard rule is resumed at
the beginning of the period +S+1; the policy rule of the central bank states that
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at the point of resumption the money stock must be proportional to the monetary
gold stock
(4.95) M+S+1 = QK
g
+S+1:
By substituting the left-hand-side for x+Sd+SM+S = M+S+1 and rewriting the
right-hand-side using
(4.96) Kg+i+1 = K
g
+i +K
s
+i  K+i
the terminal condition can be written as
(4.97) x+Sd+SM+S = QK
g
+S +Q
 
Ks+S+1  K+S+1

:
If the left hand side of (4.97) is solved recursively backwards until the rst period
of suspension, and by assuming that the gold ow resumes at period  + j; (4.97)
becomes
xd :::x+S 1d+S 1x+Sd+SM = QKg +Q
SX
i=j
 
Ks+i  K+i

:
If this expression is now normalised with M s and reorganised, the terminal condi-
tion can be written as
(4.98)
 
SY
i=0
d+ix+i   1
!
m = q
SX
i=j

Ks+i  K+i

:
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If the central banks aim is to resume the perfect gold standard, the terminal
condition (4.98) sets the limit for the money growth rate. Although monetary gold
must be proportional to the circulating money stock by the point of the resumption,
it implies that the central bank is able to issue at money during the suspension,
but the money growth rate must drop by the point of the resumption since the
perfect gold standard rule does not allow any discontinuity. On the practical level,
once the gold ow resumes, the central bank must set d+i  1 where i = j; :::; S in
order to withdraw the at money from circulation. In other words, the net growth
in money stock must be proportional to the growth in monetary gold during the
duration of the suspension period. Therefore
(4.99)
SY
i=0
x+id+i =
SY
i=0
x+i
which implies that
(4.100)
SY
i=0
d+i = 1:
Although at money has to be withdrawn from circulation, an opportunity to
boost the economy by the at money transfers may be desirable, as during a war
economic activity is likely to be low in any case. This is exactly what happened
during the Suspension Period of 1797-1821. During the war years 1797-1815 the
Bank of England created a substantial amount of credit, but when the gold trade
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resumed after the Battle of Waterloo in 1815, the credit market was constrained
and the circulating money stock reduced. This can be seen in Figures 3.3 and 3.7.
By contrast to the historical evidence, the model suggests that the adjustment
period does not necessarily result in deation if the net money growth rate x+id+i
during the adjustment periods is above one, i.e. the household deposits gold at the
central bank and simultaneously the Bank constraints discounts. Any potential
deation under the adjustment, nevertheless, lasts only for a limited time. As the
deation reduces private consumption, it is important that the adjustment occurs
when the gold has already started to ow into the country.
The central bank could prevent deation if it just closed the doors of the
central bank, but would not issue any at money. The benet of this strategy is
that it makes the adjustment period unnecessary and the length of the suspension
is parallel to the length of the stoppage in gold ow.
In at regime models such as Ireland (1997) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995),
the government gives the monetary transfer directly to the household. Under the
commodity standard set up transfers are injected via rms and not households, be-
cause the latter practice would not be feasible. In order to reduce the circulating
money stock to match the monetary gold stock in the adjustment period, the gov-
ernment would have to reduce the monetary price of gold Q that would encourage
private gold consumption and reduce the paper money available for consumption
purchases.
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4.4.5. Interest Rates during Suspension
If the gold standard was not suspended, the nominal interest rate would be at its
lower bound. Under the suspension of gold convertibility, the nominal interest rate
can be written as
(4.101)
1
I+i
= (x+id+i)
 1 E+i

UC ( + i+ 1)
UC ( + i)
p+i
p+i+1

for i = 0; :::; S   1:
If we now use the CRRA utility function and use (4.88) and (4.89), the nominal
interest rate becomes
1
I+i
= (x+id+i)
 1 1  +i +  +i + d+i x+i1 (4.102)
E+i
n
1  +i+1 +
 
+i+1 + d+i+1

x+i+1
 1o
:
Any expected increase in either the future money growth rate x+i+1 or discre-
tionary money growth rate d+i+1 increases the nominal interest rate. On the
other hand if at money is expected to be withdrawn, any expected reduction in
d+i+1 decreases the nominal interest rate. The lower is the d+i+1; the higher is
the rate by which the issued at money is withdrawn from circulation and the
closer the resumption becomes. Expected resumption thus decreases the nominal
interest rate.
The real interest rate is given by
(4.103) R+i = I+iE+i

p+i
p+i+1

for i = 0; :::; S:
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Using (4.102) and the CRRA utility function the real interest rate becomes
R+i = (x+id+i)

1  +i +
 
+i + d+i

x+i
( 1)
(4.104)

E+i
n
1  +i +
 
+i + d+i

x+i
 1o
E+i
n
1  +i +
 
+i + d+i

x+i
 1o
where i = 0; :::; S   1: The real interest rate increases if either x+i+1 or d+i+1
increases and again, if the public expects the adjustment to last for many periods,
the interest rate is higher than it would be, if the adjustment was supposed to be
short. During the stoppage period, both the nominal and real interest rate are
bounded only by d:
4.5. Calculations
To illustrate how the suspension of the gold standard rule stabilises the economy
in the bad state of the world, I compare development of consumption, monetary
gold and money: rstly, when the country stays on the gold standard; and secondly,
when the gold standard is suspended. In the absence of a time series on gold export
in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, I am not able to analyse whether the
model would match the data. According to Clapham (1944), Appendix A, the
circulation of Bank of Englands depository notes grew on average 2.5 percent per
year, but there were large uctuations in the monetary gold stock and the gold
reserve ratio. Figure 2.2 in chapter 2, and Figure 3.2 in Chapter 3 demonstrate
how monetary gold uctuated during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
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The rst columns of Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 illustrate uctuations in mone-
tary gold, the money stock and consumption when the country follows the gold
convertibility rule throughout the stoppage periods. In this simplistic example I
assume that xt = 1:01 in the good state when Ks > 0; and 0:98 in the bad state
when Ks = 0 and the country does not suspend the gold standard. In other words,
the monetary gold stock grows 1 percent in the good state and decreases 2 percent
per period in the bad state if the gold standard is not suspended. The discount
factor is always  = 0:99.
Figure 4.1. The monetary gold stock under the gold standard (LHS)
and the suspension (RHS).
Between periods t and t+20 the gold endowment is positive and the prevailing
monetary regime is the perfect gold standard. The monetary price of gold Q = 1
and the initial money stock and gold stock equal 1.42. As the money growth rate
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Figure 4.2. The money stock under the gold standard (LHS) and
the suspension (RHS).
Figure 4.3. Consumption under the gold standard (LHS) and the
suspension (RHS).
is constant (and incorporated in wage setting) consumption and the price level are
constant over time.
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At period t + 20 there is a sudden stoppage on the gold ow. The rst and
second pictures on the left hand side of the Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show how both the
circulating money stock and the monetary gold stock reduce 2 percent in every
period as the household now converts its paper money to gold to satisfy its gold
consumption. Consumption, shown in the left-hand-side of Figure 4.3 falls sharply
during the stoppage periods as the household converts its paper currency to gold
and less currency is available for consumption purchases. Consumption remains
low until the gold endowment resumes in period t + 30. After the gold ow has
resumed, it takes 20 periods before monetary gold and the money stock are at the
pre-stoppage level.
The second columns illustrates developments of monetary gold, the money
stock and consumption when the gold standard rule is suspended and the central
bank refuses to convert any currency to gold. The number of stoppage periods is
ten as above. During the stoppage periods the discretionary money growth rate
is 1 percent per period, d = 1:01 and equals the net money growth rate dx since
x = 1: The right hand side column of Figure 4.1 shows the monetary gold stock:
as the household cannot convert its paper money to gold, the gold stock remains
xed during the stoppage periods. The paper money supply, the rst picture on
the right hand side of Figure 4.2, increases at the same rate as during the gold
standard as x is now replaced by d: The last gure on the right hand side of Figure
4.3 is consumption, which between periods t+20 and t+30 does not change from it
198
gold standard level. The issue of paper money during the stoppage, made possible
by the suspension of gold standard rule, maintains consumption in the bad state.
In period t + 30 the gold endowment resumes and the money growth rate x,
which is proportional to monetary gold, is again 1 percent per period. The adjust-
ment to the gold standard begins: the discretionary money growth rate between
periods t+30 and t+50 is now d = 0:995; thus at money decreases 0.5 percent per
period and the net money growth rate is close to one, xd = 1:005. The monetary
gold stock during the adjustment period increases at the same rate as during the
gold standard. The paper money growth rate increases at a slightly smaller rate
until period t + 50; when the paper money increases again at the same rate as
monetary gold stock. Given that wage expectations do not adjust fully during the
rst adjustment period, consumption falls slightly during the adjustment periods.
However, the reduction in consumption occurs after the war, not during it, which
might be the most valuable feature of suspension for the policy maker.
4.6. Conclusion
This chapter has concentrated on studying the transition from the gold stan-
dard to the suspension of cash payments and vice versa, and most specically, the
stabilisation mechanism of the suspension of cash payments. In order to tackle
the issue of stabilisation explicitly, the gold standard and the suspension of cash
payments were modelled in a DSGE framework. In both Chapter 3 and in this
chapter I demonstrated that contrary to the dominant view in the literature 
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the gold standard and the suspension of cash payments should not be treated as
similar monetary policy regimes, since the policy rules these two systems enforced
were di¤erent. The suspension of the gold standard rule and its subsequent re-
sumption o¤er an example of how alteration of the monetary regime can be used
to stabilise the economy.
The starting point was a model of an idealised commodity standard a well
established gold standard only feasible during the good state of the world. The
gold standard restricts the central banks ability to stimulate consumption and
production by printing money. Under the gold standard the money stock can
only grow if monetary gold grows in the same proportion. As the gold endow-
ment is nite, the money growth rate was bounded and therefore, also the price
level, consumption and interest rates are bounded. Although the gold standard
cannot remove the variability in consumption as such, it provides a market driven
mechanism to ensure the existence of these bounds.
The disadvantage of the gold standard was that it was subject to gold supply
shocks as the feasibility of the standard relied on availability of gold for monetary
use. This was the very problem England had to face at the end of the eighteenth
century when the maritime war blocked the gold trade. The key conclusion of this
chapter is that if the bad state of the world is involved with a stoppage in gold
ow, the suspension of cash payments may be a preferable monetary regime to the
gold standard in terms of stabilisation of consumption, price level, asset prices and
production. The pre-condition is, however, that the monetary rule enforced by the
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suspension to return to the gold convertibility at the old par value in the future
is credible. In this model a promise of future resumption of the gold standard
represents a commitment device, which limits the issue of paper money. As the
rule implies that notes will be fully convertible in the future, the suspension of
cash payments ensured that paper money remained in circulation.
The model explained in detail how the stabilisation properties of the suspension
functioned. Two stages, also clearly recognisable during the Suspension Period
1797-1821, were identied. During the stoppage periods war years when there
is no gold ow, the central bank prevents the household from converting money
to gold and stimulates the economy with at money transfers. But as the perfect
gold standard does not allow any discontinuity, by the time of resumption the
circulating money stock must be proportional to monetary gold. To minimise any
disruptions during the war, the adjustment begins when the country is again in
the good state. During the adjustment periods any at money issued is withdrawn
from circulation, but the net money growth rate is dened as a product of the at
money withdrawal rate and the money growth rate proportional to the growth of
the monetary gold. If the net money growth rate under the adjustment periods is
less than one, the adjustment causes some deation, but only for a limited time,
but potentially, if the net money growth rate during the adjustment was equal or
larger than one, the stoppage of gold endowment does not cause any deation.
The biggest benet of the suspension of the gold standard rule is that it enables
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the central bank to defer the potentially deationary adjustment during the time
of peace, not until the time of war.
The conclusion about the desirability of suspension in terms of stabilisation
does not, at least in this particular framework, imply that the suspension would
yield higher utility than the at money or the gold standard regime. The question
of whether the suspension of cash payments also maximises the welfare of household
remains to be analysed in Chapter 5.
The historiography of the Suspension Period is confused by exaggeration and
anachronism on the part of the bullionists, but also on the part of anti-bullionists
during the era, when for the rst time in British monetary history, inconvertible
paper money also circulated as a medium of exchange amongst the lower ranks of
society, and the mechanism of money and stabilisation was barely understood. At
rst it was bullionists who were against the evils of inconvertibility after the price
level had risen in 1810, but when the resumption of the gold standard started after
the arrival of peace, the Bank was criticised for constraining credit. The Bank
was perceived as promoting its own interests in the absence of the gold conversion
rule, and this dominant opinion led the Suspension Period to be analysed in a
narrow and simplied manner. For example, it has been argued that the aim
of the suspension of the gold standard rule was to maximise the governments
seigniorage revenue. In 1797 the cash payments were suspended, because following
the convertibility rule became infeasible and the circulation of paper money fell to
a level, which did not maintain consumption and production. Abstract theoretical
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analysis in this chapter, combined with examination of the historical evidence
surrounding the nature of the suspension of cash payments in Chapter 3, shed
light on the Bank of Englands true  if partially subconscious motivation to
continue suspension throughout the Napoleonic Wars: the suspension enabled the
Bank to use monetary policy as a bu¤er, which prevented a series of shocks of
various origin from a¤ecting the real economy during the most critical of times.
CHAPTER 5
The Resumption of the Gold Standard as a Sustainable
Plan
5.1. Introduction
In standard economic literature a policy regime is dened as time inconsistent
if the policy maker deviates from a policy plan which was expected to hold inde-
nitely into the future, and was chosen as an optimal policy based on the monetary
authoritys objectives.1 The outcome of this discretionary, sequentially chosen, pol-
icy can be very di¤erent from the outcome suggested by the original optimal plan,
because rational private agents consider policy makersactions while making their
own decisions. In an environment where a commitment technology is available,
by denition the government cannot change policies in the future and the time
inconsistency problem becomes irrelevant. Although in many cases commitment
leads to a better outcome than discretion, designing a commitment technology
that would not only tie the hands of current but also future generations of policy
makers can be implausible.
1Kydland and Presscott (1977).
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Yet for centuries the gold standard and other forms of commodity standards
were commitment technologies that aimed to restrict sovereignspower over eco-
nomic policy. The monetary authority the mint or the central bank was pre-
pared to maintain the value of the paper currency in terms of a xed weight of
gold and to buy and sell gold at a xed price on demand. However, according
to Bordo and Kydland (1995) and Bordo and Schwartz (1997) the gold standard,
as it prevailed before 1914, should be considered as a contingent rule rather as a
monolithic monetary policy rule per se: during a wartime emergency, when the
government needed to collect seigniorage revenue, the gold standard rule could be
temporarily abandoned on the understanding that after the emergency had safely
passed convertibility would be restored at original parity. Along the lines of this
theory, agents considered the gold standard and the suspension to be essentially
the same monetary system and could not think of any feasible alternatives to gold:
Thus, when an emergency occurred, the abandonment of the standard would be
viewed by all to be temporary event since, from their [the publics] experience,
only gold or gold-backed claims truly served as money.2
The extensive empirical survey in Bordo and Kydland (1995) and Bordo and
Schwartz (1997), consisting of over twenty countries that have suspended and sub-
sequently resumed the gold standard, shows that the theory of the gold standard
as a contingent rule is plausible, but the explanation for credibility of the monetary
system in the absence of the gold standard seems simplistic, especially if applied
2Bordo and Kydland (1995).
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to the Suspension Period of 1797-1821. In Chapters 3 and 4, I demonstrated that
the credibility of the Suspension Period could not be dependent on the superiority
of the gold standard rule itself, as argued by Bordo and Kydland (1995) and Bordo
and Schwartz (1997): rstly, suspension was not a temporary emergency measure,
but a separate monetary policy regime that lasted for twenty-four years, when
Britain was engaged in war and society went through major structural change,
viz. the Industrial Revolution. Secondly, even ve years after the Battle of Wa-
terloo, postponement of resumption and the pegging of the pound to gold at a
lower par value had powerful advocates. Benets and weaknesses of various mon-
etary arrangements were openly debated, and before 1820 the resumption of gold
standard was far from inevitable.
If it was not the superiority of the gold standard rule, then what made the sus-
pension of cash payments credible? According to the historical evidence I presented
in Chapter 3, credibility was based on the commitment of the Bank of England
and the government to resume the gold standard in the future: the successful
resumption was an outcome of active and determined monetary policy. In order
to ensure that the market price of gold would fully converge with the monetary
price of the gold a precondition for feasible resumption the Bank, the govern-
ment and Parliament had to convince the markets of their commitment to resume
gold payments in the future.3 For example, the Bank withdrew paper money from
circulation after the war, resisted its notes becoming legal tender and built gold
3Figure 3.9 shows how the market price of gold converted the mint price already in 1819.
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reserves. Furthermore, gold was made an o¢ cial unit of account by the Coinage
Act in 1816 in spite of the absence of the actual gold standard. Unable to resume
gold payments during the long war, Parliament extended the term of the Restric-
tion Acts eleven times between 1797 and 1821. They were carefully worded and
declared, for example, that resumption was not possible until One Month after
the conclusion of the present War by a Denite Treaty of Peace.4
Motivated by this evidence, but to avoid getting tangled with historical detail,
in this chapter I characterise both the Bank and the publics decision making in a
formal theoretical framework by applying the theory of credible and time consistent
monetary policy to the gold standard and suspension. By building on an example
rst developed by Kydland and Presscott (1977), Chari and Kehoe (1990) explore
whether policy can be time consistent without commitment technology. I ask the
same question, but in the context of the gold standard.
My analysis produces two main conclusions. Firstly, the suspension of cash pay-
ments was a credible regime, because the future resumption of the gold standard
was a sustainable plan. Given the repeated interaction between the government
and private agents during suspension, the governments plan to resume the gold
standard at some future point replaced the gold standard as a reputational device,
which limited money creation and solved the time inconsistency problem. Ac-
cording to Chari and Kehoe (1990) such a plan is sustainable, because the policy
maker follows it even in the presence of a time inconsistency problem. In Chapter
4Geo. III c.3 9th November 1797.
207
3, I demonstrated that the Suspension Period gave the Bank of England many
opportunities to conduct time inconsistent monetary policy: the Bank could have
increased its private prot by discounting the bills of exchange of London mer-
chants or maximised the governments seigniorage revenue by buying government
bonds. Furthermore, as discussed in the previous chapter, as the economy had
nominal rigidities, the Bank of England could have been able to stimulate the
economy by printing more paper money and when the war nally nished, the
Bank could have avoided the adjustment process altogether.
The historical evidence raises the question just what was so important about
the resumption of the gold standard that the Bank was willing to go through the
costly adjustment process and accept a reduction in its monetary independence.
The second main conclusion of this chapter implies that the gold standard was
resumed, because it was seen to maximise social welfare in the long-run. In the
good state the government was not able to conduct time inconsistent monetary
policy without commitment technology. Sustainability of the resumption plan was
crucial and it had both short-run and long-run implications. The government
would not have been able to borrow and paper money would not have remained
in circulation during the war, if the agents had not considered suspension to be
sustainable. If the government had failed to take the necessary steps towards
resumption immediately after the war, the market price of gold would have not
started to converge towards the o¢ cial mint price and disparity between the market
and the mint price of gold have made resumption infeasible. In the long-run, if the
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agents had lost their faith in the monetary system, the whole monetary system in
the country would have been ruined. Paper currency would have been abandoned
and demonetisation would have destroyed the credit system, which was based on
the stable circulation of the Bank of England notes. The pound might have followed
in the footsteps of assignats, the value of which could not be supported even by
guillotines during the Reign of Terror 1793-1794.5
The method I use to model decisions to suspend the gold standard rule and
to subsequently resume it adapts Grossman and Van Huycks (1988) theory of
excusable deviations. The authors interpret the sovereign debt as a contingent
claim: the lenders di¤erentiate excusable defaults, which are justiably associated
with implicitly understood contingencies, from debt repudiation, which would be
unjustiable and inexcusable. An excusable default in the bad state would not
damage the countrys reputation to the same extent as inexcusable default in the
good state. Characteristic of public debt and monetary policy management is that
they both are di¢ cult to control by formal laws. The conduct of monetary policy
has been contracted to agents  independent central banks as recently as the
end of the 1990s, at least in developed countries, but the public debt is commonly
managed by some governmental body. Therefore, these institutions have been able
to default without having to answer to a higher enforcement authority.
My interpretation of contingent default in the context of monetary policy rules
is the following. The bad state can lead to two potential defaults. The rst default
5Sargent and Velde (1995).
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is what Grossman and Van Huyck (1988) call excusable and it occurs when the
authority is forced to abandon the commitment technology, the gold standard,
upon arrival of the bad state. The second potential default follows the monetary
authoritys decision not to resume the original commitment rule even though the
state of the world has switched from the bad back to the good state. This default is
total and unjustied, and leads to the loss of the monetary authoritys reputation.
Another key objective of this chapter is to dene conditions which ensure that the
second default does not occur and the policy rule enforced by the commitment
technology is resumed once the economy has returned to the normal good state.
If the resumption of the commitment rule involves incurring a cost, as it is in this
model, the authority might not have an incentive to resume the rule.
The model developed in this chapter, although it is deterministic, builds di-
rectly on the baseline model constructed at the beginning of the previous chapter.
I consider the gold standard as an exogenous rule, which limits the benevolent
governments ability to issue money by making the money stock proportional to
monetary gold. The value of money is determined by direct convertibility to gold:
the monetary authority the mint or the central bank is prepared to maintain
the value of the paper currency in terms of a xed weight of gold and to buy and
sell it at a xed price on demand. In this commodity standard setup only gold or
gold-backed instruments are accepted as money. The monetary authority does not
control the money supply, but facilitates gold conversion, prints paper money and
provides nancial intermediation services.
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The bad state makes the gold standard infeasible, because war raises the ques-
tion of the central banks solvency in the form of a potential invasion of the country.
As a result, a bank run creates a serious monetary contraction that has an impact
on the real economy. In order to maintain the paper currency in circulation, the
central bank ceases converting paper money to gold, but simultaneously it promises
to convert paper claims at some future point, after the economy has returned to
the good state. The value of money during the suspension of gold standard rule is
thus determined by the promise of future convertibility.
Following Chari and Kehoe (1990), Stokey (1989), Ireland (1997) and Chang
(1998a) the model adapts Abreaus (1988) optimal penal codes under discount-
ing to policy games played between a benevolent government and private sector.
Chari and Kehoe (1990) demonstrate how any sustainable policy plan can be sup-
ported by a reputational equilibrium in which private expectations display an ex-
treme form of trigger-like behaviour: a single deviation by the government from
its announced plan causes the economy to revert permanently to its worst pos-
sible outcome. In this commodity standard setup, the worst possible outcome is
a commodity money regime. If the policy maker defaults on its policy plan to
withdraw paper money from circulation once the gold ow resumes, the agents
will abandon paper money and start using commodity money, gold specie, as a
medium of exchange. Compared with the gold standard the commodity money
regime is ine¢ cient.
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The theory of sustainable plans helps to explain some additional puzzles cre-
ated by the suspension of the credible monetary policy rule, such as what was
the optimal money growth rate during the suspension and to which factors was
the long-run viability of suspension based. The theory of the gold standard as a
contingent rule is not able to answer satisfactorily these questions as the theory
assumes the resumption of the gold standard to be exogenously credible.
This chapter is organised as follows: the rst section considers the gold standard
as a commitment technology; the second section analyses the suspension of the gold
standard rule; the third section denes under what conditions the resumption of
the gold standard is sustainable; in the fourth I characterise decision making and
sets of sustainable plans by numerical examples; and the nal section summarises
the key ndings and results.
5.2. The Gold Standard as a Commitment Technology
The economic environment is similar to that in Chapter 4. The state of the
world evolves exogenously between the good state, peace, and the bad state, war.
Production and labour demand are dened as in (4.13)-(4.20) At the beginning of
the period a representative rm and household agree on wages which stay xed
for that period. If the previous period had been peace, the current period is also
expected to be peace, so the change of the state comes as a surprise. After the wages
have been set, the household receives gold endowment Ks, which gives information
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about the state for all agents, and, by contrast to Chapter 4, is non-stochastic in
this deterministic version of the model.
According to the baseline model presented in section 4.2, in the absence of
any commitment technology the central bank has an incentive to create surprise
ination, because wages are xed for a period, and money has real e¤ects on the
economy. In the good state the central bank is able to commit to the exogenous
gold standard rule at the beginning of time and sets the discretionary money
growth rate dt equal to one. The whole paper money stock is then backed by
monetary gold. Furthermore, as in section 4.3, I assume that under this perfect
gold standard rule the utility maximising household does not mint any new specie
and only the gradually depreciating initial stock of specie remains in circulation.
In this section, I dene formally the private sectors allocation and the central
banks policy under the perfect gold standard rule. Then I analyse some welfare
implications of the gold standard.
Formally the gold standard equilibrium is a policy d = fdt = 1 j t = 0; 1; :::g and
the agentsallocation rules (;	) that satisfy the rms problem to choose Lt to
maximise prots (4.13), and the households problem to choose Kt; Ct; mt+1 and
bt+1 to maximise its utility
(5.1)
1X
t=0
tU (Ct; Kt)
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subject to cash-in-advance constraint (4.51) and budget constraint (4.52) taking
Ks; pt; R; 
f
t and wt given for all t = 0; 1; 2:::. The market clearing conditions
are given by (4.46)(4.50) and respectively, the rst order conditions are given by
(4.54)-(4.58), where Et can be omitted as the environment is deterministic. In
equilibrium (4.47) implies mt = 1 and bt = bt+1 = 0. The wage constraint (4.34)
reduces to
(5.2) wtLt = xt:
Proposition 4.1 holds also in this deterministic case: under the gold standard rule
xt 2 (; 1 + qKs) for all t = 0; 1; 2; :::. The lower bound on the money growth
ensures the existence of monetary equilibrium where  > 0 and I > 1 in steady
state. The upper bound is derived from the gold endowment constraint (4.49): If
Kt approaches zero, from (4.49) xt approaches (1 + qKs).
Proposition 5.1 The gold standard solves the economys time inconsistency
problem and improves welfare.
Proof: Under the gold standard the central bank cannot stimulate the economy
by monetary transfers as dt = 1. There is no uncertainty about the future money
growth rate: Ks is xed and the household chooses xt so that !t = pt for all
t = 0; 1; 2; :::. This implies that Lt = 1 and Yt = Ct = A for all t = 0; 1; 2; :::. To
demonstrate why the household does not have an incentive to choose xt which
would yield an actual money growth rate to be above the expected money growth
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rate, consider the following: assume now that household takes more gold to the
central bank to be converted to gold than was assumed during the wage bargain
and the price level increases so that !t < pt: Substituting (5.2) and (4.18) into
(4.60) gives now a familiar relation between the price level and the money growth
rate, thus
(5.3) pt = A 1!

t (2xt)
1  :
Respectively, substituting (5.3) into (4.14) and using (4.46) gives a relation between
money growth level and consumption
(5.4) Ct = A1 !
 
t (2xt)
 :
Equations (5.3) and (5.4) imply that both the price level and consumption increase
if the money growth rate xt increases above the rate used in contract wage setting
at previous period. However, (5.3) and (5.4) do not hold in equilibrium. Intuitively,
if at period t 1 wage settersexpectation on the money growth rate at next period
is xe; but the actual money growth rate is xt = xe+t; where t 2 (0;1) ; from
(5.3) the price level increases, which through (4.16) decreases real wages, through
(4.17) increases labour demand and through (5.4) increases consumption. Now
the wage setters would respond by adjusting their wage expectations to xe + t,
then the household would have an incentive to set xt+1 to xt+1 = xe +t+1 where
t < t+1 < 1: The process would continue until xt would approach its upper
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bound (1 + qKs) and the price expectations !t would approach the upper bound
of the price level p = A 1! [2 (1 + qKs)]1 . As in Barro and Gordon (1983a)
any systematic benets of ination disappear in equilibrium. However, in this
commodity standard set up there is an additional constraint, the gold endowment
constraint
(5.5) Ks  Kt = xt   1
q
;
which limits the households willingness to convert gold to paper money. If the
money growth rate approaches its upper bound, the household converts almost
its whole gold endowment to paper currency. Simultaneously, gold consumption 
gold in utility yielding form approaches zero, which reduces current period utility,
while the impact of gold conversion on consumption Ct is low since expectations
have been adjusted. 
The policy d = 1 under the gold standard together with particular allocation
 t = 	(1) and t = (1) is called the gold standard outcome and is denoted
by (1; g;  g). It describes the sequences of equilibrium prices and quantities that
are obtained when the central bank manages gold reserves and converts gold to
paper currency on demand according to the exogenous gold standard rule, and the
private agents respond to the exogenous ow of gold by maximising utility and
prots.
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In order to examine the gold standard outcome, assume that the utility function
(5.1) takes a log-separable form
(5.6)
1X
t=0
tU (Ct; Kt) =
1X
t=0
t (logCt +  logKt) ;
where  is the preference parameter. The gold standard outcome can be described
by the following two propositions:
Proposition 5.2 The gold standard outcome implies that dt = 1; Lt = 1; Ct =
Yt = A and Kt = Ks   xg 1q for all t = 0; 1; :::.
Proof: By combining all four rst order conditions (4.54)-(4.57) we get the
Euler equation.
(5.7) xt

q
UK (t) = 
UC (t+ 1)
pt+1
:
By Proposition 5.1 the household does not have an incentive to surprise economy
by increasing xt; and the gold standard outcome corresponds to the steady state
equilibrium where Yt = Ct = A and Kt = Ks   (xg   1)q 1 for all t = 0; 1; 2; :::. If
the utility function takes the log-separable form (5.6), (5.7) can be written as
(5.8) 2xg2

q
= 

Ks   x
g   1
q

;
The optimal xg is the positive root of the quadratic equation
(5.9) 2xg2 + xg    (Ksq + 1) = 0
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i.e.
(5.10) xg =
  + 2 + 8 (Ksq + 1) 12
4
:
The negative root can be ignored as by denition xg has to be non-negative. Ap-
pendix 5.A establishes that if ! 1
2

1+qKs

  1

; xg !  for all t = 0; 1; :::.
Lemma 5.1 U (A; xg) is strictly decreasing on (xg; xg) = (; qKs + 1).
Proof: Note rst that U (A; xg) = (logA+  logKt) where Kt = Ks  xg 1q for
all t = 0; 1; :::. Ux (A; xg) < 06 for all xg 2 (xg; xg) and Uxx (A; xg) < 07 for all xg 2
(xg; xg).
Proposition 5.3 Welfare under the gold standard is maximised when xg ap-
proaches  for all t = 0; 1; 2; :::.
Proof: As under the gold standard rule consumption is independent of the
money growth rate xg in equilibrium, but gold demand Kt decreases when xg in-
creases, welfare increases when xg approaches its lower bound :When xg approaches
 for all t = 0; 1; 2; ::: the total discounted utility in gold standard approaches
U (A; xg) = 1
1 

logA+  log

Ks    1
q

. 
Under the perfect gold standard rule the household consumes its whole gold
endowment and converts some of its existing paper currency to gold. The outcome
under the gold standard is not necessarily the optimal Ramsey equilibrium analysed
in Chari and Kehoe (1990) and Ireland (1997) since the gold standard equilibrium
6Ux (A; x
g) =   qKs+1 xg :
7Uxx (A; x
g) =   
(qKs+1 xg)2
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is not the date 0 competitive equilibrium. The rule d = 1 is given exogenously, not
modelled explicitly as the outcome of an optimisation problem. When the central
bank commits to the gold standard at the beginning of time, it loses the ability to
increase production and employment by increasing the discretionary money growth
rate, thus the gold standard rule solves the discretionary problem which arises from
the sticky wage structure.
5.3. Abandonment of the Commitment Rule
In section 4.4, I demonstrated that the gold standard increases the economys
volatility in the bad state. To restore monetary stability, the central bank deviates
from its monetary policy rule the gold convertibility rule. It stops converting
specie to gold on demand in the bad state, but promises to resume convertibil-
ity at the old par value q once the country is again in the good state and it has
withdrawn at money from circulation. This deviation is what Grossman and
Van Huyck (1988) call an excusable default: it is justiably associated with ex-
ogenous contingencies such as a war. As in section 4.4, the suspension of the gold
standard is divided in two stages: during the bad state the gold endowment stops
and the central bank stimulates the economy by at money transfers, and once the
economy is again in the good state the gold ow has resumed the central bank
starts withdrawing paper money from circulation. The gold standard is resumed
when each note is fully backed by gold.
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In what follows I assume again that between the periods  and  + j   1 the
gold endowment is zero, from period  +j forward it is positive and period  +S is
the nal suspension period. At the beginning of period  the rm and household
agree on the wage level, then the bad state of the world is observed by all agents.
The central bank then stops converting notes to gold and announces its policy plan
to resume the gold standard at par value q at some future point.
This policy plan of the central bank to resume the gold standard at par value
q in the future induces future histories, and the policy plan together with agents
allocation rules induces future utilities. For each i = 0; 1; 2; :::; S; denote the history
of the central banks policy through time  + i by h+i = fd+k j k = 0; 1; :::i  1g ;
and h 1 = fdt = 1 j t = 0; 1; :::;    1g : For any policy plan  = f0; 1; :::g let
+i = f+i j i = 0; :::; Sg denote a sequence of policy plans from time  onward
and +i the continuation of : Policy plan  = f0; 1; :::g thus species money
growth during suspension conditional on the realisation of history h+i:
The sequence of events between periods  and  + S is the following: at the
beginning of the rst stage of suspension, household and rms agree on nomi-
nal wages, then Ks is observed by all. Next, faced with the history h+i 1; the
household chooses the rst-stage allocation of  1;+i (h+i 1) and a contingency
plan for setting future actions for all possible future histories. By denition, if
Ks = 0;  1;+i (h+i 1) = ; as K+i = 0: The central bank, faced with the his-
tory h+i 1; sets time  + i discretionary money growth rate +i (h+i 1) = d+i
and chooses a contingency plan for setting future money growth rates. At the
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second stage of period  + i, both the household and the rm face the history
h+i = [h+i 1;  (h+i 1)] = (h+i 1; dt+i). The household chooses its second
stage allocation  2;+i (h+i) and the contingency plan for all future histories, and
the rm chooses its allocation t+i (h+i) conditional on realisation of history h+i:
These denitions recognise that the household makes its decision in two stages and
rm in one.
As in Ireland (1997) without commitment technology, the price level, the con-
tract wage and interest rates are also functions of the history of the central banks
policy: Starting from any date after the announcement to suspend the cash pay-
ments, the private agents can forecast these variables using the recursive formula
h+i = [h+i 1; +i (h+i 1)] where i = 0; 1; :::; S; and their knowledge of price
level, interest rate and wage determination processes.
Consider rst the households problem during the suspension of the gold stan-
dard rule. The household chooses C+i; K+i; m+i and b+i to maximise
(5.11)
SX
i=0
iU [C+i (h+i) ; K+i (h+i 1)]
subject to
(5.12) p+iC+i  m+i + (x+i   1) +i + w+iL+i + b+i  
d+ix+ib+i+1
I+i
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and
(5.13)
d+ix+im+i+1  m+i+b+i+qK+i+w+iL+i+f+i 
d+ix+ib+i+1
I+i
 p+iC+i qK+i;
where  1;+i (h+i 1) = ; if i = 0; :::; j   1 and  1;+i (h+i 1) > 0 if i = j; :::; S:
The gold endowment constraint satises
(5.14) q
 
Ks+i  K+i

= (x+i   1) +i for i = j; :::; S.
The representative rms problem is to choose L+i (h+i) to maximise
(5.15) f+i = p+iY+i   Rw+iL+i
for each i = 0; 1; :::; S takingw+i (h+i) ; p+i (h+i) and h+i = [h+i 1;  (h+i 1)]
given for all i = 0; 1; :::; S.
At each period  + i where i = 0; 1; :::S; the central bank takes h+j 1 as given
and chooses a continuation policy +i to solve the following problem: choose d+i
to maximise (5.11), where C+i and K+i are determined by 	 and  subject to
the terminal condition8
(5.16) M+S+1 = QK
g
+S+1:
8See section 4.4 for the derivation of the terminal condition.
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The terminal condition can be written as
(5.17)
 
SY
i=0
d+i (h+i 1)x+i (h+i 1)  1
!
m = q
SX
i=j

Ks+i  K+i (h+i 1)

;
and it states that monetary gold must be proportional to the circulating money
stock by the time of the resumption. Incorporated in plan ; the terminal condition
implies that once the gold ow resumes, the central bank must set d+i < 1 where
i = j; :::; S in order to withdraw the at money from circulation. The suspension
of the gold standard rule cannot last forever. The discretionary money growth rate
satises
(5.18)
SY
i=0
d+i = 1:
and xt+i = 1 for i = 0; :::; j   1 and xt+i  1 for i = j; :::; S:
A sustainable equilibrium consists of a policy plan  and a set of allocation rules
(;	) that satisfy: (i) given a policy plan  and the households allocation rule 	,
the continuation of  solves the rms problem to maximise (5.15) subject to L+i
and history h+i; (ii) given  and the rms allocation rule ; the continuation of
	 solves the households problem to maximise (5.11) subject to (5.12), (5.13) and
history h+i 1 and ht+i; (iii) given the allocation rules (	;) ; the continuation
of plan  solves the central banks problem to choose d+i to maximise (5.11) for
every history h+i 1 and the terminal condition (5.17).
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The sustainable outcome (d;  ; ) describes the sequence of equilibrium quan-
tities and prices that are obtained when the central bank chooses d sequentially to
maximise the representative households utility subject to the terminal condition,
and private agents respond optimally. The set of sustainable outcomes is formed re-
cursively: starting from h 1 = 1; construct h = (h ; h+1; :::) and d = (d ; d+1; :::)
recursively using d+i = +i (h+i 1) and h+i = [h+i 1; +i (h+i 1)] : Then
for all i = 0; 1; :::; S construct  = (L ; L+1; :::) using L+i = (h+i) and
 =
 
  ;  +1; :::

using  1;+i = 	(h+i 1) and  2;+i = 	(h+i) for all i =
0; 1; :::. These recursive denitions are used in next section to illustrate the sus-
tainable equilibrium.
5.4. Sustainable Outcomes that Ensure Resumption of the Gold
Standard
In this section I characterise allocations and policies that result from sustain-
able equilibria. Those allocations and policies that ensure the resumption of the
gold standard are of particular interest in this chapter, but before dening them
formally, consider the households decision making problem in this framework.
During the stoppage periods, from period  to  + j  1; the household is not able
to consume any gold as Ks = 0: In order to be able to buy the consumption good,
the household has to accept inconvertible paper currency as a medium of exchange.
The cash-in-advance constraint formalises this assumption, since if the household
abandoned paper money, consumption would approach zero. The cash-in-advance
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constraint, therefore, embodies some relevant historical evidence on paper money
during the Suspension Period of 1797-1821. According to Feavearyear (1963): The
public accepted the notes because there was nothing else and because they served
the purposes of trade for the time being as well as gold9.
If Ks = 0; specie cannot be used in exchange, as the coin stock has depreci-
ated beyond meaningful use and new specie cannot be minted. The war and the
stoppage of the gold endowment, however, last for a nite time. The return of the
gold endowment gives the household an opportunity to start minting coins and
stop using paper money if the central banks plan to return to the gold standard
rule was not credible. The credibility of the monetary system collapses, if the cen-
tral bank deviates from its policy plan, which implies that the bank has to start
withdrawing paper currency from circulation by reducing discounts it gives to the
rm once the economy is again in the good state. The central bank might avoid
this adjustment process, because withdrawing at money has adverse real e¤ects
on the economy with sticky nominal wages. Yet the threat imposed by the private
agentsrevenge might support equilibria, the outcome of which is the resumption
of the gold standard.
As in Chari and Kehoe (1990) and Ireland (1997), the set of sustainable out-
comes, which in this model refers to the outcomes that support the resumption of
the gold standard, can be characterised by adapting Abreu (1988) optimal penal
codes to monetary policy games played between a benevolent central bank and a
9Feavearyear (1963) p. 184.
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large number of private agents. The autarky plan a is dened as follows: private
agents agree on nominal wages and all sectors observe that the gold ow is resumed.
The household then chooses a rst-stage allocation of  1;+j (h+j 1) > 0; and a
contingency plan for setting future actions for all possible future histories. The
central bank, given the history h+j 1; sets the time  + j discretionary money
growth rate in following manner: for any h+j 1 let a (h+j 1) be the optimal
money growth rate in the problem: maximise
(5.19)
Ua (x+j; d+j) = max
d+j
U

logC+j (h+j) +  log
 
Ks+j   q 1 [x+j (h+j 1)  1] +j

subject to
(5.20) d+j  d
where K+j is given by  1;+j (h+j 1) : Next, at the second stage of period  + j,
both the household and the rm face the history h+j = [h+j 1; a (h+j 1)]. The
household chooses its second stage allocation  2;+j (h+j) and the contingency
plan for all future histories and the rm chooses its allocation t+j (h+j).
Proposition 5.4 The policy under the autarky plan is a+j (h+j 1) = d
a = d:
Proof: Ua (x+j) is the maximum current-period utility at period  + j that the
central bank can obtain by deviating from its policy plan +j (h+j 1) at time
+j, given that the central bank has followed the plan in every period prior to the
deviation. As during the suspension of the gold standard (5.1) is strictly increasing
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in C+i and C+i is strictly increasing in d+i 2
 
0; d

; the central bank maximises
utility by setting d+j = d: 
Instead of starting to withdraw paper money from circulation at the beginning
of the adjustment period, the central bank has thus the temptation to maximise
one period utility by issuing the maximum possible amount of paper money.
Propositions 5.5 If the utility function (5.11) is logarithmic as in (5.6), the
welfare under autarky is
(5.21) Ua (x+i) = log C +  log
 
Ks+i   q 1 [x+i (h+i 1)  1] +i

:
Proof : The policy under the autarky does not have an e¤ect to the rst stage
allocation under autarky  1;+i = 	(h+i 1) ; i.e. to gold demand, but the second
stage allocation  2;+i = 	(h+i) implies that consumption under the autarky
becomes
(5.22) Ca = A1 ! +i

1  +i +
 
+i + d

x+i (h+i 1)

where x+i (h+i 1)  1 (as the gold standard has not yet been resumed). Ca is
the highest current period utility achieved by deviation. Note that in the following
period the gold backing ratio is arbitrarily small as +i+1 = +i= d. 
The result of the deviation from declared policy plan  is that the economy
reverts to the static equilibrium the commodity money system. The equilibrium
is static as the allocation rules and policy plans under the commodity money
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system do not depend on the past history. Under the static state the household
has abandoned the paper currency altogether and only specie circulates.
The static equilibrium (s;	s;s) is dened as follows. For any history i > j
h+i 1; s+i (h+i 1) = ;: For the rst stage, for every history h+i 1 the rule
species that the household does not take any gold to the central bank, but mints
some of its gold endowment to specie. With the given history ht+i the household
chooses K+i; s+i = S+i=MT+i; b+i and C+i to maximise
(5.23) U s = max
z+i
1X
i=0
tU [C+i (z+i) ; K+i (z+i)]
subject to the specie-in-advance constraint (the nominal variables have been scaled
with MT+i+1 = S
s
+i+1 = z+iS
s
+i)
(5.24) p+iC+i  qS+i + [z+i   1] + b+i   z+ib+i+1
I+i
;
and the budget constraint
(5.25)
z+iS+i+1  S+i+ b+i+w+iL+i+f+i 
z+ib+i+1
I+i
+Ks+i K+i p+iC+i
for all i > j: As the paper currency has lost its value, coins are the only medium
of exchange. The monetary value q of the gold has now a new meaning and it
measures the gold content of coin. There are no nancial intermediary services
available as the central bank does not exist. The representative rm is not able to
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borrow to pay for its workers before the production started. The current periods
wage is available for consumption purchases only in the following period. After
the deviation the country is not able to return to the gold standard at any future
point.
Proposition 5.6 The static outcome (;;  s; s) implies that C+i = A; L+i =
1; z+i = z and K = Ks   q 1 [z   1] :
Proof : Under the static state the specie-in-advance constraint implies
(5.26) p+iC+i  qS+i + (1  ) (z+i   1) + b+i   b+i+1
I+i
where  is the depreciation rate and  is brassage10. As under the gold standard,
the optimal specie growth rate can be found as a solution to the static problem.
The Euler equation (5.7) becomes
(5.27) z+i

q
UK ( + i) = 
UC ( + i+ 1)
p+i+1
If the utility function takes the loglinear form (5.6), we can write (5.27) as
(5.28) z

q

Ks   q 1 (z   1) 1 =  [ + (1  ) (z   1)] 1 :
The amount of gold available in utility yielding form is reduced by brassage and
printing cost. The optimal specie growth rate can be found as a solution to the
10The specie-in-advance constraint (5.24) can be derived from the cash-in-advance constraint
(4.23), ptCt  mt + qSt + q (1  ) (zt   1)Sst + (xt   1) tms + wtLt + bt   gtbt+1It ; discussed
in the baseline model in Section 4.2, by setting m = ms = 0 in every period, and removing the
wage bill.
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quadratic equation
(5.29) (1  ) z2 + [  (1  ) + ] z    (qKst + 1) = 0:
(5.30)
z =
  [  (1  ) + ] + [  (1  ) + ]2 + 4 (1  )  (qKst + 1) 12
2 (1  ) 
The negative root can be ignored. Note that the lower bound of the specie growth
rate z is higher than xg as z 2 (1; z) and xg 2 (; x) :
Lemma 5.2 The optimal specie growth rate z under the commodity money
standard is increasing in  2 (0; 1) and  2 (0; 1) :
Proof: Appendix 5.B establishes that the higher the rate of depreciation or
brassage, the larger the amount of gold the household has to mint.
Proposition 5.7 Welfare under the static equilibrium is lower than under the
gold standard.
Proof : The optimal money growth rate under the gold standard xg approaches
 that is less than unity, but the lowest bound of z equals unity. Under the static
equilibrium gold specie is used as a medium of exchange and the depreciation  and
brassage  reduce the amount of consumable gold, gold in utility yielding form.
In the next proposition I characterise the entire set of sustainable outcomes
which ensure the resumption of the gold standard. For an arbitrary sequence of
policies and allocations (d; ;  ) ; the revert-to-static policy plans specify contin-
uation with the plan to resume the gold standard as long as the policy dened
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by the original plan has been chosen in the past. The allocation rule species
that immediately after a deviation the household and the rm will follow the rule
dened by the static allocation rule and stay in this static state in all subsequent
periods.
Proposition 5.8 Sustainability of the resumption of the gold standard: let d
be an arbitrary policy and (;  ) an arbitrary allocation. Then the return to the
perfect gold standard is sustainable if and only if (d; ;  ) satises
(5.31)
SX
i=j
j iU+i +
1X
i=S+1
j iU g+i  Ua +

1  U
s;
where K+i; C+i; s+i+1; m+n+1 and b+i+1 are given by  ; and L+i is given
by :
Proposition 5.8 implies that the resumption of the gold standard is sustainable,
if the adjustment to the gold standard between periods  + j and  + S and gold
standard thereafter will yield at least as much utility as default on period  + j
and static state thereafter.
Inequality (5.31) completely characterises the conditions under which an arbi-
trary sequence of policies and allocations is sustainable. The resumption of the
gold standard rule between periods +j and +S and the gold standard thereafter
must provide at least as much utility from  + j forward than what is obtained by
deviating from much the plan in date +j and reverting to the autarky thereafter.
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Inequality (5.31) is the key result of this chapter. It suggests that in 1821 the
gold standard was resumed because the benets of the gold standard did outweigh
the cost of adjustment, which was a necessary procedure for resumption: the gold
standard was seen to maximise social utility in the long-run. Autarky policy in
the context of the Suspension Period meant that either the Bank would have
attempted to make the most of its paper money creation powers by issuing large
amount of paper money, or the Bank would have caused unnecessary delay before
starting to adjust the economy to the gold standard after the arrival of peace.
During the Suspension Period deviation to specie standard was seen as a serious
threat. According to The Bullion Report there was evidence that in 1810 some
merchants illegally charged higher prices from those who wished to pay with Bank
notes rather than specie.
5.5. The Discretionary Money Growth Rate and Welfare: Some
Examples
In this section, my objective is to show that viewing suspension through the
lens of theory is useful. I present some simple but suggestive numerical examples
of optimal monetary policy during suspension. I do not attempt to develop fully
calibrated models that might reect, for example, monetary policy between 1797
and 1821; this is left for future research.
The rst example analyses whether issuing at money during the stoppage
period improves social welfare. The overall welfare e¤ect of at money supply is
232
ambiguous. As discussed in Chapter 4 issuing paper money during the stoppage
period increases utility during those periods, but subsequently withdrawing pa-
per money from circulation decreases utility during the adjustment periods. The
second example illustrates how brassage and depreciation of specie decrease the
welfare of the commodity money regime and support the resumption of the gold
standard: the higher the cost of the commodity money regime, the more likely the
resumption.
Example 1: The Discretionary Money Growth RateThis exercise analy-
ses whether the total discounted utility of the representative household increases
or decreases if the central bank issues at money during the stoppage periods. In
the bad state, in absence of the gold endowment, consumption and welfare in-
creases if the at money growth rate increases, but during the adjustment periods
withdrawing issued at money from circulation reduces consumption and welfare.
As discussed in section 4.5, if issuing paper money would decrease total welfare,
the central bank would not issue any at money and only prevent the household
from converting currency to gold during the stoppage periods. The benet of this
strategy is that once the war has nished, there is no need for adjustment and the
gold standard can be resumed immediately.
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The parametric form of the utility function during the suspension is
(5.32)
SX
i=0
tU (C+i; K+i) =
jX
i=0
i [logC+i (d+i)]
+
SX
i=j+1
i [logC+i (d+i; x+i) +  logK+i (d+i; x+i)] ;
where
Pj
i=0 
i [logC+i (d+i)] is the discounted utility of the stoppage periods andPS
i=j+1 
i [logC+i (d+i; x+i) +  logK+i (d+i; x+i)] is discounted utility of the
adjustment periods. The starting point is to solve for private agentsallocations
as a function of x+i and d+i: In this deterministic model it is known that period
 + S is the nal suspension period. The Euler equation (5.7) can be written as
(5.33) d+Sx+S
UK ( + S)
q
= 
UC ( + S + 1)
p+S+1
where UK ( + S) is the marginal utility of gold during the nal suspension period
and UC ( + S + 1) is the marginal utility of consumption during the period when
the country returns to the gold standard. When the gold standard is resumed
the money growth rate is xg: Given (5.32), consumption, gold demand and price
level are derived in Appendix 5.C. During the nal suspension period, the money
growth rate proportional to net change in monetary gold is
(5.34) x+S =

 
qKs + +S

2xgd+S+ +S
:
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The money growth rate proportional to monetary gold x+i can be solved back-
wards recursively for given d+i and +i. The central banks problem is to choose
d+i to maximise (5.32) subject to the terminal condition
(5.35)
SY
i=0
d+i = 1:
Exercise 1.A The Discretionary Money Growth Rate when Suspension Lasts
for Two Periods: Let S = 2 and j = 1 which indicates the most simple case,
where the stoppage and adjustment only last one period each. Any at money
issued at period i = 1 must be withdrawn from circulation at period i = S = 2:
This implies that the discretionary money growth rate and the gold reserve ratios
during adjustment are dened by the discretionary money growth rate during the
stoppage period. In other words, the discretionary money growth rates during the
adjustment period is the inverse of the discretionary money growth rate during the
stoppage period, i.e. d2 = 1=d1: By (4.12) the discretionary money growth rate is
an inverse of the growth rate of the gold reserve ratio, i.e.
(5.36) d1 =
1
2
:
At the beginning of the stoppage period the gold backing is still perfect thus 1 = 1,
but at the beginning of the adjustment period it is smaller than unity as some at
money has been issued, i.e. 2 = 1=d1  1. The central banks problem in this two
235
period example is to choose d1 to maximise
U(d1) = logC1 +  [logC2 +  logK2](5.37)
= log(A1 ! 1 (1 + d1)
)
+ log

A1 ! 2 (1  2 + (2 + d2)x2)

+  log

Ks   q 1 (x2   1) 2

;
where both the discretionary money growth rate and the gold backing ration can
be written using d1
(5.38) 2 = d2 =
1
d1
;
subject to the terminal condition
(5.39) d1d2 = 1:
By substituting (5.38) into (5.34), the money growth rate proportional to the gold
stock at the adjustment period can be written as a function of the discretionary
money growth rate d1 and the money growth rate under the gold standard xg
(5.40) x2 =
 (qKsd1 + 1)
(2xg+ )
:
Under the suspension, x2 is bounded by
(5.41) x2 2 [1; qKs + 1) :
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Figure 5.1. Total discounted utility (5.37) when the suspension lasts
for two periods
Figure (5.1) plots total utility against d1.11 I assume the following parametric
values:  = 0:95; A = 10; p1 > !1; p1 = !2 > p2; q = 1 and Ks = 1: It can be
seen that the total discounted utility increases until d1 = 1:2 but decreases when
d1 is above 1.2. Note that this result does not indicate that d1 = 1:2 would be the
sustainable money growth rate, as that would depend on the relative disutility of
the commodity money regime.
11See Appendix 5.E for the code.
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Exercise 1.B Discretionary Money Growth Rate when Suspension Lasts for Sev-
eral Periods: Solving for the optimal d is tedious if there is more than one stop-
page and adjustment period. To make the process easier, I simplify the problem
slightly by asking what would be the optimal money growth rate during the stop-
page periods if the money growth rate were xed across stoppage periods and the
withdrawal rate is xed across adjustment periods.12 This case is identical to the
example analysed in section 4.5. Now the gold backing ratio +i; and discretionary
money growth rate d+i during the adjustment become functions of d+i during
the stoppage periods, and the relative number of stoppage and adjustment periods
(see Appendix 5.D). The war is assumed to last for two periods and adjustment
for eight periods. I assume that !+i = p+i 1:
First, as seen in Figure 5.2 for low enough values of the discount factor,  <
0:89 the total discounted utility increases when the money growth rate increases.
Second, from Figure 5.3, if  = 0:89 the total utility seems to decrease for relatively
low discretionary money growth rates but increases for relatively higher money
growth rates. Finally, Figure 5.4 shows how for high enough discount factors the
total discounted utility decreases if d increases. Also in Chari and Kehoe (1990)
the outcome is sensitive for the discount factor :
12See Appendix 5.E for the code.
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Figure 5.2 Total discounted utility vs. the discretionary money growth rate
during the stoppage periods when  < 0:89:
1 1.05 1.1 1.15 1.2 1.25 1.3 1.35 1.4
15.0322
15.0323
15.0324
15.0325
15.0326
15.0327
15.0328
15.0329
15.033
d(1,j-1)
U
til
ity
Figure 5.3 Total discounted utility vs. the discretionary money growth rate
during the stoppage periods when  = 90:
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Figure 5.4 Total discounted utility vs. the discretionary money growth rate
during the stoppage periods when  > 0:95:
Example 2With this example my aim is to illustrate how the sustainability of
the central banks policy is dependent on the ine¢ ciency of the specie standard.13
Parametric values are:  = 0:9;  = 0:98; Ks = 1; q = 1; A = 10. From
inequality (5.31) it is obvious that the lower is static utility relative to utility
under the gold standard, the more likely the monetary authority is to follow its
monetary policy plan to resume the gold standard. Thus whether some particular
policy is sustainable depends not just on the money growth rate during the war
or on the discount rate, but also on welfare losses under the commodity money
system.
13See Appendix 5.E for the code.
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Figure 5.5 Utilities from deviation and resumption of the gold standard v.s
minting cost.
Figure (5.5) plots both sides of inequality (5.31) as a function of ; brassage. The
schedule marked as U(static) plots discounted utility from deviation and static
state thereafter for di¤erent values of . The horizontal line plots utilities from
adjustment and gold standard which is independent on given : Given these para-
metric values, as long as  > 0:28 i.e. brassage equals 28 percent of the gold the
household takes to the mint to be coined resumption of the gold standard is a
sustainable plan that yields higher discounted utility than default and deviation
to static state thereafter.
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5.6. Conclusions
The main purpose of this chapter was to analyse what made the suspension
of cash payments a credible monetary policy regime. I showed that suspension
was credible, because the resumption of the gold standard in the future was a
sustainable plan, which replaced the gold standard as a commitment technology
during the time of war. The gold standard was resumed, because it was seen to
maximise long-run social welfare. This conclusion was a result of the model, which
built on the theory of sustainable plans by Chari and Kehoe (1990).
My starting point was to model the gold standard as a commitment technology
that solved the monetary authoritys time inconsistency problem in a good state
of the world, but not in a bad state. The chapter dened under what conditions
policy in the bad state, in absence of the gold convertibility rule, can still be sus-
tainable, i.e. solve the policy makers time inconsistency problem. This sustainable
equilibrium associated with the plan is a sequence of history-contingent policies
and allocations that are supported both by reputation and extreme trigger strate-
gies. The policy makers policy plan denes that after the gold ow has resumed
the policy maker has to start adjusting the economy back to the gold standard,
which is a process that might reduce social welfare temporarily. At the particular
moment when the gold ow resumes, the policy maker has a temptation to deviate,
i.e. maximise current periods utility by printing an arbitrarily large amount of
money. The outcome of the default is that the economy deviates permanently to
242
the static state in which paper money has lost its value and only gold specie cir-
culates as a medium of exchange. This commodity money standard is ine¢ cient:
it does not facilitate nancial intermediation and utility is reduced as specie is
involved with depreciation and minting costs.
Although the gold standard can be seen as a contingent rule that was aban-
doned in the war time emergency, the resumption of the gold standard in 1821
was not such a self-evident truth as Bordo and Kydland (1995) and Bordo and
Schwartz (1997) have argued. Absence of the commitment rule made the econ-
omys underlying rigidities visible and gave the central bank an opportunity to
stimulate the economy with at money transfers. This chapter showed that it was
not the superiority of the gold standard rule, but the active monetary policy con-
ducted by the Bank of England that ensured the successful resumption. The gold
standard was seen to maximise social welfare, although deviation, i.e. maximising
one period utility by issuing large amount of money would have been possible but
not desirable.
According to one of many memorable quotations by John Maynard Keynes,
the gold standard is a barbaric relic. So it might have been, if compared with
modern at monetary systems. But the gold standard, as it evolved in Britain
from 1717 until 1914, o¤ered signicant benets over commodity money systems
that had existed since ancient times. The gold standard facilitated public borrow-
ing, nancial intermediation and reduced costs of acquiring money. During the
suspension of cash payments from 1797 to 1821 reversion to the commodity money
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system was seen as a real threat by monetary authorities, because that is exactly
what had happened in France after assignats had failed as a result of over issue.
The credibility of the French nancial system was lost during the revolution, and
Napoleon, the most powerful monarch of contemporary Europe, had to nance his
wars by tax collection practices of the Old Regime.14 If anything, the successful
resumption of the gold standard in 1821 strengthened Britains credibility as a
borrower and made London the centre of the nancial world.
14Sargent and Velde (1995).
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Appendix 5.A
The money growth rate proportional to the monetary gold under the gold standard
is a positive root of the quadratic equation
2xg2 + xg    (Ksq + 1) = 0
i.e.
(5.42) xg =
  + 2 + 8 (Ksq + 1) 12
4
:
xg does not have the border solution  if  < (1+qK
s)
2
  1
2
thus
  + 2 + 8 (Ksq + 1) 12
4
> 

2 + 8 (1 + qKs)
 1
2 > (4+ 1) 
 (1 + qKs) >
 
22 + 

2
(1 + qKs) > (2+ 1) 
1
2

1 + qKs

  1

> :
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Appendix 5.B
In order to show that the specie growth rate z is a strictly increasing function in
 and ; one should show that z > 0; z > 0 and z > 0 and z > 0 (or as
below z1  < 0 and z(1 )2 < 0):
(5.B1)
z =
  [  (1  ) + ] + [  (1  ) + ]2 + 4 (1  )  (qKst + 1) 12
2 (1  ) 
The solution process is straight forward but tedious and therefore, I also add the
numerical example. Equation 5.B1 can be written as
z =   [+ ] [2 (1  ) ] 1 + 1
2
+
"
  [+ ] [2 (1  ) ] 1   1
2
2
+  (qKst + 1) [(1  ) ] 1
# 1
2
;
The rst order condition for 1  ; z1  becomes
0 >
[+ ]
2 (1  )2 +
1
2
"
  [+ ]
[2 (1  ) ]  
1
2
2
+
 (qKst + 1)
[(1  ) ]
#  1
2

1
2

[+ ]
(1  )    1

   (qKst + 1)

1
(1  )2 :
After reorganising one gets

[+ ]
[2 (1  ) ]
2
+
1
2
[+ ]
[2 (1  ) ] +
1
4
+
 (qKst + 1)
[(1  ) ] >

1
2 (1  ) 
2
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which holds.
The second order condition for 1   becomes
z(1 )2 =
 4 [+ ]2
[2 (1  ) ]3  
[+ ] 
[2 (1  ) ]2  
 (qKst + 1)
[(1  ) ]2 +

2 ((1  ) ) 3 < 0
which is negative.
Respectively, z becomes
z =   (+ ) +
+
1
2

[ (+ )  (1  ) ]2 + 4 (1  )  (qKst + 1)
  1
2
f[2 [ (+ )  (1  ) ] (+ )] + 4 (1  )  (qKst + 1)g
0 < f4 [ (+ )  (1  ) ] (+ ) + 8 (1  )  (qKst + 1)g2  
[ (+ )  (1  ) ]2 + 4 (1  )  (qKst + 1)

(+ )2
which also holds. The second order condition is
z = 4 f[ (+ )  (1  ) ] (+ ) + (1  )  (qKst + 1)g
 2 f[ (+ )  (1  ) ] (+ ) + 2 (1  )  (qKst + 1)g > 0
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Figure 5.2. Brassage and the Specie Growth Rate
The second order condition becomes
z = 32 f[ (+ )  (1  ) ] (+ ) + 2 (1  )  (qKst + 1)g
 2 f[ (+ )  (1  ) ] (+ ) + 2 (1  )  (qKst + 1)g > 0:
As these are rather obscure expressions, I also attach numerical simulation here
to highlight that the specie growth rate z is a strictly increasing function in  and
:
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Figure 5.3. Depreciation and the Specie Growth Rate
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The code for Figure 5.E.1
clear all
% CHECK THAT z IS AN INCREASING FUNCTION OF THETA
%initial values
beta=0.9;
delta=0.98;
gamma=0.8;
Ks=1;
q=1;
A=10;
rho=(Ks*q+1)/(2*beta)-1/2;
omega=2*(beta+0.001)/A;
S=20
VS=ones(S,1);
z=zeros(1,S);
for j=1:S
%Static state
theta(j)=.05*(j-1); % brassage
z(j)=(-1*((delta*rho-(1-theta(j))*rho)+beta*delta)+...
((delta*rho-(1-theta(j))*rho+beta*delta)^2+4*(1-
theta(j))*rho*delta*beta*(q*Ks+1))^(1/2))/(2*(1-theta(j))*rho)
end
plot(theta,z)
Figure 5.E.1
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The code for Figure 5.E.2
clear all
% SHOWS THAT z IS AN INCREASING FUNCTION OF DEPRECIATION delta
beta=0.9;
gamma=0.8;
theta=0.1;
Ks=1;
q=1;
A=10;
rho=(Ks*q+1)/(2*beta)-1/2;
omega=2*(beta+0.001)/A;
S=11;
VS=ones(S,1);
z=zeros(1,S);
for j=1:S
%Static state
delta(j)=.1*(j-1); % brassage
%z increases when brassage increases
z(j)=((-1*((delta(j)*rho-(1-theta)*rho)+beta*delta(j))+...
((delta(j)*rho-(1-theta))*rho+beta*delta(j))^2+4*(1-
theta)*rho*delta(j)*beta*(q*Ks+1))^(1/2))/(2*(1-theta)*rho)
end
plot(delta,z)
Figure 5.E.2
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Appendix 5.C
Example 1 During the stoppage periods, i 2 (0; j   1), x+i = 1 and the price
level and consumption are functions of d+i :
p+i = A
 1!+i (1 + d+i)
1 
C+i = A
1 ! +i (1 + d+i)

The nominal interest rate between periods  and  + j   2 is
I+i =
d+ix+i

1 + d+i+1
1 + d+i
> 1 where i 2 (0; j   2) ;
but when i = j   1 the nominal interest rate becomes
I+i =
d+ix+i

1  +i+1 +
 
+i+1 + d+i+1

x+i+1
1 + d+i
> 1:
During the adjustment periods i 2 (j; S) the price level, consumption and the
money growth rate proportional to monetary gold become:
p+i = A
 1!+i

1  +i +
 
+i + d+i

x+i
1 
C+i = A
1 ! +i

1  +i +
 
+i + d+i

x+i

x+i =


qKs + +i

d+i

1  +i+1 +
 
+i+1 + d+i+1

x+i+1

+ +i
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The money growth rate proportional to monetary gold is bounded during the
adjustment periods by
x 2 [1; qKs + 1) :
Between periods  + j and  + S   1 the nominal interest rate becomes
I+i =
d+ix+i


1  +i+1 +
 
+i+1 + d+i+1

x+i+1

1  +i +
 
+i + d+i

x+i
 > 1
and during the nal suspension period i = S
I+i =
d+ix+i

2xg
1  +i +
 
+i + d+i

x+i

or
I+i = 1 if
d+ix+i

2xg
1  +i +
 
+i + d+i

x+i
 < 1:
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Appendix 5.D
Example 1.B In this exercise the war lasts for j periods and the suspension
altogether lasts for 10 periods (S = 10) : If, as in the example presented in Chapter
4, both the discretionary money growth rate during the war and the discretionary
money reductionrate during the adjustment are assumed to be xed at every pe-
riod, the discretionary money reduction rate during the adjustment can be written
as a function of the discretionary money growth rate during the war and j (the
number of stoppage periods) and S (the total number of suspension periods). The
money reduction rate during the adjustment periods can be written as
d (adj) =j 1
d (war)
j
S j j :
The gold backing ratio during the war becomes
+i =

1
d (war)
i 1
and the gold backing ratio during the adjustment
+i =
1
d (war)
(j+(i j 1))j
j S
:
As can be seen in gure (5.6) the gold backing ratio thus gradually decreases
during the war when at money is issued, but then gradually increases during the
adjustment when the central bank withdraws the at money from circulation. In
this example the war lasts for 2 periods (j = 2) and the suspension lasts for 10
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periods (S = 10) and the central bank increases paper money supply by 38% on
each stoppage period, i.e. d (war) = 1:38:
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Figure 5.C.1 Gold backing ratio  when d = 1:38;war lasts for 2 periods (j = 2)
and adjustment for 8 periods (S = 2 + 8).
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Appendix 5.E
The code for Figure 5.1
clear all
%TOTAL DISCOUNTED UTILITY WHEN THE SUSPENSION LASTS FOR 2 PERIODS
%Initial parameter values
A=10 %technology
beta=0.95 % discount factor
Ks=1.0 %gold endowment
q=1 %monetary price of gold
rho=0.6 % preference
gamma=0.3
xg=(-beta+(beta^2+8*rho*beta*(q*Ks+1))^(1/2))/(4*rho) % the money growth
rate under the gold standard
if xg<beta %this makes sure it is always larger than beta
xg=beta+0.0001
end
Ug=log(A)+rho*log(Ks-(xg-1)/q) % utility under the gold standard
omega=2*xg/A % expected price level under the gold standard
S=40
for i=1:S
d1(i)=1+0.02*(i-1); % discretionary money growth rate during the
suspension
x(i)=beta*(q*Ks*d1(i)+1)/(2*xg*rho+beta); % the money growth rate
proportional to monetary gold during adjustment
if x(i)<1 ; % lower bound of x during the suspension is 1
x(i)=1;
end
U1(i)=log(A^(1-gamma)*omega^(-gamma)*(1+d1(i))^gamma);
UC2(i)=beta*log(A^(1-gamma)*omega^(-gamma)*(1-
1/d1(i)+(2/d1(i))*x(i))^gamma);
UK2(i)=beta*rho*log(Ks-1/q*(x(i)-1))*1/d1(i); % d2 is inverse of d1
U(i)=U1(i)+UC2(i)+UK2(i); %Total utility during the stoppage
I1(i)=d1(i)/beta*(1-1/d1(i)+2/d1(i)*x(i))/(1+d1(i)); %Interest rates
I2(i)=x(i)/(beta*d1(i))*(2)/(1-1/d1(i)+(2/d1(i))*x(i));
if I2(i)<1;
I2(i)=1;
end
end
% plot the discretionary money growth rate on the first period for total
utility
plot(d1,U)
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The code for Figures 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4
clear all
%SOLVES TOTAL DISCOUNTED UTILITY FOR d
%d is fixed during the stoppage and adjustment periods
%Initial values
Ks=1;
beta=0.90; %Change beta
q=1;
rho=0.6;
A=10;
gamma=0.3;
%money growth rate during the gold standard
xg = beta+0.0001;
%expexted price level equals actual price level under the gold standard
omega=2*xg/A;
%one period utility under the gold standard
Ug=log(A)+rho*log(Ks-(xg-1)/q);
%discounted utility under the gold standard
Vg=1/(1-beta)*Ug;
%SUSPENSION OF THE GOLD STANDARD RULE
S=10; %Total number of suspension periods
N=2; % Number of Stoppage Periods
K=20
TU=ones(K,1);
for j=1:K;
d1(j)=1+.02*(j-1); % discretionary money growth rate during the
stoppage
d=abs((1/d1(j))^(N/(S-N))); %constant money 'reduction rate' during the
adjustment
CheckD=d1(j)^N*d^(S-N); %checks that the terminal condition holds
% Gold reserve ratio
ETA=ones(S,1);
for i=1:N;
ETA(i)=(1/d1(j))^(i-1);
end
for i=N+1:S;
ETA(i)= d1(j)^(-N-(i-N-1)*(N/(N-S)));
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end
%Etas have to be turned into reverse order in order to calculate x
eta=ETA(S:-1:1);
%This calculates X on its final period, (money growth rates solved
%backwards)
X=ones(1,S);
%Final x
X(1)=beta*(q*Ks+eta(i))/(2*d*rho*xg+beta*eta(i));
if X(1)< 1;
X(1)=1;
end
%adjustment period
for i=2:S-N;
X(i)=beta*(q*Ks+eta(i))/(d*rho*(1-eta(i-1)+(eta(i-1)+d)*X(i-
1))+eta(i));
if X(i) < 1;
X(i) = 1 ;
end
end
%stoppage periods: x always unity
for i=S-N+1:S;
X(i)=1;
end
%first x should be last, turns x's around
x=X(S:-1:1);
if x(i)<1 % in absence of the gold convertibility rule x>=1
else
%INTEREST RATE
for i=1:N-1;
I(i)=d1(j)/beta*(1+d1(j))/(1+d1(j));
end
for i=N:N;
I(i)=d*x(i)/beta*(1-ETA(i)+(ETA(i)+d)*x(i))/(1+d1(j));
end
for i=N+1:S-1;
I(i)=d*x(i)/beta*(1-ETA(i+1)+(ETA(i+1)+d)*x(i+1))/(1-
ETA(i)+(ETA(i)+d)*x(i));
end
for i=S:S;
I(i)=((2*xg*d*x(i))/beta)*(1-ETA(i)+(ETA(i)+d)*x(i))^(-1);
end
if I(S)<1;
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I(S)=1
end
%Consumption, gold, price level and utility during the suspension
C=ones(S,1);
K=ones(S,1);
P=ones(S,1);
U=ones(S,1);
for i=1:S;
if i==1; % the first stoppage period
P(i)=A^(gamma-1)*(omega)^gamma*(1+d1(j))^(1-gamma);
C(i)=A*(P(i)/omega)^(gamma/(1-gamma));
K(i)=0;
elseif i==2:N; %subsequent stoppage periods
P(i)=A^(gamma-1)*(0.95*P(i-1))^gamma*(1+d1(j))^(1-gamma);
C(i)=A*(P(i)/P(i-1))^(gamma/(1-gamma));
K(i)=0;
else i==N+1:S %adjustment periods
P(i)=A^(gamma-1)*(0.95*P(i-1))^gamma*(1-
ETA(i)+(ETA(i)+d)*x(i))^(1-gamma);
C(i)=A*(P(i)/P(i-1))^(gamma/(1-gamma));
K(i)=Ks-((x(i)-1)/q)*ETA(i);
end
end
for i=1:N;
%Utility durind stoppage
U(i)=log(C(i));
end
%Utility during adjustment
for i=N+1:S;
U(i)=log(C(i))+rho*log(K(i));
end
%Total Utility
V=ones(S,1);
for i=1:S;
V(i)=beta^(i-1)*U(i);
end
TU(j)=sum(V);
end
end
plot(d1,TU)
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The code for Figure 5.5
clear all
% COMPARISON OF UTLITY LEVELS BETWEEN ADJUSTMENT + GOLD STANDARD AND
% DEVIATION + STATIC STATE
beta=0.9
delta=0.98
gamma=0.8
Ks=1
q=1
A=10
rho=(Ks*q+1)/(2*beta)-1/2
omega=2*(beta+0.001)/A
S=40
VS=ones(S,1)
z=zeros(1,S)
for j=1:S
%Static state
theta(j)=.01*(j-1); % brassage
%z increases when brassage increases
z(j)=(-1*((delta*rho-(1-theta(j))*rho)+beta*delta)+...
((delta*rho-(1-theta(j))*rho+beta*delta)^2+4*(1-
theta(j))*rho*delta*beta*(q*Ks+1))^(1/2))/(2*(1-theta(j))*rho)
%gold consumption in the static state
KS(j)=Ks-(z(j)-1);
TestK=KS(j)-Ks+(z(j)-1);
US(j)=log(A)+rho*log(KS(j));
VS(j)=beta/(1-beta)*US(j) %static state discounted utility
%Gold standard
xg=(-beta+(beta^2+8*rho*beta*(Ks*q+1))^(1/2))/(4*rho)
Kg=Ks-(xg-1)/q
UG=log(A)+rho*log(Kg) %gold stdt utility
VG=(1/(1-beta))*UG %discounted gold standard utility
%Utility from deviation
Cd=A^(1-gamma)*omega^(-gamma)*((1+9)*1)^gamma
Ud=log(Cd)+rho*log(Kg)
% Discounted utility of deviation and static state
UDS(j)=Ud+VS(j)
end
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plot(theta,UDS, theta, VG)
Conclusions
After twenty-four years and two months of a paper pound, with the consent
of Parliament the Bank of England restored full convertibility from 1 May 1821 
exactly two years before the scheduled date. The opposition towards resumption,
which had always been stronger outside than inside Parliament, faded at the same
rate as trade revived and manufacturers and merchants adjusted to the new peace
time condition, and the resumption went almost unnoticed.15 Between 1820 and
1821 the question of the monetary standard fell into the background and forgery
of the Bank notes was seen as the most acute monetary problem. The Times
expressed hopes that once the one pound notes were recalled and replaced by
the sovereigns, the problem of counterfeiting would disappear.16 Optimists then
assumed that since paper currency was again convertible to gold, and some other
regulations, such as restrictions upon the smelting and export of coin had been
abolished, the nancial stability of the country would have been achieved for good.
It was generally believed the Banks gold reserves would be su¢ cient to secure the
15Acworth (1925) p. 116.
16The Times 2 March 1821.
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stable value of money, and the fact that paper money was still issued by hundreds
of small country banks, did not raise the publics concern.17
The strain of events that followed the resumption in 1821 might lead one to
conclude that convertibility had been overrated during the Suspension Period. The
nancial crises that occurred in 1826, 1836 and 1839 made the public and politi-
cians gradually realise that although the gold standard had the microeconomic
advantage of guaranteeing to a person an opportunity of changing paper money to
gold at a xed price, convertibility could not automatically provide the macroeco-
nomic guarantee of ensuring the country with the optimal quantity of money.18
During the Suspension Period all ranks of society grew accustomed to using
paper money as a medium of exchange. Notes of small face value were a common
method of wage payments and country banks encouraged their usage following the
resumption in order to avoid transferring gold. Although the Bank of England
had not issued small notes since 8 May 1821, many still remained in circulation,
because the public considered the Bank notes to be more secure than the small
notes of the country banks.19 Monetary authorities did not consider the popularity
of small notes to be a solely positive development: poor people were the rst to
bring their small notes to be converted to gold in the event of a panic, which
increased the volatility of money supply. But as the agriculture  the largest
sector of the economy was still in a depressed state, the government and the
17Fetter (1965), p. 111. Feavearyear (1963), p. 227.
18Davies (1994) p. 304.
19Fetter (1965) p. 114.
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Bank adopted expansionary monetary and scal policies. The original intended
resumption date, 1 May 1823, had remained the date at which country banks were
supposed to cease issuing small notes, but in 1822 Parliament passed an act that
prolonged their circulation until 1833.20
Expansionary policies combined with increasing liquidity and falling market
rates of interest resulted in a nancial expansion, which led to export boom and
to extensive and speculative foreign investments. New legislation encouraged
incorporation, the stock market expanded and share prices soared. Country bank
notes, which chiey nanced this expansion,21 were convertible to gold on demand,
yet there was only little gold in the provinces. The Bank remained a passive ob-
server, because its own bullion reserves were large and the exchange rate favourable.
In December 1824 came a sharp change the crises followed a similar pattern
as that in 1797. According to Gayer et al. (1953) between January and June 1825
the Banks bullion reserves fell by 43 percent, from £ 10,100,000 to £ 5,700,000 and
by January 1826 the situation was almost as gloomy as in 1797: the Bank had only
£ 1,900,000 worth of bullion in its vaults. Again, gold went abroad and the country
banks withdrew their deposits from the Bank in order to be prepared for potential
runs. Bankruptcies grew, as the Bank at the initial stage of the crisis refused to
discount, which created a shortage of means of payment.22 The situation was eased
only when the Bank relaxed its discount policy and started itself to issue small
20Feavearyear (1963) p. 234. Fetter (1965) p. 107.
21Feavearyear (1963) p. 234.
22Pressnell (1956), p.491.
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notes to satisfy the publics demand for a liquid medium of exchange.23 According
to Fetter (1965), the crisis was nally stopped, when the public believed that the
Bank would function as a lender of the last resort.24
The crisis of 1825-1826 taught a lesson in that the gold convertibility rule alone
was not su¢ cient condition to guarantee economic stability, and other additional
controls over metallic money as well as paper money supply were needed. Once
again the policy makers in London had to acknowledge that the crisis had not hit
Scotland, where only one bank had failed since 1816. Scottish banks were stronger,
because their ownership was not limited to six partners as it was in England.25
The Act of 1826 allowed the Bank to establish local branches and other joint-stock
banks to be established outside a 65-miles radius of London.
The government and Parliament were now able to carry out economic reforms
more easily than before, because the Bank and its directorsattitude towards credit
control had changed.26 The passing of the Bank Charter Act on 23 August 1833
saw many reforms, which the Bank had been resisting during the bullion debates,
rmly established: the Bank was made more transparent by requiring it to report
its note issue and bullion reserves to the Treasury on a weekly basis, a monthly
summary of which was published in London Gazette; the Bank notes were given an
23The story tells that the Bank brought the crisis to halt when the Bank o¢ cials accidentially
found a box of unused one pound notes, which had not been issued in 1818. Fetter (1965) p. 114
and Feavearyear (1963) p. 237.
24Fetter (1965), p. 114.
25Davies (1994) p. 306.
26Feavearyear (1963) p. 246.
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o¢ cial legal tender status in England and Wales;27 and nally, to help the Bank
to react to internal drains more swiftly, the usury law was removed from limiting
the interest rate of bills of exchange payable at or within three months.28 This
new policy instrument the Bank Rate, became an important means of regulating
reserves and circulation between 1844 and 1914.29
After the resumption of the gold standard the bullionists and anti-bullionists
dispute over principles of money and monetary policy did not completely cease, but
rather re-emerged in debates between two schools: the Currency and the Banking
School. The Currency School followed in the footsteps of the Bullion Committee
and argued that the quantity of paper money should never be higher than re-
serves.30 By contrast to the 1810s when the Bank had supported the governments
anti-bullionism, two of Bank of Englands directors were amongst the main advo-
cates of the Currency School and its strict principle.31 The Banking School did
not accept the old real-bills doctrine, but opposed any mechanical rules to con-
trol issue. Its members argued that the requirement to convert currency to gold
would itself restrict issue. The Bank Charter Act of 1844, around which the de-
bate evolved, became one of the pillars of the British monetary system. It divided
the Bank into two departments: the Issue Department to regulate the currency
and the Banking Department to follow sound commercial banking principles. The
27Davies (1994) p. 310.
28Feavearyear (1963) p. 251.
29Hawtrey (1962) p.1.
30Feavearyear (1963), p. 262-263.
31Davies (1994) p.311.
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Issue Departments discretionary issue could only be £ 14,000,000, the rest had to
be fully backed by bullion. The Act made the duciary issue of Bank notes of
a xed quantity and was designed to make the long-run maintenance of the gold
standard more credible.
The epilogue of the Suspension Period was a success story once it was realised
that convertibility alone could not guarantee nancial stability. The combined
use of the Bank Rate, open market operations and increasing the limit of duciary
issue during the banking panics of 1847, 1857 and 1866 became the instruments the
Bank used to secure its gold reserves.32 Other countries were so impressed by the
British example that gradually they switched from a silver or bimetallic standard
to the gold standard. Although the sterling-centred International Classical Gold
Standard in its purest form lasted for 34 years between 1880 and 1914, in Britain
the gold standard helped to secure real, non-inationary growth from 1844 until
1914. The new century, however, brought challenges which did not have parallels
in the past. In 1914 history repeated itself, when the First World War resulted in
the gold convertibility rule to be suspended.
32In 1860 a French economist Juglar, recognised that the gold standard created periodical com-
mercial crises, which were recurrent, international and nancial in nature. He identied three
phases: during the rst period credit was easy and the central bank accommodated liberally. As
a result, bullion reserves reduced to the point where the central bank became cautious in extend-
ing credit. But such an action created the second phase: the crises. Increased alarm caused more
borrowers to seek support from the central bank and more to be turned down. The third phase
began with liquiditation and businesses went bankrupt. As the economy languished and velocity
of money declined, the central bank began rebuilding its bullion reserve. The cycle could then
start again. Flandreau (2007) and Vilar (1976).
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  
Although the resumption of the gold standard might not have been able to solve
all monetary problems immediately, the suspension of cash payments had, never-
theless, been a successful monetary policy regime during the French Wars. Unlike
many other nancial experiments, it did not lead to a collapse of the economy,
but to the restoration of monetary stability. In this thesis I used the Suspension
Period as an example of an era when monetary policy was conducted in a credible
and time consistent manner even during di¢ cult times. It was a watershed in the
development of economic policy and o¤ers a concrete example in which the rather
abstract theory of sustainable plans can be developed and illustrated.
Through employing both modern macroeconomic theory and historical evidence
in this thesis I analysed the extent to which the suspension of the gold convertibility
rule changed the basis of trust in the monetary system when paper money was no
longer convertible into gold, but only represented a promise of future convertibility
at some uncertain date, and when monetary authorities could have increased the
paper money supply without limit. According to Bordo and Kydland (1995) and
Bordo and Schwartz (1997) this change was not critical, because the gold standard
functioned as a contingent rule: the suspension of cash payments was exogenously
credible, because during the suspension agents knew for certain that the gold
standard would be resumed. My thesis has acknowledged that the gold standard
had indeed a contingent nature given that there have been fourteen successful
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suspensions and resumptions of the convertibility rule in twenty-one countries 
but it attempted to provide alternative explanations for two key issues to which
the gold standard as a contingent rule could not, in my opinion, satisfactorily
answer. These issues, which form the main contribution of this work, were the
credibility of monetary system in the absence of the gold backing, and the reason
why the gold standard was resumed. The contradiction can be explained by the
fundamental di¤erences between my approach and that of Bordo and Kydland
(1995) and Bordo and Schwartz (1997) towards the Suspension Period. Because
the gold standard as a contingent rule theory has become a widely accepted in
literature, my re-evaluation of this period is another original contribution. The
re-evaluation brought up three new methodological questions that are addressed
below: what is the most natural framework to analyse the Suspension Period, what
were the policy objectives and rules during the gold standard and the suspension,
and what was the justication to continue the suspension of cash payments for
twenty-four years.
Firstly, Bordo and Kydland (1995) and Bordo and Schwartz (1997) use clas-
sical theory to study the suspension, but by contrast, in this thesis I analyse the
Suspension Period of 1797-1821 from the perspective of the eighteenth-century
gold standard, Pre-classical Gold Standard. In Chapter 1, I demonstrated how the
classical analysis of the gold standard, such as the commodity theory of money,
stressed the automaticity and impersonality of the gold standard rule and without
modication was not a desirable framework to study reputation, expectations and
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other credibility issues. In Chapter 2, I established that the gold convertibility
became an important monetary policy target already in the eighteenth century.
Although Britain had been on a commodity money standard since medieval times,
the gold reserve policy had important benets: it increased credibility of the mon-
etary and scal institutions during the Financial Revolution, facilitated nancial
intermediation and reduced the dead-weight loss of gold reserves. As the legisla-
tion developed from practice in the eighteenth century, many inconsistencies, such
as usury laws, prevented the Bank from conducting monetary policy e¢ ciently. In
order to maintain convertibility, during crises the Bank had to rely on unconven-
tional methods, such as paying the gold out in small pieces. This method, however
unconventional, stabilised consumption and the price level su¢ ciently well until
the end of the 1790s, when the shocks of di¤erent origin became large and persis-
tent, and the stabilisation method broke down. The gold standard thus functioned
as a contingent rule during the eighteenth century, but in di¤erent manner than
argued by Bordo and Kydland (1995) and Bordo and Schwartz (1997).
My two remaining arguments which di¤er from those of Bordo and Kydland
(1995) and Bordo and Schwartz (1997) are closely interrelated. In this thesis, in-
stead of considering the gold standard and the suspension to be essentially the same
systems, I have analysed the gold standard and the suspension as two independent
monetary policy regimes, because the Bank of Englands operating procedures,
monetary policy rules and targets under these two regimes were not the same.
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The exchange rate between the main trade partners was xed under the gold stan-
dard, but oating under the suspension. The gold standard enforced credibility,
the suspension exibility as it enabled the Bank to use discretion. Under the gold
standard the value of money was dened by direct convertibility to some xed
amount of gold, under the suspension money carried a promise of future convert-
ibility. As was shown in Chapter 4, in theory under the gold standard the money
stock could increase only if monetary gold increased. But when the publics de-
mand for gold increased in the 1790s, the gold standard, which had stabilised the
economy earlier in the century, became a shock amplier.
The rumours of French invasion made the situation so critical that on 28 Feb-
ruary 1797 the Bank of England had to cease converting its deposit notes to gold
specie. The suspension of cash payments was initially an emergency measure to
prevent a complete drain of the Banks reserves and to maintain its notes in circu-
lation. The constraint on money supply would have driven many merchants and
bankers to the edge of insolvency, because long before the 1790s the importance of
specie in domestic trade had reduced, and the merchantspayment system, espe-
cially in the City of London, was based on the Bank notes. As after the suspension
the public did not have a motive to hold the Bank notes for gold conversion, the
pressure eased and the Banks reserves improved within a few months. A new war,
however, put an end to the discussion of early resumption.
According to the gold standard as a contingent rule theory, the gold payments
were not resumed after the initial emergency had passed, because in the absence
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of the gold standard the government was able to maximise its seigniorage revenue.
It is di¢ cult to see, though, why the private borrowers so willingly bought gov-
ernment debt, if the governments aim was maximising its seigniorage revenue:
this would have created ination, which would have decreased the realised return
on the government paper. In this thesis, by contrast, I argued that although the
suspension was initially an emergency measure, it increased a degree of exibility
in the economy and gave the monetary authorities an opportunity to stabilise the
economy. Within the limits of its stabilisation policy, the Bank was able to provide
the government with short-term debt nance in emergencies, but this was not ever
a main source of war nance and the Napoleonic Wars were nanced through pub-
lic borrowing and taxation. Furthermore, the Bank was able to issue small notes,
increase its discounts to the London merchants and buy the short-term paper of
the government. As the economy had rigidities, increased issue had indirect e¤ects:
it stimulated production and increased employment by reducing real wages.
The success of the Banks stabilisation policy was, however, dependent on the
credibility of resumption and for example, debt was thus sold in terms of nominal
value of its currency on the understanding that the debt would be eventually be
paid o¤ by gold. The model developed in Chapter 4 demonstrated how during
the war years the Bank had an opportunity to issue at money, as long as it
understood that once the war had nished, at money would be withdrawn from
circulation. According to Feavearyear (1963) during the suspension the Bank was
torn between its desire to help merchants and its promise to Parliament to resume
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payment as soon as possible,33 while simultaneously facing the erce criticism of
the bullionists. After the war, when the economy was adjusting to new peace time
conditions, the Bank was blamed for not discounting enough. The Bank pursued
active and credible monetary policy during the suspension period and there was
nothing magic in the gold standard which could explain the credibility of the
suspension.
But ultimately, analysing the Suspension Period of 1797-1821 through the the-
ory of credible and time consistent policy, this thesis has shown that suspension
was credible, because the resumption of the gold standard rule at the old par value
at some future unknown date was a sustainable plan. As was demonstrated in
Chapter 5, the monetary authorities had an opportunity to innite nominal ex-
pansion or avoiding the costly adjustment process altogether, which might have
served to maximise utility in the very short-run. But the outcome of this deviation
might have been a hyperination as in France between 1794 and 1795, a collapse
of trust towards the monetary institutions and demonetisation, which could have
brought the whole Industrial Revolution to an halt. Sustainability was crucial both
during and after war: it maintained paper currency in circulation and enabled the
Bank of England to conduct independent and credible stabilisation policy. The
gold standard was resumed because it was seen to maximise long-term benets of
the society: it facilitated public borrowing and maintained economic conditions
stable during the time of peace. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 3, the mint
33Feavearyear (1963) p. 246.
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price of gold was an important nominal anchor which made the monetary policy
of the Bank transparent. Debate over the resumption of the gold standard at the
original parity became so heated in the 1810s that it had almost religious qualities.
Lowering the standard was such an evil suggestion for bullionists that according to
one contemporary observer, it could have been suggested by nobody but the Devil
himself in person, it will not, it cannot, it must not, be adopted nor attempted.34
As the stabilisation policy was relatively successful during the war, one might
ask whether the Bank would have been able to issue the right amount of currency
to deliver price stability with a permanent paper pound regime? The answer of
Ricardo and other bullionists was strictly negative, as the Bank in their opin-
ion would not be able to resist its temptation to increase its private prots by
increasing issue. Mathias and Thomas Atwood, who had played with the idea
of inconvertible paper money, put an emphasis on exibility and independence,
and believed that the Directors of the Bank could use their discretion wisely to
serve the needs of trade. According to Bordo and Kydland (1995) and Bordo and
Schwartz (1997) the price stability during the suspension was dependent on the
gold standard functioning as a contingent rule, so a permanent paper pound regime
would have been impossible. Flandreau (2007) demonstrates rather convincingly
how the management of currency by a private institution such as the Bank of
England, might not necessarily have been inationary, because the private central
bank should aim to minimise the opportunity cost of holding money and in the
34Cobbett, Political Register, 12 May 1821, p. 417, as quoted in Fetter (1965) p. 103.
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long-run, ination would have eroded the prots of the share owners of the private
central bank. My conclusion, based on the theory of sustainable plans, is that the
permanent paper pound regime would have been a deviation from the monetary
policy plan. Credible stabilisation policy was only possible during war time emer-
gency and the original plan required that the monetary rule will be resumed after
the period of adjustment.
For politicians and academics alike puzzled by stagnation and the ination
that followed the Keynesian Revolution the gold standard rule in its simplicity
has sometimes seemed appealing. Surprisingly many economists who have recently
written about the gold standard, have concluded by recommending whether or not
the gold standard should be adopted again.35 This study does not make such a
recommendation. Instead, I argue that the Suspension Period of 1797-1821, when
the rst modern monetary policy rule was designed, raises other, deeper, issues
that are worth considering. In particular, it seems that the most desirable way
to conduct monetary policy is to stick with narrow rules unconditionally during
normal times. This helps to build the monetary authoritys reputation and has an
inuence upon private agentsexpectations. In the face of a serious, nationwide
crisis, there can be a well understood deviation from the original rule. During
the crisis the exibility in conduct of monetary policy increases, but nevertheless,
policy must be conducted in such a manner that resumption of the original rule
35See for example Barro (1979), Bordo (1981), Schnadt and Whittaker (1993) and Reisman
(2000).
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remains feasible. After the crisis has passed there may be an adjustment period
which aims to resume the original standard. The real-life problem, however, is that
the authorities do not tend to recognise that there are two sides in stabilisation
which have an equal importance: stimulation as well as contraction. Ignoring
monetary rules can have fatal results, as is shown by the Radcli¤e report of 1959.
It underestimated the importance of rules the old fashioned convertibility rule in
particular and famously precipitated the period of the record peace time ination
in British monetary history.
In recent years societies around the world have tried to solve the monetary
authoritys time inconsistency problem of monetary policy by central bank inde-
pendence and the ination target rule two hundred years earlier the gold standard
emerged as the best available solution to the same dilemma. The Suspension Pe-
riod of 1797-1821 deserves special attention, because it is one of those rare examples
in monetary history when experiments with at money did not lead to rampant
ination or to economic collapse, but to a sustainable monetary policy.
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